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Mallory
Malware

Perl/Calfbot

Tracked since Jan 24, 2026 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK11Techniques
IOCs32Tracked
Type
Botnet
Capabilities
Exfiltration
Platforms
LinuxmacOSWindows

Perl/Calfbot is a Perl-based spam-sending malware component associated with Operation Windigo, a large profit-driven intrusion ecosystem centered on compromised Linux and Unix servers. Within that operation, Perl/Calfbot was used to distribute unsolicited bulk email at very large scale, with observed infrastructure supporting tens of millions of spam messages per day. It operated as one element of a broader toolset that also included Linux/Ebury, an OpenSSH backdoor and credential stealer; Linux/Cdorked, a web traffic redirection component; and Linux/Onimiki, a malicious DNS component.

Perl/Calfbot receives spam-sending jobs from command-and-control infrastructure, processes those jobs, and reports delivery statistics including successful and failed message attempts. Analysis of the wider operation linked Perl/Calfbot to shared infrastructure and overlapping compromised hosts used by other Windigo components. Spam delivered through the ecosystem was monetized alongside web redirection and drive-by malware delivery.

The malware was notable for cross-platform portability inherent to Perl deployments. It was observed affecting Linux and other Unix-like environments, and reporting also noted operation on FreeBSD, OpenBSD, macOS, and Windows when Perl was available through Cygwin. In the Windigo campaign, compromised servers hosting Perl/Calfbot were part of a long-running criminal infrastructure that relied primarily on stolen credentials rather than exploitation of novel server vulnerabilities. Perl/Calfbot is best understood as the spam bot element of that larger server-side malware operation.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

11 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence1

One of the main items through which the operators of Windigo are monetizing infections is by sending spam email messages.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

The purpose of the operation seems to be monetary profit. This profit is gathered through various ways including redirecting web users to malicious content and sending unsolicited emails.

Execution

2 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

Perl/Calfbot – a Perl script used to send spam

T1059.004Unix ShellEvidence1

One can use the following command to determine if the server he is on is compromised: ssh -G 2>&1 | grep -e illegal -e unknown > /dev/null && echo "System clean" || echo "System infected"

Stealth

2 techniques
T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

Abused legitimate processes include: /bin/hostname, /bin/sync, /sbin/auditd, /sbin/rsyslogd, /sbin/udevd...

T1564Hide ArtifactsEvidence1

No configuration files are kept on disk

Command and Control

5 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence2

The following domains are used to exfiltrate HTTP POST requests over HTTP or HTTPS.

T1071.004DNSEvidence2

Linux/Onimiki is a DNS server backdoor. These rules will alert on either inbound or outbound DNS requests with the specific Linux/Cdorked URL pattern... Since Perl/Calfbot uses HTTPS... these rules will match specific DNS requests.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

First, the complete source code of the targeted web server is downloaded, along with a malicious “diff patch” coming from a server under the attacker’s control.

T1568Dynamic ResolutionEvidence1

First domain of the sixth iteration of the DGA... First domain of the fifth iteration of the DGA... Below is the list of domains generated by the DGA for each seed by DGA generation.

T1568.002Domain Generation AlgorithmsEvidence2

First domain of the sixth iteration of the DGA... First domain of the fifth iteration of the DGA... First domain of the fourth iteration of the DGA.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

32 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Mallory platform

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IOC matching32Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping11Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.