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Malware1 associated actor

GnatSpy

Tracked since Feb 3, 2026 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK14Techniques
IOCs1Tracked
Type
Spyware
Capabilities
ReconnaissanceExfiltration
Platforms
Android

GnatSpy is an Android spyware family associated with the cyberespionage actor Arid Viper, also known as APT-C-23 and Desert Falcon. Publicly documented in December 2017, it belongs to the actor’s evolving mobile surveillance toolkit. GnatSpy extends VAMP’s surveillance functionality, including call recording and collection of contacts and documents, with additional collection of battery usage, memory, storage, and SIM-card information. It supports uploading collected information to attacker-controlled infrastructure.

GnatSpy shares code and upload functionality with later Arid Viper Android spyware, including SpyC23, demonstrating continuity across the actor’s mobile tooling. Its operational context is espionage in the Middle East, where Arid Viper has targeted Palestinian and Israeli individuals and organizations, including government and security personnel, journalists, and dissidents.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Arid Viper

GnatSpy, which expands VAMP's functionality by collecting information about battery usage, memory, storage, and SIM card status.

via ptsecurity globalglobal.ptsecurity.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

14 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

This spike in account creation towards the later half of 2019 was observed alongside an increase in attempts to distribute both iOS and Android malware as well as phish credentials from users.

Execution

2 techniques
T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

In all cases the successful installation of these tools did not require any exploits. This suggests that Arid Viper operators continue to heavily rely on social engineering to distribute their malware.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence2

That campaign featured several apps designed to mimic Telegram and Android application update managers.

Stealth

3 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

The main changes from earlier research centered primarily around code obfuscation being added by those developing this malware.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

Facebook found recent variants pretending to be popular Android applications for dating, networking, and regional banking in the Middle East.

T1564.001Hidden Files and DirectoriesEvidence1

the values for those C2 domains first contacted weren’t hardcoded in the Java layer, where they would be clearly visible, instead they were encrypted and stored in a separate ELF binary.

Collection

5 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

Retrieve photos from the camera roll ... Retrieve contacts ... Retrieve text messages ... Search for and return the path of files with a doc or PDF extension

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

The analyzed Arid Viper Android malware contained the following functionality: • Take screenshots or record video

T1123Audio CaptureEvidence1

Phenakite periodically recording audio and notifying C2 infrastructure... Similarly, Phenakite periodically uses the camera of a compromised device to take photos

T1125Video CaptureEvidence1

Phenakite periodically uses the camera of a compromised device to take photos and sends these automatically to attacker infrastructure.

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

Search for files of specific types and add them to RAR archives for exfiltration

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1001Data ObfuscationEvidence1

Use Base64 to obfuscate command and control communications

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

Some Primewire samples utilize “multipart/form-data” for command and control check-ins... other samples combine the C2 parameters into a single “application/x-www-form-urlencoded” POST body.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

uploading any files present before recursively uploading any files in subdirectories.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

1 indicator attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

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IOC matching1Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping14Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.