Skip to main content
Mallory
Back to malware
MalwareUsed by 1 actor

SilentCryptoMiner

SilentCryptoMiner is an open-source cryptocurrency miner that has been modified and deployed maliciously in multiple cryptojacking campaigns. Reported variants silently abuse victim CPU and GPU resources to mine cryptocurrency, including Monero and, in some builds, Ethereum. Across the cited reporting, SilentCryptoMiner has been delivered through fake software installers, ISO images, pirated streaming and digital library sites using fake update or browser crash prompts, and loaders that use DLL side-loading. One January 2025 campaign documented by Doctor Web also distributed components via steganography in specially crafted images.

Observed behavior includes in-memory loading after decryption, junk-code padding and packing for anti-analysis, use of direct system calls for evasion, disabling Windows sleep and hibernation to maximize mining uptime, and persistence via scheduled tasks, Run registry keys, or fake services such as GoogleUpdateTaskMachineQC. Some variants inject a watchdog into conhost.exe and the miner into explorer.exe; the watchdog restores the miner from encrypted backup or reinstalls artifacts if removed. Elastic reported variants that use the signed vulnerable driver WinRing0x64.sys/WinRing0.sys to tune CPU settings and improve mining performance. Kaspersky-reported activity described a modified fork that collected processor metadata and disk serial numbers and exfiltrated them via DNS tunneling disguised as traffic to domains such as microsoft.com. That campaign also disabled built-in security controls, deleted Microsoft’s Malicious Software Removal Tool when run with administrator privileges, and repeatedly prompted for elevation when not elevated.

SilentCryptoMiner has been observed alongside additional malware including RAT components, watchdogs, CNB Bot, PureRAT, PureMiner, Vidar Stealer, Kraken RAT, and custom loaders. In Kaspersky- and Securelist-reported campaigns, a RAT component communicated through dynamically generated domains and allowed operators to execute arbitrary commands, run files, deploy additional malware, or custom shellcode. Elastic linked SilentCryptoMiner deployment to the financially motivated cluster REF1695, active since at least late 2023, which used fake installers, GitHub-hosted payload staging, anti-analysis checks for tools such as Task Manager and Wireshark, and monetized victims through Monero mining and CPA fraud. Doctor Web reported SilentCryptoMiner infections affecting Russian users via fake VPN and DPI bypass tools and separately documented a January 2025 Monero-mining campaign.

High-confidence indicators mentioned in the content include the malicious archive download URL urush1bar4[.]online; SHA1 6A0FE6065D76715FEEBC1526D456DB737F624407 for a malicious DLL; RAT/C2-related domains 5d14vnfb[.]space, r7mvjl67[.]space, zgj1tam9[.]space, jeaw520i[.]space, and qdmagva5[.]space; miner configuration server IP 107[.]172[.]212[.]235; UnamWebPanel addresses m4yuri[.]online and kristina[.]quest; and GitHub accounts lebnabar198 and ugurlutaha6116 used to host related payloads. Additional hashes cited in reporting on layered obfuscation involving SilentCryptoMiner include cf1d985a33b39d332d4bac33d971a004dcd18cea82ff1b291c6a5046e073414d, e3505901fd44c8f6597ca9c512375b6ecbf3dc21dbae3d373318c99929d62091, and b86612a6d62a1789031248bdb732b8bff51acaeaa687c3559f0980560a8abf2f.

Share:
For your environment

Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details
REF1695

However, instead of the promised software, a series of loaders installs a malicious toolkit including CNB Bot, PureRAT, and SilentCryptoMiner.

via hackreadhackread.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

27 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence1

By visiting pirated movie and TV show streaming sites, users are met with a fake alert claiming their video player plugin is out of date. One click on that fake update button kicks off an infection.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

The infection chain leveraged a fake update for a video player plugin. When the user attempted to watch a video, the player displayed a message saying the plugin version was outdated and asking to install an update to continue. Clicking the link downloaded a ZIP archive.

Execution

5 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence4
TacticExecution

operators retain full authority to run arbitrary commands or custom shellcode remotely

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1
TacticExecution

powercfg / x - hibernate - timeout - ac 0 ... powercfg / x - standby - timeout - dc 0

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence1
TacticExecution

a hidden function inside the file actively triggers a strategic stack overflow ... This overflow systematically builds a customized return-oriented programming chain to decrypt the primary payload

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1
TacticExecution

users attempting to watch videos encounter a deceptive alert about an outdated application ... fake browser crash pages to trigger downloads ... Once a victim runs the installer, an intricate execution process unfolds silently

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1
TacticExecution

Актуальная версия загружаемого вредоносного ПО представляет собой ZIP-архив, содержащий легитимный .exe-файл и вредоносную DLL-библиотеку. При запуске исполняемого файла библиотека подгружается в его процесс, после чего начинается выполнение вредоносной логики.

