Mount Locker
- Type
- Ransomware
- Capabilities
- ExfiltrationDefense evasionExtortion
- Platforms
- Windows
Mount Locker is a human-operated Windows ransomware family and ransomware operation that emerged in mid-2020 and is associated with double-extortion attacks. Operators typically compromise enterprise networks prior to deployment, steal data for blackmail, then encrypt victim systems and threaten publication of stolen information through dedicated leak infrastructure and Tor-based negotiation portals. Reporting has linked likely access patterns to compromised credentials and exposed remote access services, including RDP and remote management, rather than indiscriminate mass infection.
Technically, Mount Locker has been observed using ChaCha20 for file encryption together with an embedded RSA public key to protect encryption material. Analyses of later variants describe operator-oriented command-line options, mutex creation to prevent duplicate execution, broad process and service termination before encryption, deletion of shadow copies, registration of encrypted-file associations so opening encrypted files launches the HTML ransom note, and self-deletion after execution. Some samples were delivered through VB6-based loader components that unpacked and self-injected the ransomware payload, while 64-bit executions have also been observed as DLLs launched manually through Rundll32. Research on Version 2 noted that the malware remained relatively immature in some respects, with verbose logging, incomplete network-share encryption support in observed builds, no meaningful persistence, and operational flaws including the ability to render Windows systems unbootable when run with sufficient privileges.
Mount Locker has been used against corporate environments and has shown selective targeting behavior, including versions that specifically encrypted TurboTax-related files during tax season. The operation is materially connected in public reporting to Astro Locker, with overlapping leak-site victims, ransom-note characteristics, and tradecraft suggesting either a rebrand, affiliate relationship, or shared operational backend. Mount Locker has also appeared in broader ransomware affiliate ecosystems and has been discussed in connection with access brokers and other malware operators. Overall, Mount Locker is best characterized as a targeted, operator-driven ransomware threat focused on enterprise extortion through combined encryption and data theft.
Associated threat actors
1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
Astro Locker TeamはMount Lockerというランサムウェアを用いる旧来の攻撃グループと繋がりがあり、新しいブランドイメージに一新する目的等で新たに作成されたランサムウェア攻撃グループのブランドであるという見解が一部で見られています。
Techniques & procedures
22 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
2 techniques
Initial Access
旧来のMount Lockerの攻撃においては侵害された資格情報によるRDPへの不正アクセスによりターゲット環境へ侵入する手口などが過去に確認されています。
旧来のMount Lockerの攻撃においては侵害された資格情報によるRDPへの不正アクセスによりターゲット環境へ侵入する手口などが過去に確認されています。
Execution
2 techniques
Execution
Up next we have a Powershell script that is written to %temp% ... the first half of the Powershell script is used to delete the Volume Shadow Copies via vssadmin.exe and to stop all services that don't run from the Windows System Directory.
MITRE ATT&CK T1129 --> Shared Modules --> Execution
Persistence
4 techniques
Persistence
旧来のMount Lockerの攻撃においては侵害された資格情報によるRDPへの不正アクセスによりターゲット環境へ侵入する手口などが過去に確認されています。
The ransomware will then register the extension in the Registry so that when you click on an encrypted file, it will automatically load the ransom note.
旧来のMount Lockerの攻撃においては侵害された資格情報によるRDPへの不正アクセスによりターゲット環境へ侵入する手口などが過去に確認されています。
To constantly remind the victims of the Ransom and increase psychological pressure Mount Locker registers the Ransomnote to be opened when the user tries to access an encrypted file.
Privilege Escalation
4 techniques
Privilege Escalation
Apparently this sample utilizes Self-Injection, so the call to CreateProcessInternalW won't take us to the unpacked Child Process but rather a Powershell script.
旧来のMount Lockerの攻撃においては侵害された資格情報によるRDPへの不正アクセスによりターゲット環境へ侵入する手口などが過去に確認されています。
MITRE ATT&CK T1134 --> Access Token Manipulation --> Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
To constantly remind the victims of the Ransom and increase psychological pressure Mount Locker registers the Ransomnote to be opened when the user tries to access an encrypted file.
Stealth
7 techniques
Stealth
Both of the samples ... were obviously altered to act as a packer for it ... load the PE resource ... call to VirtualAlloc ... VirtualProtect and RtlMoveMemory ... moving the payload there.
when encrypting files, the ransomware will add an extension in the format .ReadManual.ID . For example, 1.doc would be encrypted and renamed to 1.doc.ReadManual.C77BFF8C
Apparently this sample utilizes Self-Injection, so the call to CreateProcessInternalW won't take us to the unpacked Child Process but rather a Powershell script.
After the Ransomware finished the encryption routine and if the /nodel flag was not supplied it's time to clean up and Mount Locker will delete itself by invoking e.g. cmd /c ... .bat
旧来のMount Lockerの攻撃においては侵害された資格情報によるRDPへの不正アクセスによりターゲット環境へ侵入する手口などが過去に確認されています。
MITRE ATT&CK T1134 --> Access Token Manipulation --> Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
ransomware attackers are using virtual machines (VMs) in order to run their ransomware payloads on compromised computers. The motivation behind the tactic is stealth. In order to avoid raising suspicions or triggering antivirus software, the ransomware payload will “hide” within a VM while encrypting files on the host computer.
Defense Impairment
2 techniques
Defense Impairment
The ransomware will then register the extension in the Registry so that when you click on an encrypted file, it will automatically load the ransom note.
Every process running on the system that does not belong to the Ransomware, run from the Windows directory and is not on the Exception List will be terminated.
Discovery
4 techniques
Discovery
MITRE ATT&CK T1012 --> Query Registry --> Discovery
The generation of the ClientID is based on the return of GetComputerName ... To make sure the Ransomware only runs once on a particular system it will create a Mutex that is derived from the Volume Serialnumber of the System Drive
Mount Locker will separate its log output by the volume type of the targeted drive ... the encryption of Network Shares is not supported yet ... Mount Locker ships with a list of Directory Paths and extensions to be spared from encryption
ransomware attackers are using virtual machines (VMs) in order to run their ransomware payloads on compromised computers. The motivation behind the tactic is stealth. In order to avoid raising suspicions or triggering antivirus software, the ransomware payload will “hide” within a VM while encrypting files on the host computer.
Collection
1 technique
Collection
Like other human-operated ransomware gangs, the Mount Locker gang will compromise networks, harvest unencrypted files to be used for blackmail, and then encrypt the devices on the network.
Exfiltration
2 techniques
Exfiltration
Before encrypting files, Mount Locker will also steal unencrypted files and threaten victims that the data will be published if a ransom is not paid.
Ultimately, the victim did not pay, and their data was published to a ransomware data leak site.
Impact
3 techniques
Impact
最近のランサムウェアと同じく、ファイルを暗号化して身代金を要求し、応じない場合はあらかじめ盗み取っておいたデータをリークサイトで公開すると脅す2重脅迫の手口で使用されるランサムウェアです。
the first half of the Powershell script is used to delete the Volume Shadow Copies via vssadmin.exe and to stop all services that don't run from the Windows System Directory.
the first half of the Powershell script is used to delete the Volume Shadow Copies via vssadmin.exe
Observables
15 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
10 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.