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Malware

ShadowHS

Tracked since Jan 30, 2026 · Updated 8 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK7Techniques
IOCs0Tracked

ShadowHS is a fileless Linux post-exploitation framework documented by Cyble Research & Intelligence Labs in January 2026. It uses a highly obfuscated, multi-stage encrypted shell loader to decrypt and execute a weaponized variant of the open-source hackshell payload entirely in memory, including execution via anonymous file descriptors under /proc, leaving no persistent payload binary on disk. The loader performs runtime dependency checks for tools such as OpenSSL, Perl, and gunzip, reconstructs the payload through AES-256-CBC decryption, Perl/gzip processing, and byte-offset skipping, and can spoof argv[0] to disguise execution, often as python3.

The framework is designed for stealthy, long-term, operator-controlled access to compromised Linux systems, especially server environments. Reported capabilities include host and security-tool fingerprinting, reconnaissance, credential theft, privilege escalation, lateral movement including SSH-based scanning and brute-forcing, memory dumping for credential extraction, covert data staging and exfiltration, and cryptomining support. ShadowHS also includes anti-competition logic to identify and terminate rival malware, including XMRig, Kinsing, and Ebury, and checks for kernel rootkits, AppArmor, loaded modules, deleted or memfd-backed executables, and numerous EDR/AV products including CrowdStrike, Elastic Agent, Sophos, Cortex XDR, WithSecure, Wazuh, Rapid7, Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, Tanium, Cybereason, and others.

For covert transfer operations, ShadowHS abuses GSocket user-space tunneling with rsync rather than direct SSH/SCP/SFTP, using a hardcoded rendezvous endpoint at 62.171.153[.]47. Reported infrastructure and operational IOCs include 91.92.242[.]200 for payload staging and mining-related infrastructure at 204.93.253[.]180 on ports 4080, 3080, and 1080, as well as zergpool kawpow endpoints on port 3638. The malware has been described as intentionally restrained at runtime, exposing an interactive post-exploitation environment while keeping higher-risk functionality dormant or operator-invoked, which researchers assessed as indicative of deliberate tradecraft rather than commodity botnet activity.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

7 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

1 technique
T1059.004Unix ShellEvidence1

"a staging wrapper built with bincrypter, a publicly available open-source shell-script encryption framework"

Stealth

2 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

"bincrypter-generated encrypted loader... decodes and decrypts it using AES-256-CBC"; "Wallet regex patterns and replacement addresses are encrypted inside the binary using ChaCha20"

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence2

"...runs entirely in memory... The loader decrypts and executes its payload exclusively in memory, leaving no persistent binary artifacts on disk."

Discovery

1 technique
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence2

"Other capabilities ... include system profiling..." and "...aggressively fingerprints host security controls, enumerates defensive tooling..."

Collection

1 technique
T1115Clipboard DataEvidence1

"...designed to target cryptocurrency users by intercepting and altering copied wallet addresses... monitoring the clipboard every 200 milliseconds and substituting cryptocurrency addresses"

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence2

"...leading to... data exfiltration..." / "The framework supports... data exfiltration."

Impact

1 technique
T1496Resource HijackingEvidence1

"The framework supports... cryptomining..."

Activity feed

Recent activity

13 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

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Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping7Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.