Persistence

3 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

To prevent MSRT from being automatically installed during the next update, the DontOfferThroughWUAU parameter is created with a value of 1 under the HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\MRT registry key.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence3

To stay on the device, the malware registers itself as a fake Google service named GoogleUpdateTaskMachineQC, which launches automatically at every system startup.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence2

...настраивается автозагрузка копии майнера из этой папки путем добавления записи в HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run

T1055Process InjectionEvidence3

Once full control is established, the malware injects separate sub-components into core processes

T1055.012Process HollowingEvidence2

The encrypted data is then converted into a base64 string, which is passed as a command-line parameter to launch the miner inside the explorer.exe process through process hollowing.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence3

To stay on the device, the malware registers itself as a fake Google service named GoogleUpdateTaskMachineQC, which launches automatically at every system startup.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence2

...настраивается автозагрузка копии майнера из этой папки путем добавления записи в HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run

T1548Abuse Elevation Control MechanismEvidence1

standard user runs will continuously trigger intrusive privilege prompts . This aggressive routine loops every three minutes until the victim yields control

Stealth

7 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence2
TacticStealth

the malicious library file contains significant amounts of generated junk code . This random data deliberately inflates the asset size to frustrate automated sandbox analysis

T1036MasqueradingEvidence2
TacticStealth

the attackers craft custom network packets to disguise this traffic as standard communication . For instance, the outbound queries mimic connections to legitimate domains like microsoft.com

T1055Process InjectionEvidence3

Once full control is established, the malware injects separate sub-components into core processes

T1055.012Process HollowingEvidence2

The encrypted data is then converted into a base64 string, which is passed as a command-line parameter to launch the miner inside the explorer.exe process through process hollowing.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1
TacticStealth

It kills Microsoft's Malicious Software Removal Tool (MSRT) by calling ZwSetInformationFile with the FileDispositionInformation type, which causes the mrt.exe file to be deleted upon closing.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

Only after receiving a specific approval signal from the server does the malware proceed, showing that attackers carefully filter targets to avoid tripping security test environments.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence4
TacticStealth

this shellcode reflectively loads the main module completely inside system memory

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

To prevent MSRT from being automatically installed during the next update, the DontOfferThroughWUAU parameter is created with a value of 1 under the HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\MRT registry key.

Discovery

2 techniques
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence2
TacticDiscovery

the main module gathers basic processor metadata and disk serial numbers

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

Only after receiving a specific approval signal from the server does the malware proceed, showing that attackers carefully filter targets to avoid tripping security test environments.

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence2

The command-and-control addresses used to receive these commands follow this format: http://{domain}.space/index.php?authorization=1

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

Адреса управления, с которых происходит получение команд, имеют следующий вид: http://{domain}.space/index.php?authorization=1

T1071.004DNSEvidence4

It then transmits this hardware information by utilizing advanced DNS tunneling techniques

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

The decrypted data contains a malicious payload, as well as its RSA-SHA256 signature... The table below lists the four remote control commands... 2 Reflexive execution of the provided PE file within the explorer.exe process 3 Execution of the provided shellcode

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence2

a remote access trojan agent handles direct operator communications ... operators retain full authority to run arbitrary commands or custom shellcode remotely

T1568Dynamic ResolutionEvidence2

This agent utilizes dynamically generated domains to receive administrative instructions

Impact

1 technique
T1496Resource HijackingEvidence2
TacticImpact

The core payload is a modified version of an open-source cryptocurrency miner called SilentCryptoMiner. Once active, it silently uses the victim’s CPU and GPU to mine cryptocurrency without the user noticing.

Other

1 technique
T1562Impair DefensesEvidence2

If running with administrator rights, the threat disables built-in operating system security utilities . It actively deletes Microsoft’s Malicious Software Removal Tool

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

34 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Network
19 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
9 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

Other
6 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app7 days ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app7 days ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app7 days ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app7 days ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app7 days ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app7 days ago
ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

10 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching34

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping27

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.