IDATLOADER
Associated vulnerabilities
1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
Techniques & procedures
15 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
1 technique
Initial Access
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping ... Initial Access Phishing T1566 ClickFix/FakeCAPTCHA social engineering
Execution
4 techniques
Execution
The shortcut subsequently executes the VBScript through cscript, launches the downloaded PowerShell file with a hidden window and deletes both temporary files.
This incident involved a victim accessing a Bollywood pirate movie download site. When attempting to download a video, the victim was directed to a page hosted on Bunny CDN that provided a bit[.]ly link that ultimately download a ZIP file.
So, instead of traditional DLL sideloading, this is a case of BPL sideloading. At time of writing there is no MITRE sub-technique for BPL sideloading...
Initially this appeared to be straightforward DLL sideloading a malicious Register.dll file. However on closer inspection this was not the case.
Persistence
1 technique
Persistence
The nested ZIP file contained a 192 MB LNK file along with a decoy “trailer” video file. The LNK file triggered the first element of the novel technique used in this infection chain for distributing IDATLOADER.
Privilege Escalation
2 techniques
Privilege Escalation
The attack chain utilizes DLL sideloading and IDATLoader to inject the final payload into explorer.exe.
The nested ZIP file contained a 192 MB LNK file along with a decoy “trailer” video file. The LNK file triggered the first element of the novel technique used in this infection chain for distributing IDATLOADER.
Stealth
9 techniques
Stealth
The above PowerShell script decrypts the AES-encrypted blocks to load another PowerShell script.
IDATLOADER will inject shellcode into pla.dll that will then extract a PNG resource from the Delphi file... From this PNG, the payload is extracted, a stealer.
The larger physicsdesc.map file is approximately 1.36 MB... The file is not a valid image, but enough of the internal PNG chunk structure is retained for the shellcode to parse it.
The infection hinged around utilizing Microsoft’s mshta.exe to execute code buried deep within a specially crafted file masquerading as a PGP Secret Key.
The attack chain utilizes DLL sideloading and IDATLoader to inject the final payload into explorer.exe.
The following data is decoded by adding the key to each 32-bit value... The XOR output is then decompressed using: RtlDecompressBuffer
The LNK file was using mshta.exe to execute what appeared to be a “PGP Secret Key,” hosted again hosted on Bunny CDN.
So, instead of traditional DLL sideloading, this is a case of BPL sideloading. At time of writing there is no MITRE sub-technique for BPL sideloading...
Initially this appeared to be straightforward DLL sideloading a malicious Register.dll file. However on closer inspection this was not the case.
Collection
1 technique
Collection
The script uses an unzip function with interesting functionality: it will unzip the archive in %AppData% and try to use the ZIP file content as a command to execute.
Command and Control
1 technique
Command and Control
Once fully deobfuscated, the code can be seen to download two separate ZIP archives.
Observables
42 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
5 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.