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Malware2 associated actors1 associated CVE

STOCKSTAY

Tracked since Jan 27, 2026 · Updated 4 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns1Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK33Techniques
IOCs69Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
ExfiltrationPersistenceInitial accessPost exploitationDefense evasionReconnaissance
Delivery
PhishingSpearphishingLure
Platforms
Windows

STOCKSTAY is a .NET-based multi-component Windows backdoor attributed to the Russia-linked espionage group Turla and used since at least December 2022 in intelligence collection operations. It has been deployed primarily against Ukrainian government, military, and defense-related organizations, and has also been observed targeting European entities, including organizations connected to Italian foreign policy and diplomatic interests. The malware is associated with long-term surveillance and post-compromise access in campaigns aligned with Russian state intelligence objectives.

STOCKSTAY uses a modular architecture built on .NET and Windows Forms. Reported components include a downloader, an orchestrator, a communications module, and a task-execution module. Command-and-control traffic is carried over secure WebSocket connections, while local component coordination uses inter-process communication based on WM_COPYDATA. The malware supports host reconnaissance, directory and file enumeration, file collection and exfiltration, screen capture, command and process execution, registry modification, and archive handling. Some variants generate host-specific identifiers and cryptographic material during execution, and the framework has been observed using execution scheduling and environmental constraints to reduce visibility and blend into normal user activity.

Turla has disguised STOCKSTAY as benign software to evade suspicion. Early variants masqueraded as stock market utilities, while later versions posed as PDF viewers and calculator applications. Delivery has been tied to phishing operations using academic, diplomatic, and military-themed lures, including malicious Remote Desktop Protocol files, MSI installers, HTA-based chains, and malicious RAR archives exploiting CVE-2025-8088. In multiple operations, Turla used compromised local infrastructure in Ukraine and third-party hosting services to stage payloads and obscure backend infrastructure.

STOCKSTAY shows significant architectural and code overlap with Turla's KAZUAR malware ecosystem, including shared obfuscation patterns, suggesting parallel development or maintenance by a common development team. It has been observed both as an initial access-enabling payload chain and as a later-stage persistence or fallback capability during active espionage operations.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2025-8088via cyber security newsExploited in the wildWinRAR Archive Extraction Path Traversal Leading to Code ExecutionThat campaign used malicious RAR archives exploiting a WinRAR path traversal flaw tracked as CVE-2025-8088. | Russia-linked threat group Turla has been quietly expanding its espionage arsenal with a new backdoor called STOCKSTAY, actively targeting government and military organizations in Ukraine since at least December 2022.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Turla

Turla deployed STOCKSTAY (a .NET-based multi-component backdoor) to conduct long-term surveillance of Ukrainian and European diplomatic organizations.

via ahnlab asec blogasec.ahnlab.com
SUMMIT

Turla (SUMMIT) delivering the STOCKSTAY malware suite using Ukrainian army themes.

via bleeping computerbleepingcomputer.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

33 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Reconnaissance

1 technique
T1598Phishing for InformationEvidence1

Researchers said Turla repeatedly used academic and diplomatic themes to lure victims. In one campaign, the attackers sent phishing emails from a compromised account belonging to a Ukrainian university. In another, they abused a diplomatic education platform to distribute malicious emails and files.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1586Compromise AccountsEvidence1

In one campaign, the attackers sent phishing emails from a compromised account belonging to a Ukrainian university.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence5

Initial access relied on phishing with malicious Remote Desktop Protocol files. In early 2025, victims received emails posing as a defense training academy, and opening the RDP attachment connected them to actor-controlled infrastructure.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence4

That campaign used malicious RAR archives exploiting a WinRAR path traversal flaw tracked as CVE-2025-8088.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence2

A later wave in mid-2025 used a compromised diplomatic education platform to draw in victims under the guise of accessing an online training portal.

Execution

6 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence3

This backdoor component handles the actual execution of malicious tasks, supporting a wide range of filesystem, registry, and command execution operations on the infected host.

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence1

calculator.rar RAR archive containing HTA lure and STOCKSTAY components

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence5

That campaign used malicious RAR archives exploiting a WinRAR path traversal flaw tracked as CVE-2025-8088.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

GTIG also observed Turla deploying the backdoor via malicious RDP configuration files delivered via phishing emails.

T1559Inter-Process CommunicationEvidence2

Its components use an inter-process communication (IPC) channel to communicate with one another.

