RUDEBIRD
Associated threat actors
2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
Elastic Security Labs identified a lightweight Windows backdoor that communicates over HTTPS and contains capabilities to perform reconnaissance and execute code. We refer to this malware family as RUDEBIRD.
Elastic Security Labs identified a lightweight Windows backdoor that communicates over HTTPS and contains capabilities to perform reconnaissance and execute code. We refer to this malware family as RUDEBIRD.
Techniques & procedures
17 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
1 technique
Initial Access
The process was executed with the parent process ( w3wp.exe ) coming from a Microsoft Exchange application pool. This is consistent with the exploitation of an unpatched Exchange vulnerability, and prior research supports that hypothesis.
Execution
3 techniques
Execution
RUDEBIRD operates as a backdoor with the capability to launch new processes; the ATT&CK mapping explicitly lists Command and Scripting Interpreter for RUDEBIRD.
"C:\windows\help\exec.exe" /accepteula \\{victim-1} -d -s C:\windows\debug\RVTDM.EXE
MDR launched the hunt after the discovery of a DLL sideloading technique that exploited VMNat.exe, a VMware component... The Crimson Palace campaign included over 15 distinct DLL sideloading scenarios... Cluster Alpha activity included multiple sideloading attempts to deploy various malware... Cluster Bravo used renamed versions of a signed side-loadable binary (mscorsvw.exe) to obfuscate backdoor deployment.
Privilege Escalation
1 technique
Privilege Escalation
Elastic Defend registered a process injection alert shortly after RUDEBIRD execution. EAGERBEE modifies memory protections with VirtualProtect and executes downloaded payloads in the same process.
Stealth
6 techniques
Stealth
EAGERBEE dynamically constructs its Import Address Table (IAT) during runtime; RUDEBIRD resolves imports dynamically by walking the TEB/PEB and loaded modules.
The attacker created two DLLs (swprvs.dll and appmgmt.dll)... An ‘s’ was added to the filename of the legitimate swprv.dll and the ‘s’ was removed from the legitimate appmgmts.dll.
Elastic Defend registered a process injection alert shortly after RUDEBIRD execution. EAGERBEE modifies memory protections with VirtualProtect and executes downloaded payloads in the same process.
the HUI loader (msedge_elf.dll), which de-obfuscated the file log.ini to reveal a Cobalt Strike reflective Loader
the actor frequently abused endpoint protection software binaries to sideload their malicious payloads.
MDR launched the hunt after the discovery of a DLL sideloading technique that exploited VMNat.exe, a VMware component... The Crimson Palace campaign included over 15 distinct DLL sideloading scenarios... Cluster Alpha activity included multiple sideloading attempts to deploy various malware... Cluster Bravo used renamed versions of a signed side-loadable binary (mscorsvw.exe) to obfuscate backdoor deployment.
Discovery
2 techniques
Discovery
EAGERBEE gathers the computer name, Windows version, GUID, processor architecture, and Windows product/build details. RUDEBIRD enumerates hostname, username, IP address, architecture, and current-user privilege.
RUDEBIRD can perform file/directory enumeration; DOWNTOWN includes file/folder enumeration functionality.
Lateral Movement
2 techniques
Lateral Movement
RUDEBIRD used PsExec ( exec.exe ) to execute itself from the SYSTEM account and then move laterally from victim 0 to another targeted host. "C:\windows\help\exec.exe" /accepteula \\{victim-1} -d -s C:\windows\debug\RVTDM.EXE
RUDEBIRD used PsExec (exec.exe) to execute itself from the SYSTEM account and then move laterally from victim 0 to another targeted host.
Collection
1 technique
Collection
The Mongolia infection chain collected sensitive data and files from the machine; RUDEBIRD can read file content and retrieve the victim desktop path and disk-volume information.
Command and Control
3 techniques
Command and Control
the overall goal behind the campaign was to maintain access to the target network for cyberespionage... deploying various malware implants for command-and control (C2) communications... Use of multiple persistent C2 channels including Merlin Agent, PhantomNet backdoor, RUDEBIRD malware, EAGERBEE malware, and PowHeartBeat backdoor... Deployment of several samples of... PocoProxy for persistent C2 communications.
RUDEBIRD communicates using HTTPS. EAGERBEE can initialize a proxy by sending a CONNECT request.
The optional 's' in EAGERBEE C2 configuration instructs the malware to open SSL; RUDEBIRD communicates using HTTPS.
Observables
10 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
5 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.