STOCKSTAY
- Type
- Backdoor
- Capabilities
- ExfiltrationPersistenceInitial accessPost exploitationDefense evasionReconnaissance
- Delivery
- PhishingSpearphishingLure
- Platforms
- Windows
STOCKSTAY is a .NET-based multi-component Windows backdoor attributed to the Russia-linked espionage group Turla and used since at least December 2022 in intelligence collection operations. It has been deployed primarily against Ukrainian government, military, and defense-related organizations, and has also been observed targeting European entities, including organizations connected to Italian foreign policy and diplomatic interests. The malware is associated with long-term surveillance and post-compromise access in campaigns aligned with Russian state intelligence objectives.
STOCKSTAY uses a modular architecture built on .NET and Windows Forms. Reported components include a downloader, an orchestrator, a communications module, and a task-execution module. Command-and-control traffic is carried over secure WebSocket connections, while local component coordination uses inter-process communication based on WM_COPYDATA. The malware supports host reconnaissance, directory and file enumeration, file collection and exfiltration, screen capture, command and process execution, registry modification, and archive handling. Some variants generate host-specific identifiers and cryptographic material during execution, and the framework has been observed using execution scheduling and environmental constraints to reduce visibility and blend into normal user activity.
Turla has disguised STOCKSTAY as benign software to evade suspicion. Early variants masqueraded as stock market utilities, while later versions posed as PDF viewers and calculator applications. Delivery has been tied to phishing operations using academic, diplomatic, and military-themed lures, including malicious Remote Desktop Protocol files, MSI installers, HTA-based chains, and malicious RAR archives exploiting CVE-2025-8088. In multiple operations, Turla used compromised local infrastructure in Ukraine and third-party hosting services to stage payloads and obscure backend infrastructure.
STOCKSTAY shows significant architectural and code overlap with Turla's KAZUAR malware ecosystem, including shared obfuscation patterns, suggesting parallel development or maintenance by a common development team. It has been observed both as an initial access-enabling payload chain and as a later-stage persistence or fallback capability during active espionage operations.
Associated vulnerabilities
1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
Associated threat actors
2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
Turla deployed STOCKSTAY (a .NET-based multi-component backdoor) to conduct long-term surveillance of Ukrainian and European diplomatic organizations.
Turla (SUMMIT) delivering the STOCKSTAY malware suite using Ukrainian army themes.
Techniques & procedures
33 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Reconnaissance
1 technique
Reconnaissance
Researchers said Turla repeatedly used academic and diplomatic themes to lure victims. In one campaign, the attackers sent phishing emails from a compromised account belonging to a Ukrainian university. In another, they abused a diplomatic education platform to distribute malicious emails and files.
Resource Development
1 technique
Resource Development
In one campaign, the attackers sent phishing emails from a compromised account belonging to a Ukrainian university.
Initial Access
3 techniques
Initial Access
Initial access relied on phishing with malicious Remote Desktop Protocol files. In early 2025, victims received emails posing as a defense training academy, and opening the RDP attachment connected them to actor-controlled infrastructure.
That campaign used malicious RAR archives exploiting a WinRAR path traversal flaw tracked as CVE-2025-8088.
A later wave in mid-2025 used a compromised diplomatic education platform to draw in victims under the guise of accessing an online training portal.
Execution
6 techniques
Execution
This backdoor component handles the actual execution of malicious tasks, supporting a wide range of filesystem, registry, and command execution operations on the infected host.
calculator.rar RAR archive containing HTA lure and STOCKSTAY components
That campaign used malicious RAR archives exploiting a WinRAR path traversal flaw tracked as CVE-2025-8088.
GTIG also observed Turla deploying the backdoor via malicious RDP configuration files delivered via phishing emails.
Its components use an inter-process communication (IPC) channel to communicate with one another.
GTIG identified what we believe to be an early development sample of STOCKSTAY.MARKETMAKER which... was dependent on external mechanisms (such as .NET AppDomainManager injection) for the initial deployment of samples to the target host.
