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Malware2 associated actors1 associated CVE

Amaranth Loader

Tracked since Feb 4, 2026 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns1Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK6Techniques
IOCs0Tracked
Type
Loader
Capabilities
Defense evasionDLL sideloading
Delivery
Lure
Platforms
Windows

Amaranth Loader is a custom Windows first-stage loader used by the China-linked Amaranth-Dragon threat cluster in targeted cyberespionage operations. It retrieves an AES key from an external service, obtains an encrypted payload from a separate location, and decrypts and executes that payload directly in memory. Its principal observed follow-on payload is the Havoc command-and-control framework. The loader is launched through DLL side-loading using a legitimate executable, and its encrypted configuration and in-memory payload execution support defense evasion. It shares technical similarities with the APT41-associated tools DodgeBox, DUSTPAN, and DUSTTRAP.

Amaranth Loader has been deployed in campaigns targeting government and law enforcement organizations across Southeast Asia, including Cambodia, Thailand, Laos, Indonesia, Singapore, and the Philippines. Delivery chains have used cloud-hosted archives and politically themed lures aligned with local events. Earlier chains used ZIP archives containing shortcut files and batch scripts; later chains exploited the WinRAR path traversal vulnerability CVE-2025-8088 through crafted RAR archives. Exploitation enabled placement of launch components in the Windows Startup folder for persistence and subsequent execution. Associated delivery and command-and-control infrastructure used Cloudflare protection and geographic access restrictions to limit payload delivery to intended target countries. The campaigns emphasized sustained access and geopolitical intelligence collection.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2025-8088via threatlandscapeExploited in the wildWinRAR Archive Extraction Path Traversal Leading to Code ExecutionMultiple intrusion sets have been observed actively exploiting CVE-2025-8088, a path traversal vulnerability in WinRAR, to establish initial access and deploy modular malware frameworks. Affected software: WinRAR prior to version 7.13.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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APT41

The archive contains several files, including a malicious DLL named Amaranth Loader that's launched by means of DLL side-loading... Once executed, the loader is designed to contact an external server to retrieve an encryption key, which is then used to decrypt an encrypted payload retrieved from a different URL and execute it directly in memory.

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com
Amaranth-Dragon

The archive contains several files, including a malicious DLL named Amaranth Loader that's launched by means of DLL side-loading... Once executed, the loader is designed to contact an external server to retrieve an encryption key, which is then used to decrypt an encrypted payload retrieved from a different URL and execute it directly in memory.

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

6 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

"... suggests the use of spear-phishing emails to distribute the archive files hosted on well-known cloud platforms like Dropbox ..."

Execution

2 techniques
T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence1

"Attack chains ... have been found to abuse CVE-2025-8088 ... impacting RARLAB WinRAR that allows for arbitrary code execution when specially crafted archives are opened by targets."

T1204.001Malicious LinkEvidence1

"... early iterations ... made use of ZIP files containing Windows shortcuts (LNK) ..."; "Present within the compressed file is a single LNK file that, when launched, triggers the execution of a PowerShell command ..."

Stealth

2 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence2

Encrypted configuration embedded in the binary

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1

"... decrypt an encrypted payload ... and execute it directly in memory."

Command and Control

1 technique
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

"... distribute the archive files hosted on well-known cloud platforms like Dropbox ..."; "... distribute a password-protected RAR archive from Dropbox ..."

Activity feed

Recent activity

5 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

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Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities1CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping6Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.