ClawdBot Agent
ClawdBot Agent is a malicious Visual Studio Code extension discovered on 2026-01-27 that masqueraded as a legitimate AI coding assistant associated with Clawdbot. The real Clawdbot service had not released an official VS Code extension. The extension was described as a fully functional trojan: it presented a polished UI and integrated with AI providers including OpenAI, Anthropic, Google, Ollama, Groq, Mistral, and OpenRouter, while silently deploying malware onto Windows systems when VS Code started.
The extension abused the VS Code activation event "onStartupFinished" so its malicious logic executed automatically at launch. Its activate() flow called initCore(), which fetched remote configuration from http://clawdbot.getintwopc[.]site/config.json and then downloaded and executed payloads. Errors were suppressed with an empty catch block to avoid visible failures. Payloads were staged under %TEMP%\Lightshot and launched as hidden, detached processes.
The primary payload was Code.exe (SHA-256: e20b920c7af988aa215c95bbaa365d005dd673544ab7e3577b60fecf11dcdea2), identified as a legitimate ConnectWise ScreenConnect client installer that had been preconfigured to connect to attacker-controlled infrastructure at meeting.bulletmailer[.]net:8041. When executed, it installed to C:\Program Files (x86)\ScreenConnect Client (083e4d30c7ea44f7)\ and deployed components including ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe, ScreenConnect.WindowsBackstageShell.exe, and ScreenConnect.WindowsFileManager.exe, enabling remote access to victim machines.
A secondary delivery path used a malicious Rust-based DWrite.dll (SHA-256: d1e0c26774cb8beabaf64f119652719f673fb530368d5b2166178191ad5fcbea) that exported DWriteCreateFactory to mimic the legitimate DirectWrite interface. This DLL implemented a download-write-execute chain via WinINet APIs and retrieved a payload from a Dropbox URL ending in zoomupdate.msi, disguised as a Zoom update; the downloaded file had the same SHA-256 as Code.exe. Additional fallback mechanisms included JavaScript download paths for Lightshot.exe and Lightshot.dll from clawdbot.getintwopc[.]site and a batch-script/PowerShell fallback that downloaded Lightshot.exe from https://darkgptprivate[.]com/d111.
The campaign used multiple layers of redundancy and brand impersonation, including Clawdbot, VS Code, Lightshot, and Zoom, to reduce suspicion and maintain delivery if infrastructure was disrupted. Reported infrastructure included clawdbot.getintwopc[.]site, meeting.bulletmailer[.]net:8041, darkgptprivate[.]com, and 178.16.54[.]253. Microsoft was notified and removed the malicious extension from the marketplace. At the time of removal, the extension reportedly had 21 installs.
Recent activity
3 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.