Persistence
2 techniques
Persistence
STOCKTRADER executes commands on infected machines, including file collection, registry modifications, and screen capture.
StockStay payloads are fetched from a remote server using a proxy-aware downloader named StockStay.MarketMaker, which runs in the background and sets up autorun entries to execute core backdoor components.
Privilege Escalation
1 technique
Privilege Escalation
StockStay payloads are fetched from a remote server using a proxy-aware downloader named StockStay.MarketMaker, which runs in the background and sets up autorun entries to execute core backdoor components.
Stealth
6 techniques
Stealth
In April 2025, STOCKSTAY adopted a new string obfuscation method based on a pseudo-random algorithm called Squirrel3... GTIG tracks this as K1MORPHER.
An encrypted on-disk configuration file contains various options regarding malware execution.
STOCKSTAY was originally disguised as a stock market data viewing tool, with fake file names and configuration data designed to blend in with everyday software. By 2025, updated variants were found posing as PDF viewers and calculator utilities.
Del Delete the specified files... RmDir Delete the specified directories...
Other campaigns have leveraged MSI installers... and RAR files containing an HTML Application (HTA) script, the latter of which is designed to execute a variant of STOCKSTAY.MARKETMAKER.
GTIG identified what we believe to be an early development sample of STOCKSTAY.MARKETMAKER which... was dependent on external mechanisms (such as .NET AppDomainManager injection) for the initial deployment of samples to the target host.
Defense Impairment
1 technique
Defense Impairment
STOCKTRADER executes commands on infected machines, including file collection, registry modifications, and screen capture.
Discovery
3 techniques
Discovery
The malware also captures a list of the names of running processes.
STOCKTRADER is capable of conducting comprehensive reconnaissance, including the generation of directory listings and performing recursive enumerations of file paths, effectively allowing the operators to map the environment of the compromised target.
STOCKTRADER is capable of conducting comprehensive reconnaissance, including the generation of directory listings and performing recursive enumerations of file paths, effectively allowing the operators to map the environment of the compromised target.
Lateral Movement
3 techniques
Lateral Movement
opening the RDP attachment connected them to actor-controlled infrastructure.
Victims were typically infected through phishing emails containing malicious Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) configuration files that connected compromised computers to infrastructure controlled by the attackers, allowing them to deploy additional malware.
GTIG conducted a review... in which we observed Turla deploying a wide range of tools into the victim’s network... via malicious GPO installation from a compromised domain controller... Multiple ZIP archives, each containing one of the core components of STOCKSTAY or its configuration, were uploaded to the domain controller.
Collection
3 techniques
Collection
STOCKTRADER executes commands on infected machines, including file collection, registry modifications, and screen capture.
STOCKTRADER executes commands on infected machines, including file collection, registry modifications, and screen capture.
All files matching either the specified file paths, or the target file extensions, will be added to an in-memory ZIP archive and subsequently base64-encoded for transmission to the C2.
Command and Control
5 techniques
Command and Control
The malware is built in .NET and communicates with operators through a secure WebSocket connection, making it difficult to detect within normal network traffic.
Network communication is provided through StockStay.StockBroker, a proxy-aware tunneler...
In Ukraine, Turla used compromised infrastructure, including government services and an IT company’s server, to stage and deliver the payload. This lets the group blend into local network traffic, making detection considerably harder.
Turla then deployed the STOCKSTAY.MARKETMAKER downloader, which retrieved the full STOCKSTAY suite from the compromised server.
To ensure secure data exfiltration, this component generates a unique 4096-bit RSA key pair upon initial execution, allowing for the encryption of task responses before transmission to the C2 server.
Exfiltration
1 technique
Exfiltration
The backdoor component, named StockStay.StockTrader, supports various command execution capabilities, including file download/exfiltration/modification...
Observables
69 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
13 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.