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Mallory
Malware2 associated actors1 associated CVE

CoolClient

Tracked since Jan 27, 2026 · Updated 19 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns1Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK43Techniques
IOCs19Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
Credential theftKeyloggingExfiltrationPersistencePrivilege escalationPost exploitationDefense evasionReconnaissanceDLL sideloadingProcess injection
Delivery
PhishingSpearphishing
Platforms
Windows

CoolClient is a Windows backdoor associated with the China-linked cyberespionage group HoneyMyte, also known as Mustang Panda. Publicly documented since 2022, it has been deployed against organizations across Asia and Russia, including government entities in Myanmar, Mongolia, Pakistan, and Russia. In observed intrusions, it served as a secondary backdoor deployed after attackers established access with PlugX.

CoolClient supports keystroke and window monitoring, clipboard theft, credential harvesting, system reconnaissance, file upload, download and deletion, packet tunneling, and port-mapping information collection. Plugins extend its functionality, and variants support TCP and UDP communications. Its multistage execution chains abuse legitimate applications for DLL sideloading, decrypt payloads in memory, and inject subsequent stages into other processes. Persistence mechanisms include scheduled tasks, registry autorun entries, and Windows services. The malware also implements UAC bypass techniques, including RPC-based elevation combined with parent-process spoofing. Observed deployments have used renamed legitimate Sangfor applications and Microsoft Defender exclusions to facilitate execution and evade detection.

Variants investigated in late 2025 and 2026 added a digitally signed Windows kernel-mode driver that provides rootkit capabilities. When sufficient privileges are available, CoolClient installs the driver as a service and controls it through IOCTL requests. The driver can hide processes, files, directories, registry objects, and kernel modules; restrict access to protected malware processes; and filter network information to conceal configured command-and-control addresses from user-mode tools. CoolClient can continue executing its final backdoor stage when driver deployment is unavailable. The combination of user-mode espionage functionality and kernel-level concealment supports persistent, difficult-to-inspect access to compromised systems.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2025-15467via f5Stack Buffer Overflow in OpenSSL CMS AEAD Parameter ParsingA critical pre-authentication remote code execution vulnerability, CVE-2025-15467 (CVSS 9.8), affects OpenSSL versions 3.0, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details →
Mustang Panda

The analyzed COOLCLIENT sample supports installation, payload injection, UAC bypass, file operations, and keystroke and window monitoring.

via trendai security blogtrendaisecurity.com
SteppeDriver

This includes an unreported cluster dubbed SteppeDriver that was first discovered in 2024 and has since targeted entities in France, Mongolia, and South America using tools like ShadowPad, COOLCLIENT, CurlyDoor, RudeGull, and MKTDownloader.

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

43 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

3 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence8

Для закрепления в системе атакующие создавали задачу планировщика, которая запускала defender.exe с правами SYSTEM при каждом старте Windows.

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence3

The malware then starts the service by executing "sc start media_updaten" via WinExec.

T1574.001DLLEvidence5

The actor then created a fake Windows Defender installation directory, copied the CoolClient components into it, and renamed a legitimate Sangfor executable, usually named Sang.exe, to defender.exe to serve as the DLL sideloader. When executed, defender.exe sideloads the malicious libngs.dll, initiating the CoolClient execution chain. | Execution begins when the legitimate Sangfor application (defender.exe or Sang.exe) loads the malicious libngs.dll through DLL sideloading.

Persistence

4 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence8

Для закрепления в системе атакующие создавали задачу планировщика, которая запускала defender.exe с правами SYSTEM при каждом старте Windows.

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence5

The latter handles persistence, registry modifications... The rootkit loads its stealth configuration from \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\RNG and uses separate configuration entries for directories, files, registry keys and values, and processes that should be hidden, protected, or ignored.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence8

Déchiffrement et écriture du driver msagent.sys installé comme service Windows ... et/ou service media_updaten

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence10

It installs itself to %programdata% and then sets the registry run key for persistence.

Privilege Escalation

9 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence8

Для закрепления в системе атакующие создавали задачу планировщика, которая запускала defender.exe с правами SYSTEM при каждом старте Windows.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence10

Остальные, среди прочего, поддерживают скрытие процессов и модулей ядра, внедрение шелл-кода, снятие защиты PPL и запись по произвольному адресу в памяти ядра.

T1068Exploitation for Privilege EscalationEvidence1

In this campaign, we discovered several tools used for UAC bypass in Windows 10.

