GnatSpy
- Type
- Spyware
- Capabilities
- ReconnaissanceExfiltration
- Platforms
- Android
GnatSpy is an Android spyware family associated with the cyberespionage actor Arid Viper, also known as APT-C-23 and Desert Falcon. Publicly documented in December 2017, it belongs to the actor’s evolving mobile surveillance toolkit. GnatSpy extends VAMP’s surveillance functionality, including call recording and collection of contacts and documents, with additional collection of battery usage, memory, storage, and SIM-card information. It supports uploading collected information to attacker-controlled infrastructure.
GnatSpy shares code and upload functionality with later Arid Viper Android spyware, including SpyC23, demonstrating continuity across the actor’s mobile tooling. Its operational context is espionage in the Middle East, where Arid Viper has targeted Palestinian and Israeli individuals and organizations, including government and security personnel, journalists, and dissidents.
Associated threat actors
1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
GnatSpy, which expands VAMP's functionality by collecting information about battery usage, memory, storage, and SIM card status.
Techniques & procedures
14 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
1 technique
Initial Access
This spike in account creation towards the later half of 2019 was observed alongside an increase in attempts to distribute both iOS and Android malware as well as phish credentials from users.
Execution
2 techniques
Execution
In all cases the successful installation of these tools did not require any exploits. This suggests that Arid Viper operators continue to heavily rely on social engineering to distribute their malware.
That campaign featured several apps designed to mimic Telegram and Android application update managers.
Stealth
3 techniques
Stealth
The main changes from earlier research centered primarily around code obfuscation being added by those developing this malware.
Facebook found recent variants pretending to be popular Android applications for dating, networking, and regional banking in the Middle East.
the values for those C2 domains first contacted weren’t hardcoded in the Java layer, where they would be clearly visible, instead they were encrypted and stored in a separate ELF binary.
Collection
5 techniques
Collection
Retrieve photos from the camera roll ... Retrieve contacts ... Retrieve text messages ... Search for and return the path of files with a doc or PDF extension
The analyzed Arid Viper Android malware contained the following functionality: • Take screenshots or record video
Phenakite periodically recording audio and notifying C2 infrastructure... Similarly, Phenakite periodically uses the camera of a compromised device to take photos
Phenakite periodically uses the camera of a compromised device to take photos and sends these automatically to attacker infrastructure.
Search for files of specific types and add them to RAR archives for exfiltration
Command and Control
2 techniques
Command and Control
Use Base64 to obfuscate command and control communications
Some Primewire samples utilize “multipart/form-data” for command and control check-ins... other samples combine the C2 parameters into a single “application/x-www-form-urlencoded” POST body.
Exfiltration
1 technique
Exfiltration
uploading any files present before recursively uploading any files in subdirectories.
Observables
1 indicator attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
8 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.