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Mallory
Malware1 associated actor

PureStealer

Tracked since Jan 25, 2026 · Updated 10 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK11Techniques
IOCs3Tracked
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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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UNC5812

The final payload is PURESTEALER ... a heavily obfuscated commodity infostealer written in .NET that is designed to steal browser data, such as passwords and cookies, cryptocurrency wallets, and from various other applications such as messaging and email clients.

via mandiant threat intelligencecloud.google.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

11 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1583.001DomainsEvidence1

UNC5812’s malware delivery operations are conducted both via an actor-controlled Telegram channel @civildefense_com_ua and website hosted at civildefense[.]com.ua.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence1

The ultimate aim of the campaign is to have victims navigate to the UNC5812-controlled "Civil Defense" website, which advertises several different software programs for different operating systems. When installed, these programs result in the download of various commodity malware families.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

The ultimate aim of the campaign is to have victims navigate to the UNC5812-controlled "Civil Defense" website, which advertises several different software programs for different operating systems.

T1566.003Spearphishing via ServiceEvidence2

UNC5812’s malware delivery operations are conducted both via an actor-controlled Telegram channel @civildefense_com_ua and website hosted at civildefense[.]com.ua. To drive potential victims towards these actor-controlled resources, we assess that UNC5812 is likely purchasing promoted posts in legitimate, established Ukrainian-language Telegram channels.

Execution

1 technique
T1204User ExecutionEvidence2

If installed with Google Play Protect disabled, these programs deliver an operating system-specific commodity malware variant to the victim alongside a decoy mapping application we track as SUNSPINNER.

Stealth

2 techniques
T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

"Civil Defense" claims to be a provider of free software programs designed to enable potential conscripts to view and share crowdsourced locations of Ukrainian military recruiters.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

Pronsis Loader initiates a convoluted malware delivery chain, ultimately delivering SUNSPINNER and a commodity information stealer commonly known as PURESTEALER.

Credential Access

2 techniques
T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence1

The final payload is PURESTEALER ... designed to steal browser data, such as passwords and cookies...

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence2

The final payload is PURESTEALER ... designed to steal browser data, such as passwords and cookies, cryptocurrency wallets, and from various other applications such as messaging and email clients.

Collection

1 technique
T1213Data from Information RepositoriesEvidence1

PURESTEALER ... is designed to steal browser data, such as passwords and cookies, cryptocurrency wallets, and from various other applications such as messaging and email clients.

Command and Control

1 technique
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

Pronsis Loader is used to retrieve both the decoy SUNSPINNER binary and a second-stage downloader "civildefensestarter.exe" ... initiating a multi-stage delivery chain ... which ultimately executes PURESTEALER on the victim device.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

3 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

3 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching3Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping11Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.