Amaranth Loader
- Type
- Loader
- Capabilities
- Defense evasionDLL sideloading
- Delivery
- Lure
- Platforms
- Windows
Amaranth Loader is a custom Windows first-stage loader used by the China-linked Amaranth-Dragon threat cluster in targeted cyberespionage operations. It retrieves an AES key from an external service, obtains an encrypted payload from a separate location, and decrypts and executes that payload directly in memory. Its principal observed follow-on payload is the Havoc command-and-control framework. The loader is launched through DLL side-loading using a legitimate executable, and its encrypted configuration and in-memory payload execution support defense evasion. It shares technical similarities with the APT41-associated tools DodgeBox, DUSTPAN, and DUSTTRAP.
Amaranth Loader has been deployed in campaigns targeting government and law enforcement organizations across Southeast Asia, including Cambodia, Thailand, Laos, Indonesia, Singapore, and the Philippines. Delivery chains have used cloud-hosted archives and politically themed lures aligned with local events. Earlier chains used ZIP archives containing shortcut files and batch scripts; later chains exploited the WinRAR path traversal vulnerability CVE-2025-8088 through crafted RAR archives. Exploitation enabled placement of launch components in the Windows Startup folder for persistence and subsequent execution. Associated delivery and command-and-control infrastructure used Cloudflare protection and geographic access restrictions to limit payload delivery to intended target countries. The campaigns emphasized sustained access and geopolitical intelligence collection.
Associated vulnerabilities
1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
Associated threat actors
2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
The archive contains several files, including a malicious DLL named Amaranth Loader that's launched by means of DLL side-loading... Once executed, the loader is designed to contact an external server to retrieve an encryption key, which is then used to decrypt an encrypted payload retrieved from a different URL and execute it directly in memory.
The archive contains several files, including a malicious DLL named Amaranth Loader that's launched by means of DLL side-loading... Once executed, the loader is designed to contact an external server to retrieve an encryption key, which is then used to decrypt an encrypted payload retrieved from a different URL and execute it directly in memory.
Techniques & procedures
6 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
1 technique
Initial Access
"... suggests the use of spear-phishing emails to distribute the archive files hosted on well-known cloud platforms like Dropbox ..."
Execution
2 techniques
Execution
"Attack chains ... have been found to abuse CVE-2025-8088 ... impacting RARLAB WinRAR that allows for arbitrary code execution when specially crafted archives are opened by targets."
"... early iterations ... made use of ZIP files containing Windows shortcuts (LNK) ..."; "Present within the compressed file is a single LNK file that, when launched, triggers the execution of a PowerShell command ..."
Stealth
2 techniques
Stealth
Encrypted configuration embedded in the binary
"... decrypt an encrypted payload ... and execute it directly in memory."
Command and Control
1 technique
Command and Control
"... distribute the archive files hosted on well-known cloud platforms like Dropbox ..."; "... distribute a password-protected RAR archive from Dropbox ..."
Recent activity
5 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.