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Malware1 associated actor

Arkei

Tracked since Jan 25, 2026 · Updated today
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days1 mention · peak 1 in a dayToday
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK11Techniques
IOCs5Tracked
Type
Infostealer
Capabilities
Credential theft
Delivery
USB
Platforms
Windows

Arkei Stealer is a Windows information-stealing malware family documented since at least 2018. It targets saved passwords and other sensitive browser data, including credentials stored by Chromium-based browsers. Its credential-theft functionality includes decrypting locally stored browser data, and it uses legitimate browser-support libraries to access protected information.

Arkei has been distributed as a secondary payload by the Retadup worm, which spreads through infected removable drives. In this delivery chain, Retadup provides propagation and payload installation; those behaviors do not establish that Arkei itself is self-propagating.

Arkei is also an important source-code ancestor of later information stealers. Its source code was sold on underground forums and formed the basis of early Vidar versions. Vidar subsequently developed into a distinct malware family with differences in implementation and command-and-control communications, so its later capabilities and distribution campaigns should not be attributed automatically to Arkei.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Stealth Mango

rule win_arkei_stealer_auto { ... description = "Detects win.arkei_stealer." ... malpedia_reference = "https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.arkei_stealer" ... } ... rule win_arkei_stealer_w0 { ... description = "Arkei Stealer" ... $s1 = "Arkei" ... $s2 = "/server/gate" ... $s3 = "/server/grubConfig" ... $s4 = "\\files\\" ... $s5 = "SQLite" ... }

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

11 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

1 technique
T1129Shared ModulesEvidence1

The network activity from the report indicates the sample downloaded mozglue.dll, sqlite3.dll, nss3.dll, freebl3.dll, and a couple others. These DLLs are commonly downloaded and loaded into memory by stealers...

Stealth

1 technique
T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

Their endpoint telemetry and dynamic analysis revealed a chain of processes showing script masquerading, staged payload extraction, and command-and-control communication.

Credential Access

3 techniques
T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence1

These DLLs are commonly downloaded and loaded into memory by stealers as they provide functionality to decrypt sensitive data within Mozilla Firefox and Chromium-based web browsers.

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence3

These DLLs are commonly downloaded and loaded into memory by stealers as they provide functionality to decrypt sensitive data within Mozilla Firefox and Chromium-based web browsers.

T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence1

Collect data from browsers: Passwords Autofill data Payment cards Cookies

Discovery

1 technique
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

Stealers commonly capture system configuration data within a text file... let’s start with system.txt.

Collection

2 techniques
T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

After unpacking the ZIP we can find just a few files... screenshot.jpg

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

Once we do that, we can see it looks like the malware uploaded a ZIP archive named USR1V37900ZM7Q.zip.

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

Again that’s it! The data is ready to be forwarded to the cybercriminals.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence3

The network activity from the report indicates the sample downloaded mozglue.dll, sqlite3.dll, nss3.dll, freebl3.dll, and a couple others.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1048.003Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 ProtocolEvidence1

Since this file is uploaded over HTTP, it stands to reason that we can carve it out of the network traffic and inspect the contents.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

5 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching5Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping11Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.