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Malware3 associated actors

Buer

Tracked since Feb 3, 2026 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors3Associated
ATT&CK33Techniques
IOCs50Tracked
Type
Loader
Capabilities
Initial accessPersistenceDefense evasionProcess injectionPost exploitationReconnaissance
Delivery
PhishingSpearphishingMalvertisingExploit kitMalspam
Platforms
Windows

Buer Loader is a modular Windows malware loader first observed in 2019 and sold on underground forums as a malware-as-a-service offering. It is designed to establish an initial foothold on compromised systems and deliver follow-on payloads, including banking trojans, stealers, Cobalt Strike, SystemBC, and ransomware. Buer has been repeatedly linked to intrusion chains that culminated in Ryuk and later Conti-related activity, and it has also been used by crews associated with TrickBot. A Rust-based rewrite known as RustyBuer was later introduced, apparently to preserve compatibility with existing Buer infrastructure while improving evasion against detections focused on earlier C-based builds.

Buer is typically used as a first-stage downloader or loader rather than as the final payload. Its command-and-control model supports victim profiling, tasking, payload download and execution, and campaign management through a dedicated panel. Reported bot telemetry includes host identifiers, operating system and architecture details, processor count, privilege level, and computer name, enabling operators to filter and prioritize infections. Later development added enterprise-oriented host and domain profiling functionality and direct shellcode-loading support, allowing operators to deploy in-memory payloads such as Cobalt Strike without a separate stager.

The malware incorporates multiple anti-analysis and defense-evasion features, including debugger checks, virtual-machine detection, API hashing, and geofencing to avoid execution on systems in Commonwealth of Independent States countries. It has been observed using HTTPS-based command-and-control with encrypted tasking, surrogate-process execution, in-memory loading, and process injection. Persistence has been reported through mechanisms including RunOnce entries and startup shortcut creation, depending on the variant and campaign.

Observed delivery vectors include malicious macro-enabled Office documents in phishing and spearphishing campaigns, reply-chain email lures, cloud-hosted malicious documents, exploit-kit delivery through malvertising, and trojanized software distribution. Campaign themes have included shipping notices, payroll or tax lures, and fake business documents. In some operations, Buer served as an access broker platform, with operators apparently selling or transferring footholds to other criminal actors for later post-exploitation and ransomware deployment.

Buer has been associated with broad criminal targeting rather than a single vertical, but reporting shows impact across enterprise environments and use in campaigns affecting hundreds of organizations across dozens of sectors. Its role in ransomware precursor activity, modular design, and continued adaptation made it a notable loader in the Windows cybercrime ecosystem.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

3 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Stealth Mango

rule win_buer_auto { ... description = "Detects win.buer." ... malpedia_reference = "https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.buer" ... }

FAKESECURITY

While analyzing the infrastructure, we discovered the Buer and Smoke loaders.

via group ibgroup-ib.com
Trickbot

One of the crews involved in TrickBot has been utilizing Buer loader for sometime now to ultimately deliver CobaltStrike and ultimately leading to ransomware.

via walmart global tech infosecmedium.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

33 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

5 techniques
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence2

According to Stern, Netwalker will use the TrickBot botnet to distribute their malware.

T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence1

Figure 2: HTTP network traffic trace with the Fallout EK exploiting vulnerable browsers

T1566PhishingEvidence5

The campaigns generally used DHL-themed phishing emails to distribute malicious Word or Excel documents.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence3

On August 28, Proofpoint researchers observed malicious email messages that appear to reply to earlier legitimate email conversations. They contained Microsoft Word attachments that use Microsoft Office macros to download the next stage payload.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence2

They contained a link to a malicious Microsoft Word or Excel document download that used macros to drop the new malware variant.

Execution

8 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

Depending on the version, the registry entry will execute the malware directly or schedule a task to execute it.

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence3

The C2 functions are handled via HTTP(S) POST requests.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

Upon launch, the Buer bot does a number of things to set up shop. The bot executes two sets of PowerShell commands...

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence4

They contained a link to a malicious Microsoft Word or Excel document download that used macros to drop the new malware variant.

T1106Native APIEvidence1

Otherwise, the dropper then dumps the Buer bot in memory and executes it.

T1129Shared ModulesEvidence1

Buer’s new functionality around loading shellcode as a task allowing for broader functionality against targets without the need for downloading a separate CobaltStrike stager.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence2

The loader was delivered by a malicious document stored on Google Docs, which required the victim to enable scripted content to activate.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

The file is a lure document with malicious macros. When activated, it downloads a payload from http://cloudupdate.co[.]za/documents/msofficeupdate.exe.

Persistence

3 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

Depending on the version, the registry entry will execute the malware directly or schedule a task to execute it.

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

Buer queries the Windows Registry for the value of \Microsoft\Cryptography\MachineGuid to get the unique identifier for the infected machine.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence2

autorun - indicates whether to setup Registry RunOnce persistence for the payload modules

Privilege Escalation

3 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

Depending on the version, the registry entry will execute the malware directly or schedule a task to execute it.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

the injection into the surrogate process fails ... the loader will execute under its own process instead.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence2

autorun - indicates whether to setup Registry RunOnce persistence for the payload modules

Stealth

9 techniques
T1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileEvidence1

This sample contains a function to encrypt strings.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

The author also notes that the loader runs as a surrogate process of a trusted application

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

the injection into the surrogate process fails ... the loader will execute under its own process instead.

T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence1

The payload of that malicious document was named print_document.exe. Like other Buer dropper samples we’ve analyzed, it was a digitally signed binary, using a stolen and now-revoked certificate issued by DigiCert.

T1218.011Rundll32Evidence1

The bot can be configured for execution either as a 32-bit Windows executable or as a DLL.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

Checks for virtual machines using the Red Pill, No Pill, and related mechanisms

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

Checks locale to make sure the malware is not running in specific countries

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1

method - method of execution: ... memload - inject and manually load payload memloadex - inject and manually load payload loaddllmem - inject and manually load payload

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence2

It first checks for the presence of a debugger to evade forensic analysis...

Defense Impairment

2 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

Buer queries the Windows Registry for the value of \Microsoft\Cryptography\MachineGuid to get the unique identifier for the infected machine.

T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

...another (add-mppreference -exclusionpath) to make changes to Windows Defender’s exclusion list—concealing files it downloads from Windows’ built-in malware protection.

Discovery

6 techniques
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

Buer’s ‘DomainInfo’ component which is ultimately designed to profile some information about the infected system and the network that it is joined to.

T1482Domain Trust DiscoveryEvidence1

The data gathered is constructed into a JSON blob listing ‘Id’, ‘Domains’, ‘Group’ and ‘Server’.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

Checks for virtual machines using the Red Pill, No Pill, and related mechanisms

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

Checks locale to make sure the malware is not running in specific countries

T1614.001System Language DiscoveryEvidence1

...and then checks language and localization settings to determine the geographic region of the system being attacked. If the settings match a CIS country, it will exit without depositing the malware.

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence2

It first checks for the presence of a debugger to evade forensic analysis...

Command and Control

4 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence2

Command and control (C&C) functions are handled via HTTP(S) GET requests.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

The C2 functions are handled via HTTP(S) POST requests.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence6

Proofpoint researchers observed RustyBuer distributing Cobalt Strike Beacon as a second-stage payload in some instances.

T1568.001Fast Flux DNSEvidence1

The loader uses a FastFlux architecture.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

After all the data has been collected it will simply post it off to the C2, in doing so a hardcoded User-Agent is passed in.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

50 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

14 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

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IOC matching50Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors3Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping33Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.