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Mallory
Malware

Mega

Tracked since Jan 25, 2026 · Updated 7 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK7Techniques
IOCs0Tracked

Mega is referenced in the provided content as a legitimate file-sharing/service platform used by threat actors as part of post-compromise activity, specifically for file exfiltration. It is mentioned in connection with Phobos ransomware actors and with Vanilla Tempest, alongside other legitimate remote administration or transfer tools such as WinSCP and AnyDesk. The content does not describe Mega as malware itself, and no malware-specific capabilities, infection vectors, persistence mechanisms, payload behavior, targeted platforms, or indicators of compromise are provided beyond its use by threat actors for exfiltration.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

7 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Collection

1 technique
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

“Double extortion… exfiltration of victim’s sensitive data” and “T1005: Data from Local System”

Command and Control

1 technique
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

Once inside, the attackers backdoored the systems with Supper malware and deployed the legitimate AnyDesk remote monitoring and MEGA data synchronization tools.

Exfiltration

5 techniques
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

The Akira actors’ primary tools supporting exfiltration include WinRAR, WinSCP, rclone, and MEGA... the actors used rclone to exfiltrate information

T1048Exfiltration Over Alternative ProtocolEvidence1

“Phobos actors install Mega.io [T1048] and use it to export victim files…”

T1537Transfer Data to Cloud AccountEvidence2

“cloud storage services like Mega [T1537]”

T1567Exfiltration Over Web ServiceEvidence2

the actors generated compressed archives with sensitive data [T1560] and exfiltrated the archives to the file-sharing service Mega [T1567]

T1567.002Exfiltration to Cloud StorageEvidence8

Several intrusions also involved data theft using Rclone, ProtonDrive, FileZilla, and MEGA cloud storage, while others focused solely on rapid encryption.

Activity feed

Recent activity

2 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

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Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping7Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.