Mega
Mega is referenced in the provided content as a legitimate file-sharing/service platform used by threat actors as part of post-compromise activity, specifically for file exfiltration. It is mentioned in connection with Phobos ransomware actors and with Vanilla Tempest, alongside other legitimate remote administration or transfer tools such as WinSCP and AnyDesk. The content does not describe Mega as malware itself, and no malware-specific capabilities, infection vectors, persistence mechanisms, payload behavior, targeted platforms, or indicators of compromise are provided beyond its use by threat actors for exfiltration.
Techniques & procedures
7 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Collection
1 technique
Collection
“Double extortion… exfiltration of victim’s sensitive data” and “T1005: Data from Local System”
Command and Control
1 technique
Command and Control
Once inside, the attackers backdoored the systems with Supper malware and deployed the legitimate AnyDesk remote monitoring and MEGA data synchronization tools.
Exfiltration
5 techniques
Exfiltration
The Akira actors’ primary tools supporting exfiltration include WinRAR, WinSCP, rclone, and MEGA... the actors used rclone to exfiltrate information
“Phobos actors install Mega.io [T1048] and use it to export victim files…”
“cloud storage services like Mega [T1537]”
the actors generated compressed archives with sensitive data [T1560] and exfiltrated the archives to the file-sharing service Mega [T1567]
Several intrusions also involved data theft using Rclone, ProtonDrive, FileZilla, and MEGA cloud storage, while others focused solely on rapid encryption.
Recent activity
2 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.