Loading malware…
TripleCross is a Linux eBPF-based rootkit that hooks the execve system call to monitor and manipulate process execution. It represents a modern Linux rootkit approach that uses eBPF rather than a traditional loadable kernel module, reducing reliance on conventional module-loading mechanisms and associated kernel-module visibility. Its eBPF-based operation is relevant to post-compromise activity and can complicate detection strategies focused on loaded kernel modules.
Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
2 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
“An attacker can load one or more eBPF programs that attach to sensitive kernel events... [including] the system call entry for execve.” | “Rootkits are stealthy malware designed to conceal malicious activity, such as files, processes, network connections, kernel modules, or accounts.”
4 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A Linux rootkit included in the static detection experiment comparing original, stripped, and null-byte-modified binaries.
Linux rootkit included in static-detection testing; stripping and a null-byte alteration lowered static antivirus detection.
Linux rootkit/implant leveraging eBPF to hook syscalls (e.g., execve) to monitor and manipulate process execution while avoiding traditional LKM-based detection surfaces.
"BPF filter applied using TC ... [Threat: TripleCross]"
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.