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Malware3 associated actors

CatB

Tracked since Jan 25, 2026 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors3Associated
ATT&CK15Techniques
IOCs4Tracked
Type
Ransomware
Capabilities
Credential theftSession hijackingPersistencePrivilege escalationDefense evasionDLL sideloadingExtortion
Platforms
Windows

CatB, also known as CatB99 or Baxtoy, is a Windows ransomware family first observed in late 2022. It is associated with ChamelGang, also known as CamoFei, through overlaps in code, staging mechanisms, and malware artifacts. CatB has been linked to ransomware attacks against government and healthcare institutions, including the Presidency of Brazil and the All India Institute of Medical Sciences.

CatB uses a DLL-based loader that checks processor count, physical memory, and disk capacity to detect virtualized or analysis environments. After these checks pass, the loader deploys the ransomware payload and abuses DLL loading in the Microsoft Distributed Transaction Coordinator (MSDTC) service to execute it within a trusted Windows service process. The loader configures the service for automatic startup and execution under LocalSystem, supporting persistence and elevated execution. The ransomware payload repeats the environment checks before encrypting files. Its initial delivery vector is not established.

CatB searches multiple local drives and applies file-extension inclusion and exclusion rules. It fully encrypts targeted files smaller than approximately 52 MB, while larger files and eligible files outside its primary extension list receive partial encryption of their first 20,480 bytes. Unlike many ransomware families, it leaves file extensions unchanged and prepends a ransom note to each encrypted file rather than creating separate notes. The note demands payment and threatens permanent data loss. CatB also attempts to collect sensitive browser and Windows Mail data, including credentials, browser session keys, browsing history, autofill information, and profile data.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

3 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Chamelgang

Its ransomware payload, known as CatB, had been signed with the same coolschool certificate.

via symantec blogsecurity.com
CamoFe i

Its ransomware payload, known as CatB, had been signed with the same coolschool certificate.

via symantec blogsecurity.com
camofei

"Its ransomware payload, known as CatB, had been signed with the same coolschool certificate."

via symantec blogsecurity.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

15 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

2 techniques
T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence1

The CatB ransomware sample discussed in this Spotlight uses a DLL Side-Loading vulnerability in a trusted Windows service called MSDTC.

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

The malware then abuses the MSDTC service, manipulating the permissions and startup parameters. As a result, the system will inject the malicious oci.dll into the service’s executable (msdtc.exe) when the MSDTC service is restarted. | Upon execution, CatB payloads rely on DLL search order hijacking to drop and load the malicious payload. The dropper (versions.dll) drops the payload (oci.dll) into the System32 directory.

Persistence

1 technique
T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence2

During the next step, the loader modifies the MSDTC service to let it start automatically to achieve persistence... the loader updates the user which is used to run the service to LocalSystem.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence2

During the next step, the loader modifies the MSDTC service to let it start automatically to achieve persistence... the loader updates the user which is used to run the service to LocalSystem.

Stealth

7 techniques
T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

First, the dropper is distributed in the form of a UPX-packed DLL (versions.dll). This dropper deposits the second DLL payload (oci.dll) onto the target host.

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence1

The ChamelGang group repeatedly deployed ransomware and encryptors “for the purposes of financial gain, disruption, distraction, misattribution, or removal of evidence” ... The specific use of ransomware also allows APT groups to destroy evidence of their espionage efforts and force organizations to focus on data restoration instead of investigating how hackers gained initial entry.

T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence1

As a result, the system will inject the malicious oci.dll into the service’s executable (msdtc.exe) when the MSDTC service is restarted.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

Before the ransomware is executed, its loader component performs basic evasion checks to ensure the sample is not running in an analysis environment, such as a sandbox.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence2

The first one checks the number of CPU cores... The second performed anti-VM technique checks for the amount of main memory... For the third and final check, the sample extracts the size of the hard drive...

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence1

The CatB ransomware sample discussed in this Spotlight uses a DLL Side-Loading vulnerability in a trusted Windows service called MSDTC.

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

The malware then abuses the MSDTC service, manipulating the permissions and startup parameters. As a result, the system will inject the malicious oci.dll into the service’s executable (msdtc.exe) when the MSDTC service is restarted. | Upon execution, CatB payloads rely on DLL search order hijacking to drop and load the malicious payload. The dropper (versions.dll) drops the payload (oci.dll) into the System32 directory.

Credential Access

2 techniques
T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence1

Data extracted from browsers includes bookmarks, blocklists, crash logs, history, user profile data, autofill data, environmental settings, browser session keys, and more.

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

In addition to file encryption and obfuscation, the CatB malware will attempt to gather specific, sensitive information from targeted systems. This includes browser session and credential data.

Discovery

4 techniques
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

CatB performs three primary checks in an attempt to determine if the payload is being executed within a virtual environment. These are direct checks for type and size of physical RAM, type and size of physical hard disks, and checking for odd or anomalous combinations of processors and cores.

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

Once CatB passes all the checks for the second time, the ransomware tries to find interesting files to encrypt... searching for files across multiple drives.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

Before the ransomware is executed, its loader component performs basic evasion checks to ensure the sample is not running in an analysis environment, such as a sandbox.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence2

The first one checks the number of CPU cores... The second performed anti-VM technique checks for the amount of main memory... For the third and final check, the sample extracts the size of the hard drive...

Collection

1 technique
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

The ransomware contains functionality to discover and extract user data from Mozilla Firefox, Google Chrome, Microsoft Edge as well as Internet Explorer... CatB malware will also attempt to locate and extract sensitive information from Windows Mail profile data.

Impact

2 techniques
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence4

CatB then searches for user-specific files based on a list of extensions that can be encrypted.

T1489Service StopEvidence1

Taskill.exe is used to terminate the msdtc.exe process once the service configuration changes have been made.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

4 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching4Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors3Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping15Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.