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Malware1 associated actor

VAMP

Tracked since Feb 3, 2026 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK16Techniques
IOCs97Tracked
Type
Spyware
Capabilities
Exfiltration
Delivery
PhishingLanding page
Platforms
Android

VAMP is an Android spyware family used in targeted cyberespionage and associated with Arid Viper, also known as Desert Falcon and APT-C-23. It records telephone calls and steals contacts, messages, and documents stored on infected devices, enabling surveillance of victims’ communications and collection of sensitive personal information.

VAMP has appeared in a multi-platform espionage toolkit alongside the Windows malware families KASPERAGENT and MICROPSIA and the Android downloader SECUREUPDATE. Broader campaigns involving this toolkit targeted users primarily in the United States, Israel, the Palestinian territories, and Egypt, with some media organizations also targeted. VAMP shares code and functionality with other Android spyware associated with Arid Viper, including FrozenCell and later SpyC23 variants. These relationships link it to the actor’s continuing development of mobile surveillance tooling, but do not establish that all capabilities of those related families are present in VAMP.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Arid Viper

VAMP, designed to steal data through call recording and stealing contacts and documents stored on the device.

via ptsecurity globalglobal.ptsecurity.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

16 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

This spike in account creation towards the later half of 2019 was observed alongside an increase in attempts to distribute both iOS and Android malware as well as phish credentials from users.

Execution

2 techniques
T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

In all cases the successful installation of these tools did not require any exploits. This suggests that Arid Viper operators continue to heavily rely on social engineering to distribute their malware.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence2

That campaign featured several apps designed to mimic Telegram and Android application update managers.

Stealth

3 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

The main changes from earlier research centered primarily around code obfuscation being added by those developing this malware.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

Facebook found recent variants pretending to be popular Android applications for dating, networking, and regional banking in the Middle East.

T1564.001Hidden Files and DirectoriesEvidence1

the values for those C2 domains first contacted weren’t hardcoded in the Java layer, where they would be clearly visible, instead they were encrypted and stored in a separate ELF binary.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

A competitor killer feature... Killing matches and binding their ports to prevent re-infection

Discovery

1 technique
T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

A competitor killer feature Scans of /proc for memory signatures of Mirai, QBOT, Vamp, Anime and dvrHelper

Collection

5 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

Retrieve photos from the camera roll ... Retrieve contacts ... Retrieve text messages ... Search for and return the path of files with a doc or PDF extension

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

The analyzed Arid Viper Android malware contained the following functionality: • Take screenshots or record video

T1123Audio CaptureEvidence2

Features of the malware include: Ability to record calls

T1125Video CaptureEvidence1

Phenakite periodically uses the camera of a compromised device to take photos and sends these automatically to attacker infrastructure.

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

Search for files of specific types and add them to RAR archives for exfiltration

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1001Data ObfuscationEvidence1

Use Base64 to obfuscate command and control communications

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

Some Primewire samples utilize “multipart/form-data” for command and control check-ins... other samples combine the C2 parameters into a single “application/x-www-form-urlencoded” POST body.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence2

Exfilitrate arbitrary files (zip compressed and encrypted)

Indicators of compromise

Observables

97 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching97Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping16Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.