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Malware1 associated actor

Mount Locker

Tracked since Jan 25, 2026 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK22Techniques
IOCs15Tracked
Type
Ransomware
Capabilities
ExfiltrationDefense evasionExtortion
Platforms
Windows

Mount Locker is a human-operated Windows ransomware family and ransomware operation that emerged in mid-2020 and is associated with double-extortion attacks. Operators typically compromise enterprise networks prior to deployment, steal data for blackmail, then encrypt victim systems and threaten publication of stolen information through dedicated leak infrastructure and Tor-based negotiation portals. Reporting has linked likely access patterns to compromised credentials and exposed remote access services, including RDP and remote management, rather than indiscriminate mass infection.

Technically, Mount Locker has been observed using ChaCha20 for file encryption together with an embedded RSA public key to protect encryption material. Analyses of later variants describe operator-oriented command-line options, mutex creation to prevent duplicate execution, broad process and service termination before encryption, deletion of shadow copies, registration of encrypted-file associations so opening encrypted files launches the HTML ransom note, and self-deletion after execution. Some samples were delivered through VB6-based loader components that unpacked and self-injected the ransomware payload, while 64-bit executions have also been observed as DLLs launched manually through Rundll32. Research on Version 2 noted that the malware remained relatively immature in some respects, with verbose logging, incomplete network-share encryption support in observed builds, no meaningful persistence, and operational flaws including the ability to render Windows systems unbootable when run with sufficient privileges.

Mount Locker has been used against corporate environments and has shown selective targeting behavior, including versions that specifically encrypted TurboTax-related files during tax season. The operation is materially connected in public reporting to Astro Locker, with overlapping leak-site victims, ransom-note characteristics, and tradecraft suggesting either a rebrand, affiliate relationship, or shared operational backend. Mount Locker has also appeared in broader ransomware affiliate ecosystems and has been discussed in connection with access brokers and other malware operators. Overall, Mount Locker is best characterized as a targeted, operator-driven ransomware threat focused on enterprise extortion through combined encryption and data theft.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Astro Locker

Astro Locker TeamはMount Lockerというランサムウェアを用いる旧来の攻撃グループと繋がりがあり、新しいブランドイメージに一新する目的等で新たに作成されたランサムウェア攻撃グループのブランドであるという見解が一部で見られています。

via mbsd blogmbsd.jp
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

22 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

旧来のMount Lockerの攻撃においては侵害された資格情報によるRDPへの不正アクセスによりターゲット環境へ侵入する手口などが過去に確認されています。

T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence1

旧来のMount Lockerの攻撃においては侵害された資格情報によるRDPへの不正アクセスによりターゲット環境へ侵入する手口などが過去に確認されています。

Execution

2 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

Up next we have a Powershell script that is written to %temp% ... the first half of the Powershell script is used to delete the Volume Shadow Copies via vssadmin.exe and to stop all services that don't run from the Windows System Directory.

T1129Shared ModulesEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK T1129 --> Shared Modules --> Execution

Persistence

4 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

旧来のMount Lockerの攻撃においては侵害された資格情報によるRDPへの不正アクセスによりターゲット環境へ侵入する手口などが過去に確認されています。

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence2

The ransomware will then register the extension in the Registry so that when you click on an encrypted file, it will automatically load the ransom note.

T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence1

旧来のMount Lockerの攻撃においては侵害された資格情報によるRDPへの不正アクセスによりターゲット環境へ侵入する手口などが過去に確認されています。

T1546Event Triggered ExecutionEvidence1

To constantly remind the victims of the Ransom and increase psychological pressure Mount Locker registers the Ransomnote to be opened when the user tries to access an encrypted file.

Privilege Escalation

4 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

Apparently this sample utilizes Self-Injection, so the call to CreateProcessInternalW won't take us to the unpacked Child Process but rather a Powershell script.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

旧来のMount Lockerの攻撃においては侵害された資格情報によるRDPへの不正アクセスによりターゲット環境へ侵入する手口などが過去に確認されています。

T1134Access Token ManipulationEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK T1134 --> Access Token Manipulation --> Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation

T1546Event Triggered ExecutionEvidence1

To constantly remind the victims of the Ransom and increase psychological pressure Mount Locker registers the Ransomnote to be opened when the user tries to access an encrypted file.

Stealth

7 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

Both of the samples ... were obviously altered to act as a packer for it ... load the PE resource ... call to VirtualAlloc ... VirtualProtect and RtlMoveMemory ... moving the payload there.

T1027.011Fileless StorageEvidence1

when encrypting files, the ransomware will add an extension in the format .ReadManual.ID . For example, 1.doc would be encrypted and renamed to 1.doc.ReadManual.C77BFF8C

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

Apparently this sample utilizes Self-Injection, so the call to CreateProcessInternalW won't take us to the unpacked Child Process but rather a Powershell script.

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence1

After the Ransomware finished the encryption routine and if the /nodel flag was not supplied it's time to clean up and Mount Locker will delete itself by invoking e.g. cmd /c ... .bat

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

旧来のMount Lockerの攻撃においては侵害された資格情報によるRDPへの不正アクセスによりターゲット環境へ侵入する手口などが過去に確認されています。

T1134Access Token ManipulationEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK T1134 --> Access Token Manipulation --> Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

ransomware attackers are using virtual machines (VMs) in order to run their ransomware payloads on compromised computers. The motivation behind the tactic is stealth. In order to avoid raising suspicions or triggering antivirus software, the ransomware payload will “hide” within a VM while encrypting files on the host computer.

Defense Impairment

2 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence2

The ransomware will then register the extension in the Registry so that when you click on an encrypted file, it will automatically load the ransom note.

T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

Every process running on the system that does not belong to the Ransomware, run from the Windows directory and is not on the Exception List will be terminated.

Discovery

4 techniques
T1012Query RegistryEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK T1012 --> Query Registry --> Discovery

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

The generation of the ClientID is based on the return of GetComputerName ... To make sure the Ransomware only runs once on a particular system it will create a Mutex that is derived from the Volume Serialnumber of the System Drive

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

Mount Locker will separate its log output by the volume type of the targeted drive ... the encryption of Network Shares is not supported yet ... Mount Locker ships with a list of Directory Paths and extensions to be spared from encryption

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

ransomware attackers are using virtual machines (VMs) in order to run their ransomware payloads on compromised computers. The motivation behind the tactic is stealth. In order to avoid raising suspicions or triggering antivirus software, the ransomware payload will “hide” within a VM while encrypting files on the host computer.

Collection

1 technique
T1074Data StagedEvidence2

Like other human-operated ransomware gangs, the Mount Locker gang will compromise networks, harvest unencrypted files to be used for blackmail, and then encrypt the devices on the network.

Exfiltration

2 techniques
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

Before encrypting files, Mount Locker will also steal unencrypted files and threaten victims that the data will be published if a ransom is not paid.

T1567Exfiltration Over Web ServiceEvidence1

Ultimately, the victim did not pay, and their data was published to a ransomware data leak site.

Impact

3 techniques
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence6

最近のランサムウェアと同じく、ファイルを暗号化して身代金を要求し、応じない場合はあらかじめ盗み取っておいたデータをリークサイトで公開すると脅す2重脅迫の手口で使用されるランサムウェアです。

T1489Service StopEvidence1

the first half of the Powershell script is used to delete the Volume Shadow Copies via vssadmin.exe and to stop all services that don't run from the Windows System Directory.

T1490Inhibit System RecoveryEvidence1

the first half of the Powershell script is used to delete the Volume Shadow Copies via vssadmin.exe

Indicators of compromise

Observables

15 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

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IOC matching15Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping22Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.