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Malware1 associated actor

7-Zip

Tracked since Jan 25, 2026 · Updated 7 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK22Techniques
IOCs0Tracked

7-Zip is a legitimate archive utility that threat actors have used during post-compromise collection and exfiltration. In the provided reporting, it was observed in UNC2447 intrusions as part of recon and exfiltration activity, and in a China-linked UAT-8837 campaign exploiting Sitecore CVE-2025-53690, where attackers compressed sensitive files prior to exfiltration. Specifically, the content states that files such as web.config and Windows registry hives were compressed with 7-Zip before being transferred to attacker-controlled infrastructure. The activity is mapped to MITRE ATT&CK T1560.001 (Archive via Utility). The content does not describe 7-Zip itself as malware, but as a dual-use utility leveraged by threat actors including UNC2447 and UAT-8837.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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UNC2447

...UNC2447 has been observed using the following tools: ... 7ZIP.

via mandiant threat intelligencecloud.google.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

22 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1588.002ToolEvidence2

Leveraged publicly available tools like WinSCP, 7-Zip, Everything.exe, and MEGACmd.

Stealth

7 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence2

"The MSI file has 4 embedded objects within it" including "an encrypted archive"; "The script.bat contains commands to extract the infected file from the archive and execute it"; "The archive.bat just creates the encrypted archive."

T1027.009Embedded PayloadsEvidence1

Extracts HIVE ransomware payload(s) from an encrypted archive (int.7z) using 7-Zip's console executable (7zr.exe)

T1027.015CompressionEvidence2

“7-zip… compress data to evade detection [T1027.015].”

T1036.008Masquerade File TypeEvidence1

The legitimate 7-Zip executable is delivered as 7za.png before being renamed to 7za.exe.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1

T1070.004. Indicator Removal on Host: File Deletion Deletes some of its files used during operations as part of cleanup, including removing applications such as 7z.exe, tor.exe, ssh.exe

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence4

7-Zip extracts the encrypted Windows_Repair.zip using the embedded password Lopata.

T1218.007MsiexecEvidence1

"We are using MSI abuse for this evasion technique" ... "Firstly, the user will execute the MSI file" ... "a custom action is defined to run the bat script immediately after the installation."

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

7-zip ... Compresses data to avoid detection before exfiltration.

Credential Access

1 technique
T1003.003NTDSEvidence1

By doing so, they were able to copy the NTDS.dit file and compress it using 7-zip. Additionally, the threat actor was able to exfiltrate the SYSTEM hive, providing them with the decryption key for the password hashes.

Collection

5 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

MAZE Group 1 mapping includes “T1005: Data from Local System,” and narrative describes collecting directory listings and archiving data prior to exfiltration.

T1039Data from Network Shared DriveEvidence1

MAZE Group 2/3 mappings include “T1039: Data from Network Shared Drive,” and narrative describes archiving data from corporate file shares.

T1074Data StagedEvidence3

Data Discovery and Staging → with AV blinded and lateral movement achieved, attackers enumerate datastores, databases, and file servers. Common techniques include native tools (Robocopy, PowerShell, xcopy), compressing to encrypted 7-Zip or WinRAR archives on staging hosts... The SFTP server compromise likely served as a staging or exfiltration relay here.

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence38

Affiliates stage and archive data on compromised hosts with tools like 7-Zip or WinRAR

T1560.001Archive via UtilityEvidence37

References https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1560.001/T1560.001.md

Command and Control

1 technique
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence9

curl retrieves Windows_Repair.zip, the disguised 7za.png, and other resources from attacker-controlled infrastructure.

Exfiltration

5 techniques
T1020Automated ExfiltrationEvidence1

Victims who refuse to pay face not only locked systems but also the exposure of sensitive corporate records on INC’s data leak site.

T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

Using 7-Zip to compress stolen data into ZIP files for exfiltration.

T1048Exfiltration Over Alternative ProtocolEvidence1

The FBI observed several common open source tools on Gunra infrastructure that Gunra actors use to facilitate collection and exfiltration of data, including 7-Zip, RClone, and FileZilla [T1048]

T1567Exfiltration Over Web ServiceEvidence1

INC ransomware actors compress and password-protect the staged data with 7-Zip, then upload the archives to attacker-controlled cloud storage using rclone.

T1567.002Exfiltration to Cloud StorageEvidence3

It copies data from servers/shared directories to the local directory and compresses with dropped 7zip binary. It also drops and installs MegaSync to exfiltrate data.

Impact

1 technique
T1496Resource HijackingEvidence1

BISMUTH downloaded 7-Zip and a ZIP archive, extracted a Monero coin miner, and registered the miner as a service named after a common virtual-machine process.

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Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping22Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.