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Mallory
Malware1 associated CVE

IDATLOADER

Tracked since Jan 25, 2026 · Updated 10 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns1Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK15Techniques
IOCs42Tracked
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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2024-21412via cyble blogExploited in the wildMicrosoft Windows Internet Shortcut SmartScreen Bypass“When a user opens the internet shortcut file, it exploits CVE-2024-21412 to evade Microsoft Defender SmartScreen and triggers the execution of the LNK file hosted on the same WebDAV share.” The content also uses CVE-2024-21212 once for this same infection step; this appears to be a typographical error rather than a separate vulnerability.View vulnerability →Source ↗
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

15 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566PhishingEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping ... Initial Access Phishing T1566 ClickFix/FakeCAPTCHA social engineering

Execution

4 techniques
T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

The shortcut subsequently executes the VBScript through cscript, launches the downloaded PowerShell file with a hidden window and deletes both temporary files.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence2

This incident involved a victim accessing a Bollywood pirate movie download site. When attempting to download a video, the victim was directed to a page hosted on Bunny CDN that provided a bit[.]ly link that ultimately download a ZIP file.

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence1

So, instead of traditional DLL sideloading, this is a case of BPL sideloading. At time of writing there is no MITRE sub-technique for BPL sideloading...

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

Initially this appeared to be straightforward DLL sideloading a malicious Register.dll file. However on closer inspection this was not the case.

Persistence

1 technique
T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence1

The nested ZIP file contained a 192 MB LNK file along with a decoy “trailer” video file. The LNK file triggered the first element of the novel technique used in this infection chain for distributing IDATLOADER.

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence3

The attack chain utilizes DLL sideloading and IDATLoader to inject the final payload into explorer.exe.

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence1

The nested ZIP file contained a 192 MB LNK file along with a decoy “trailer” video file. The LNK file triggered the first element of the novel technique used in this infection chain for distributing IDATLOADER.

Stealth

9 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence2

The above PowerShell script decrypts the AES-encrypted blocks to load another PowerShell script.

T1027.003SteganographyEvidence1

IDATLOADER will inject shellcode into pla.dll that will then extract a PNG resource from the Delphi file... From this PNG, the payload is extracted, a stealer.

T1027.009Embedded PayloadsEvidence1

The larger physicsdesc.map file is approximately 1.36 MB... The file is not a valid image, but enough of the internal PNG chunk structure is retained for the shellcode to parse it.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

The infection hinged around utilizing Microsoft’s mshta.exe to execute code buried deep within a specially crafted file masquerading as a PGP Secret Key.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence3

The attack chain utilizes DLL sideloading and IDATLoader to inject the final payload into explorer.exe.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

The following data is decoded by adding the key to each 32-bit value... The XOR output is then decompressed using: RtlDecompressBuffer

T1218.005MshtaEvidence1

The LNK file was using mshta.exe to execute what appeared to be a “PGP Secret Key,” hosted again hosted on Bunny CDN.

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence1

So, instead of traditional DLL sideloading, this is a case of BPL sideloading. At time of writing there is no MITRE sub-technique for BPL sideloading...

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

Initially this appeared to be straightforward DLL sideloading a malicious Register.dll file. However on closer inspection this was not the case.

Collection

1 technique
T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

The script uses an unzip function with interesting functionality: it will unzip the archive in %AppData% and try to use the ZIP file content as a command to execute.

Command and Control

1 technique
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

Once fully deobfuscated, the code can be seen to download two separate ZIP archives.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

42 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

5 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching42Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities1CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping15Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.