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Malware2 associated actors2 associated CVEs

Covenant Grunt

Tracked since Feb 3, 2026 · Updated 24 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days1 mention · peak 1 in a dayToday
Vulns2Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK22Techniques
IOCs1Tracked
Type
RAT
Capabilities
Post exploitationDefense evasion
Delivery
SpearphishingLure
Platforms
Windows

Covenant Grunt is a .NET remote-control implant associated with the open-source Covenant command-and-control framework. It receives operator tasks and provides remote control of compromised systems for post-exploitation activity. APT28, also known as Fancy Bear and TA422, has deployed Grunt against Windows systems in campaigns targeting Ukraine and other European countries, including government, defense, transportation, and diplomatic organizations.

In Operation Neusploit and related APT28 activity, spearphishing messages deliver weaponized Microsoft Office documents exploiting CVE-2026-21509. A multistage infection chain involving PixyNetLoader extracts a concealed payload from the least significant bits of PNG image pixels. The extracted shellcode hosts the .NET Common Language Runtime and loads the Grunt assembly directly into memory. The surrounding loader chain uses COM hijacking for persistence, DLL proxying, and anti-analysis checks; these mechanisms support deployment rather than representing intrinsic Grunt capabilities.

Observed Grunt variants use the legitimate Filen cloud-storage API as a command-and-control bridge to communicate with operators and receive tasks. This use of legitimate cloud infrastructure helps blend command-and-control traffic with ordinary activity. Variants also conceal configuration strings with XOR encoding and Base64 wrapping.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

2 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2026-21509via the hacker newsExploited in the wildMicrosoft Office COM/OLE Security Feature BypassThreat hunters have also charted the evolution of PixyNetLoader, a malware loader attributed to APT28 in connection with campaigns exploiting a Microsoft Office vulnerability (CVE-2026-21509), to extract a COVENANT Grunt implant.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2026-21513via trend micro researchExploited in the wildMicrosoft MSHTML Framework Security Feature BypassCVE-2026-21513 zero-day: Exploited at least 11 days before the February 10, 2026 patch release... By combining zero-day exploitation (CVE-2026-21513) with rapid weaponization of newly disclosed vulnerabilities (CVE-2026-21509)... Immediate mitigations Patching: Prioritize the remediation of both CVE-2026-21509 and CVE-2026-21513 across the entire fleet immediately.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details →
APT28

Hunting APT28: How We Caught Covenant Grunt Hiding in Office Documents

via blueteamsecinfosec.pub
TA422

The exploitation delivers a multi-stage infection chain culminating in the NotDoor Outlook backdoor and Covenant Grunt implants.

via proofpointproofpoint.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

22 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence1

In these attacks, phishing emails with geopolitically-charged narratives related to transnational weapons smuggling, military training programs, and meteorological emergency bulletins contain weaponized documents that exploit CVE-2026-21509...

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence4

Proofpoint telemetry observed CVE-2026-21509 in targeted spear-phishing campaigns delivering weaponized document attachments with high-fidelity institutional lures — official letterheads, bilingual formatting, ministerial seals.

Execution

4 techniques
T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence1

"The shellcode employs CLR hosting to load and execute an embedded .NET assembly in-memory: a Covenant Grunt implant..."

T1129Shared ModulesEvidence1

The main purpose of this 64-bit shellcode is to load a .NET assembly embedded inside it. In order to load a managed assembly from native code, the shellcode uses the CLR hosting technique.

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence8

CVE-2026-21509, a remote code execution vulnerability in Microsoft Office affecting RTF and OLE document processing... weaponized the flaw in malicious RTF files targeting Ukrainian government agencies and European defense, transportation, and diplomatic entities.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

이들은 스피어피싱 문서, LNK 기반 익스플로잇, WebDAV 외부 호출, COM 하이재킹, 스테가노그래피 등 복잡한 다단계 로딩 체인을 활용해 탐지를 우회하고 최종적으로 Covenant Grunt 등 원격제어 임플란트를 설치해 장기간 내부 장악력을 유지했다.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1546.015Component Object Model HijackingEvidence2

They employed complex multi-stage loading chains—including spear-phishing documents, LNK-based exploits, WebDAV external calls, COM hijacking...

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence1

They employed complex multi-stage loading chains—including spear-phishing documents, LNK-based exploits...

Privilege Escalation

3 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

The entire chain is designed for resilience and evasion, utilizing encrypted payloads, legitimate cloud services for C2, in-memory execution, and process injection to minimize forensic artifacts

T1546.015Component Object Model HijackingEvidence2

They employed complex multi-stage loading chains—including spear-phishing documents, LNK-based exploits, WebDAV external calls, COM hijacking...

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence1

They employed complex multi-stage loading chains—including spear-phishing documents, LNK-based exploits...

Stealth

4 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence3

The entire chain is designed for resilience and evasion, utilizing encrypted payloads... Zscaler said... similar techniques, including... XOR string encryption techniques...

T1027.003SteganographyEvidence5

PixyNetLoader loads the .PNG file, extracts a Covenant Grunt payload from the pixels’ LSBs... The payload is contained in the least significant bits of the file’s pixels.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

The entire chain is designed for resilience and evasion, utilizing encrypted payloads, legitimate cloud services for C2, in-memory execution, and process injection to minimize forensic artifacts

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence5

In-memory assembly loading: The malware uses System.Reflection.Assembly.Load(byte[]) to load the .NET assembly directly from the in-memory byte array.

Command and Control

7 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence3

The Grunt payload uses the FILEN cloud service as its command-and-control channel.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence4

The malware abuses the legitimate end-to-end encrypted cloud storage service Filen.io for C&C communications.

T1090.002External ProxyEvidence1

“the implant uses the Filen API as a C2Bridge to communicate and receive tasks from the threat actor. This abuse of legitimate APIs…”

T1102Web ServiceEvidence2

By leveraging this trusted service, the malicious traffic blends in with normal encrypted web traffic, effectively bypassing reputation-based filtering and firewall rules.

T1102.003One-Way CommunicationEvidence1

"Abused Filen API as a C2 bridge between the implant and actor-controlled Covenant listener"

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

GammaPhish is designed to deploy GammaLoad first

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence1

Ultimately, they installed remote control implants like Covenant Grunt to maintain long-term internal control.

Exfiltration

3 techniques
T1048Exfiltration Over Alternative ProtocolEvidence2

They employed complex multi-stage loading chains—including spear-phishing documents, LNK-based exploits, WebDAV external calls...

T1048.003Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 ProtocolEvidence1

Ingress domains: ingest.filen.io (for data exfiltration)

T1567.002Exfiltration to Cloud StorageEvidence1

"It uses a legitimate cloud service called Filen to communicate with the hackers, making the stolen data look like regular, harmless internet traffic."

Indicators of compromise

Observables

1 indicator attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

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IOC matching1Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities2CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping22Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.