T1134Access Token ManipulationEvidence3

CoolClient дублирует ее токен доступа, обновляет идентификатор сессии и создает новый процесс synchost.exe с помощью функции CreateProcessAsUserA

T1134.004Parent PID SpoofingEvidence3

It also implements a remote procedure call (RPC)-based process creation technique combined with parent process ID (PPID) spoofing to relaunch itself in an elevated context before injecting into a process named synchost.exe.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence8

Déchiffrement et écriture du driver msagent.sys installé comme service Windows ... et/ou service media_updaten

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence10

It installs itself to %programdata% and then sets the registry run key for persistence.

T1548Abuse Elevation Control MechanismEvidence3

To continue execution with elevated privileges while concealing its true parent process, CoolClient implements an RPC-based process creation technique... The technique combines RPC process creation with parent process ID (PPID) spoofing to launch a new elevated instance of itself.

T1548.002Bypass User Account ControlEvidence3

The latter handles persistence, registry modifications, User Account Control (UAC) bypass, process injection, driver deployment, and loading the final-stage cert.ini implant responsible for C2 communications and backdoor functionality.

Stealth

16 techniques
T1014RootkitEvidence12

The driver enhances the malware's stealth by hiding the COOLCLIENT process, protecting related files and registry entries, and preventing them from being inspected or modified

T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence3

The routine ultimately performs a straightforward task: loading, decrypting, and executing the encrypted second-stage DLL, loadcert.ini... decrypts it using a 0x32-byte repeating XOR keystream...

T1027.002Software PackingEvidence1

Le driver est extrait compressé (LZMA) depuis loadcert.ini

T1036MasqueradingEvidence3

The actor copied the malware components into the directory, renamed a legitimate Sangfor executable to defender.exe for DLL sideloading... before injecting into a process named synchost.exe.

T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEvidence2

Earth Preta tends to hide malicious payloads in fake files, disguising them as legitimate ones.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence10

Остальные, среди прочего, поддерживают скрытие процессов и модулей ядра, внедрение шелл-кода, снятие защиты PPL и запись по произвольному адресу в памяти ядра.

T1070.005Network Share Connection RemovalEvidence1

Files get similar treatment through a Windows filesystem minifilter. The driver maintains protected path lists and checks filesystem activity against them, denying access to matching files and directories.

T1134Access Token ManipulationEvidence3

CoolClient дублирует ее токен доступа, обновляет идентификатор сессии и создает новый процесс synchost.exe с помощью функции CreateProcessAsUserA

T1134.004Parent PID SpoofingEvidence3

It also implements a remote procedure call (RPC)-based process creation technique combined with parent process ID (PPID) spoofing to relaunch itself in an elevated context before injecting into a process named synchost.exe.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence2

The TONEINS malware, libcef.dll, will decrypt this file with a single byte in XOR operations, find the PE header, and drop the payload to the specified path.

T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence2

A legitimate Sangfor executable such as Sang.exe or a renamed defender.exe is abused for DLL sideloading

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

CoolClient loaders, which employed advanced anti-disassembly techniques to evade analysis

T1564Hide ArtifactsEvidence7

The newest CoolClient variant can deploy a signed kernel-mode driver as a Windows service and communicate with it through IOCTL requests. The driver enhances the malware’s stealth by hiding the CoolClient process, protecting related files and registry entries, and preventing them from being inspected or modified.

T1564.001Hidden Files and DirectoriesEvidence5

Компонент работает на уровне ядра и по сути превращает бэкдор группировки в руткит: он способен скрывать процессы, защищать файлы и разделы реестра от просмотра, изменения и удаления

T1564.009Resource ForkingEvidence2

During process hiding and restoration, the driver uses IOCTLs 0x22219C and 0x2221A0 to unlink and relink entries in the Windows active process list, effectively hiding or restoring processes on demand.

T1574.001DLLEvidence5

The actor then created a fake Windows Defender installation directory, copied the CoolClient components into it, and renamed a legitimate Sangfor executable, usually named Sang.exe, to defender.exe to serve as the DLL sideloader. When executed, defender.exe sideloads the malicious libngs.dll, initiating the CoolClient execution chain. | Execution begins when the legitimate Sangfor application (defender.exe or Sang.exe) loads the malicious libngs.dll through DLL sideloading.

Defense Impairment

2 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence5

The latter handles persistence, registry modifications... The rootkit loads its stealth configuration from \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\RNG and uses separate configuration entries for directories, files, registry keys and values, and processes that should be hidden, protected, or ignored.

T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence6

Перед установкой малвари злоумышленники добавляли в исключения Microsoft Defender поддельный каталог Windows Defender и файл defender.exe.

Credential Access

4 techniques
T1040Network SniffingEvidence1

Kaspersky documented another evolution in 2025, when the malware gained clipboard theft and HTTP traffic interception for credential harvesting.

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence10

COOLCLIENT supports such a wide array of capabilities as keylogging, clipboard theft, credential harvesting, file management, system reconnaissance, and plugin-based extensions.

