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Malware2 associated actors

RUDEBIRD

Tracked since Jan 25, 2026 · Updated 10 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK17Techniques
IOCs10Tracked
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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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REF5961

Elastic Security Labs identified a lightweight Windows backdoor that communicates over HTTPS and contains capabilities to perform reconnaissance and execute code. We refer to this malware family as RUDEBIRD.

via elastic security labselastic.co
REF2924

Elastic Security Labs identified a lightweight Windows backdoor that communicates over HTTPS and contains capabilities to perform reconnaissance and execute code. We refer to this malware family as RUDEBIRD.

via elastic security labselastic.co
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

17 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence1

The process was executed with the parent process ( w3wp.exe ) coming from a Microsoft Exchange application pool. This is consistent with the exploitation of an unpatched Exchange vulnerability, and prior research supports that hypothesis.

Execution

3 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence2

RUDEBIRD operates as a backdoor with the capability to launch new processes; the ATT&CK mapping explicitly lists Command and Scripting Interpreter for RUDEBIRD.

T1569.002Service ExecutionEvidence1

"C:\windows\help\exec.exe" /accepteula \\{victim-1} -d -s C:\windows\debug\RVTDM.EXE

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

MDR launched the hunt after the discovery of a DLL sideloading technique that exploited VMNat.exe, a VMware component... The Crimson Palace campaign included over 15 distinct DLL sideloading scenarios... Cluster Alpha activity included multiple sideloading attempts to deploy various malware... Cluster Bravo used renamed versions of a signed side-loadable binary (mscorsvw.exe) to obfuscate backdoor deployment.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1055Process InjectionEvidence2

Elastic Defend registered a process injection alert shortly after RUDEBIRD execution. EAGERBEE modifies memory protections with VirtualProtect and executes downloaded payloads in the same process.

Stealth

6 techniques
T1027.007Dynamic API ResolutionEvidence1

EAGERBEE dynamically constructs its Import Address Table (IAT) during runtime; RUDEBIRD resolves imports dynamically by walking the TEB/PEB and loaded modules.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

The attacker created two DLLs (swprvs.dll and appmgmt.dll)... An ‘s’ was added to the filename of the legitimate swprv.dll and the ‘s’ was removed from the legitimate appmgmts.dll.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence2

Elastic Defend registered a process injection alert shortly after RUDEBIRD execution. EAGERBEE modifies memory protections with VirtualProtect and executes downloaded payloads in the same process.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

the HUI loader (msedge_elf.dll), which de-obfuscated the file log.ini to reveal a Cobalt Strike reflective Loader

T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence1

the actor frequently abused endpoint protection software binaries to sideload their malicious payloads.

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

MDR launched the hunt after the discovery of a DLL sideloading technique that exploited VMNat.exe, a VMware component... The Crimson Palace campaign included over 15 distinct DLL sideloading scenarios... Cluster Alpha activity included multiple sideloading attempts to deploy various malware... Cluster Bravo used renamed versions of a signed side-loadable binary (mscorsvw.exe) to obfuscate backdoor deployment.

Discovery

2 techniques
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence2

EAGERBEE gathers the computer name, Windows version, GUID, processor architecture, and Windows product/build details. RUDEBIRD enumerates hostname, username, IP address, architecture, and current-user privilege.

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence2

RUDEBIRD can perform file/directory enumeration; DOWNTOWN includes file/folder enumeration functionality.

Lateral Movement

2 techniques
T1021.002SMB/Windows Admin SharesEvidence1

RUDEBIRD used PsExec ( exec.exe ) to execute itself from the SYSTEM account and then move laterally from victim 0 to another targeted host. "C:\windows\help\exec.exe" /accepteula \\{victim-1} -d -s C:\windows\debug\RVTDM.EXE

T1570Lateral Tool TransferEvidence2

RUDEBIRD used PsExec (exec.exe) to execute itself from the SYSTEM account and then move laterally from victim 0 to another targeted host.

Collection

1 technique
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

The Mongolia infection chain collected sensitive data and files from the machine; RUDEBIRD can read file content and retrieve the victim desktop path and disk-volume information.

Command and Control

3 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

the overall goal behind the campaign was to maintain access to the target network for cyberespionage... deploying various malware implants for command-and control (C2) communications... Use of multiple persistent C2 channels including Merlin Agent, PhantomNet backdoor, RUDEBIRD malware, EAGERBEE malware, and PowHeartBeat backdoor... Deployment of several samples of... PocoProxy for persistent C2 communications.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

RUDEBIRD communicates using HTTPS. EAGERBEE can initialize a proxy by sending a CONNECT request.

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence1

The optional 's' in EAGERBEE C2 configuration instructs the malware to open SSL; RUDEBIRD communicates using HTTPS.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

10 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

5 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching10Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping17Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.