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence1

GTIG identified what we believe to be an early development sample of STOCKSTAY.MARKETMAKER which... was dependent on external mechanisms (such as .NET AppDomainManager injection) for the initial deployment of samples to the target host.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence4

STOCKTRADER executes commands on infected machines, including file collection, registry modifications, and screen capture.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence2

StockStay payloads are fetched from a remote server using a proxy-aware downloader named StockStay.MarketMaker, which runs in the background and sets up autorun entries to execute core backdoor components.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence2

StockStay payloads are fetched from a remote server using a proxy-aware downloader named StockStay.MarketMaker, which runs in the background and sets up autorun entries to execute core backdoor components.

Stealth

6 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

In April 2025, STOCKSTAY adopted a new string obfuscation method based on a pseudo-random algorithm called Squirrel3... GTIG tracks this as K1MORPHER.

T1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileEvidence1

An encrypted on-disk configuration file contains various options regarding malware execution.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence5

STOCKSTAY was originally disguised as a stock market data viewing tool, with fake file names and configuration data designed to blend in with everyday software. By 2025, updated variants were found posing as PDF viewers and calculator utilities.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1

Del Delete the specified files... RmDir Delete the specified directories...

T1218.005MshtaEvidence2

Other campaigns have leveraged MSI installers... and RAR files containing an HTML Application (HTA) script, the latter of which is designed to execute a variant of STOCKSTAY.MARKETMAKER.

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence1

GTIG identified what we believe to be an early development sample of STOCKSTAY.MARKETMAKER which... was dependent on external mechanisms (such as .NET AppDomainManager injection) for the initial deployment of samples to the target host.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence4

STOCKTRADER executes commands on infected machines, including file collection, registry modifications, and screen capture.

Discovery

3 techniques
T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

The malware also captures a list of the names of running processes.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence3

STOCKTRADER is capable of conducting comprehensive reconnaissance, including the generation of directory listings and performing recursive enumerations of file paths, effectively allowing the operators to map the environment of the compromised target.

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence2

STOCKTRADER is capable of conducting comprehensive reconnaissance, including the generation of directory listings and performing recursive enumerations of file paths, effectively allowing the operators to map the environment of the compromised target.

Lateral Movement

3 techniques
T1021Remote ServicesEvidence1

opening the RDP attachment connected them to actor-controlled infrastructure.

T1021.001Remote Desktop ProtocolEvidence2

Victims were typically infected through phishing emails containing malicious Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) configuration files that connected compromised computers to infrastructure controlled by the attackers, allowing them to deploy additional malware.

T1570Lateral Tool TransferEvidence1

GTIG conducted a review... in which we observed Turla deploying a wide range of tools into the victim’s network... via malicious GPO installation from a compromised domain controller... Multiple ZIP archives, each containing one of the core components of STOCKSTAY or its configuration, were uploaded to the domain controller.

Collection

3 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

STOCKTRADER executes commands on infected machines, including file collection, registry modifications, and screen capture.

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence3

STOCKTRADER executes commands on infected machines, including file collection, registry modifications, and screen capture.

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

All files matching either the specified file paths, or the target file extensions, will be added to an in-memory ZIP archive and subsequently base64-encoded for transmission to the C2.

Command and Control

5 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence5

The malware is built in .NET and communicates with operators through a secure WebSocket connection, making it difficult to detect within normal network traffic.

T1090ProxyEvidence2

Network communication is provided through StockStay.StockBroker, a proxy-aware tunneler...

T1090.003Multi-hop ProxyEvidence1

In Ukraine, Turla used compromised infrastructure, including government services and an IT company’s server, to stage and deliver the payload. This lets the group blend into local network traffic, making detection considerably harder.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence4

Turla then deployed the STOCKSTAY.MARKETMAKER downloader, which retrieved the full STOCKSTAY suite from the compromised server.

T1573.002Asymmetric CryptographyEvidence1

To ensure secure data exfiltration, this component generates a unique 4096-bit RSA key pair upon initial execution, allowing for the encryption of task responses before transmission to the C2 server.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence2

The backdoor component, named StockStay.StockTrader, supports various command execution capabilities, including file download/exfiltration/modification...

Indicators of compromise

Observables

69 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

13 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

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IOC matching69Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities1CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping33Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.