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence5

COOLCLIENT supports such a wide array of capabilities as keylogging, clipboard theft, credential harvesting, file management, system reconnaissance, and plugin-based extensions.

T1557Adversary-in-the-MiddleEvidence1

появились функции ... перехвата HTTP-трафика с целью сбора учетных данных

Discovery

5 techniques
T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence1

Before creating the target process, the malware enumerates active WinStation sessions to identify a suitable interactive user session.

T1040Network SniffingEvidence1

Kaspersky documented another evolution in 2025, when the malware gained clipboard theft and HTTP traffic interception for credential harvesting.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence6

COOLCLIENT supports such a wide array of capabilities as keylogging, clipboard theft, credential harvesting, file management, system reconnaissance, and plugin-based extensions.

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

COOLCLIENT supports such a wide array of capabilities as keylogging, clipboard theft, credential harvesting, file management, system reconnaissance, and plugin-based extensions.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

CoolClient loaders, which employed advanced anti-disassembly techniques to evade analysis

Collection

4 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

T1005 — Data from Local System (Collection)

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence10

COOLCLIENT supports such a wide array of capabilities as keylogging, clipboard theft, credential harvesting, file management, system reconnaissance, and plugin-based extensions.

T1115Clipboard DataEvidence6

COOLCLIENT supports such a wide array of capabilities as keylogging, clipboard theft, credential harvesting, file management, system reconnaissance, and plugin-based extensions.

T1557Adversary-in-the-MiddleEvidence1

появились функции ... перехвата HTTP-трафика с целью сбора учетных данных

Command and Control

9 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence2

имплант третьего этапа принимает на себя взаимодействие с командным сервером

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence3

Masquage du trafic C2 : hook sur le driver Nsiproxy supprimant les adresses IP C2 des données réseau retournées aux outils en mode utilisateur

T1090ProxyEvidence2

CoolClient could upload and delete files, route network traffic

T1090.001Internal ProxyEvidence1

It also hooks the Windows Nsiproxy driver to filter network information returned to user mode.

T1090.003Multi-hop ProxyEvidence1

По данным специалистов, в новых атаках HoneyMyte сначала устанавливала на машины жертв PlugX, а уже через него разворачивала CoolClient.

T1095Non-Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

It is also able to communicate through different network protocols such as UDP ... and TCP.

T1104Multi-Stage ChannelsEvidence1

The decrypted payload contains another payload that is XOR-encrypted... After this is decrypted, there is yet another final backdoor payload

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence3

In the observed campaign targeting Myanmar, HoneyMyte used PlugX as the initial post-compromise implant to deploy the CoolClient components.

T1572Protocol TunnelingEvidence1

CoolClient supports the following capabilities: ... Tunneling packets

Indicators of compromise

Observables

19 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

33 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

View more in app →
the hacker newsNews · Aug 24, 2026Operation QUICSILVER Targets Myanmar Government and IT with QUICAgent BackdoorA known backdoor, first detected in 2022, associated here with Mustang Panda. The updated variant can deploy a signed kernel-mode driver to improve stealth by hiding the process and protecting files and registry entries; it also supports keylogging, clipboard theft, credential harvesting, file management, reconnaissance, and plugin-based extensions.Read more ↗xakepNews · Aug 18, 2026Группировка HoneyMyte обновила бэкдор CoolClient и использует руткит уровня ядра Windows - ХакерBackdoor used by HoneyMyte in espionage campaigns. It can log keystrokes, capture clipboard contents, steal credentials, manipulate files, collect system information, and be extended via plugins. The updated version uses a signed Windows kernel-mode driver (msagent.sys) to hide and protect processes, files, and registry objects, filter network data, and effectively add rootkit capabilities.Read more ↗cyberveilleNews · Aug 17, 2026HoneyMyte améliore CoolClient avec un rootkit noyau signé pour masquer processus, fichiers et C2 | CyberVeilleBackdoor/implant used by HoneyMyte, updated with a signed kernel-mode rootkit component to hide processes, files, registry keys, and C2 traffic, while protecting the CoolClient process from termination or code injection.Read more ↗cyber security newsNews · Aug 17, 2026HoneyMyte CoolClient Backdoor Uses Signed Kernel Rootkit to Hide Processes, Files and C2 TrafficWindows backdoor used for keystroke logging, clipboard theft, credential collection, system reconnaissance and file operations. The upgraded variant deploys the signed msagent.sys kernel driver to conceal processes, files, registry entries and command-and-control connections, and to obstruct inspection or termination. It uses DLL sideloading and persistence through scheduled tasks, AutoRun entries and services. The reported activity targeted organizations in Pakistan, Mongolia, Myanmar and Russia.Read more ↗
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IOC matching19Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities1CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping43Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.