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QSnatch is a QNAP-focused malware family targeting network-attached storage devices. It has been active in multiple campaigns since at least 2014 and became widely known for large-scale compromises of internet-exposed QNAP NAS systems. The malware is commonly characterized as a backdoor trojan and has been associated with long-term, stealth-oriented access rather than overt monetization.
QSnatch infects QNAP NAS devices and establishes persistence by modifying system behavior to interfere with legitimate firmware updates, helping compromised devices remain vulnerable and under attacker control. It has been reported to disable or evade security tooling on affected systems and to use a domain generation algorithm to locate command-and-control infrastructure. Samples have been described as shell scripts, including SHC-compiled ELF shell scripts, and the malware appears to integrate into device firmware execution flow.
Its capabilities include credential theft through fake administrative login mechanisms and credential-scraping components, collection and exfiltration of files such as configuration and log data, remote code execution through an SSH backdoor, and webshell-style remote access. QSnatch can also retrieve and execute additional malicious code from its command-and-control infrastructure, making it a flexible post-compromise platform. Reporting has additionally noted theft of user data including passwords and multifactor-related settings.
The initial infection vector has not been conclusively identified in the available reporting, though unpatched or exposed QNAP devices have been repeatedly highlighted as at risk. Victimology has been broad and opportunistic, with infections observed globally and especially high counts in North America and Europe. Public reporting has not conclusively attributed QSnatch to a known threat actor, and the operators' objectives have remained unclear, though some assessments have suggested an espionage-oriented design due to its emphasis on persistence, credential capture, and data theft.
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1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
One notable point is that some samples intentionally patch the infected QNAP for Samba remote code execution vulnerability CVE-2017-7494. | CISA and NCSC are investigating a strain of malware known as QSnatch, which attackers used in late 2019 to target Network Attached Storage (NAS) devices manufactured by the firm QNAP.
13 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
QSnatch is a malware that infects QNAP NAS devices. It collects and exfiltrates user credentials from vulnerable devices, and can also load malicious code from its command and control (C2) servers.
using the following HTTP GET request: HTTP GET https://[generated-address]/qnap_firmware.xml?=t[timestamp]
It collects and exfiltrates user credentials from vulnerable devices, and can also load malicious code from its command and control (C2) servers.
62 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
8 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
IoT malware noted as an outlier for implementing data collection and exfiltration capabilities.
Backdoor trojan historically observed targeting QNAP NAS devices.
Malware targeting QNAP NAS devices that steals and exfiltrates user credentials, retrieves additional malicious code from C2 infrastructure, and uses a domain generation algorithm (DGA) to resolve its C2 servers.
Backdoor malware associated with compromising NAS devices and enabling remote control/persistence.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.