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Malware1 associated actor

Diaoyu

Tracked since Feb 5, 2026 · Updated 9 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK5Techniques
IOCs1Tracked

Diaoyu (original filename observed: "DiaoYu.exe") is a custom malware loader used in Palo Alto Networks Unit 42’s reported global espionage activity dubbed “Shadow Campaigns,” attributed with high confidence to an Asia-based state-sponsored actor tracked as TGR-STA-1030/UNC6619 (CISA is also tracking TGR-STA-1030). Diaoyu has been delivered via tailored phishing: emails to government officials linked to malicious archives hosted on mega[.]nz (including a zero-byte PNG named pic1.png) that contained the loader. Unit 42 also reported the broader campaign used exploitation of at least 15 known vulnerabilities (including in SAP Solution Manager, Microsoft Exchange Server, D-Link, Microsoft Windows, and Atlassian products) for initial access.

Behavior/capabilities described by Unit 42 include multiple evasion checks: requiring a horizontal screen resolution of at least 1440; checking for the presence of pic1.png as a file-based integrity check; and checking for running processes associated with Kaspersky, Avira, Bitdefender, SentinelOne, and Symantec/Norton. Under certain conditions, Diaoyu can fetch and deploy Cobalt Strike payloads and the VShell framework for command-and-control (C2).

The associated operations primarily targeted government and critical infrastructure organizations globally (Unit 42 confirmed at least 70 compromises across 37 countries, with additional reconnaissance targeting government entities connected to 155 countries), including ministries and agencies spanning law enforcement/border control, finance/trade, energy/mining, immigration, and diplomatic functions. No specific Diaoyu network indicators (e.g., hashes, C2 IPs/domains) were provided in the content beyond the mega[.]nz hosting and the referenced decoy/marker file name pic1.png.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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TGR-STA-1030

"The compressed files contained a malware loader called Diaoyu..." / "the Diaoyu loader would fetch Cobalt Strike payloads and the VShell framework for command-and-control (C2) under certain conditions..."

via bleeping computerbleepingcomputer.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

5 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566.003Spearphishing via ServiceEvidence1

"Early operations relied on highly tailored phishing emails sent to government officials... The emails embedded links to malicious archives... hosted on the Mega.nz storage service."

Execution

1 technique
T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

"The emails embedded links to malicious archives... The compressed files contained a malware loader called Diaoyu"

Stealth

1 technique
T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence2

"They're also using a custom loader dubbed 'Diaoyu' with some clever sandbox evasion tricks."

Discovery

2 techniques
T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence2

"They're also using a custom loader dubbed 'Diaoyu' with some clever sandbox evasion tricks."

T1518.001Security Software DiscoveryEvidence1

"To evade detection, the loader looks for running processes from... Kaspersky, Avira, Bitdefender, Sentinel One, and Norton"

Command and Control

1 technique
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

"...Diaoyu loader would fetch Cobalt Strike payloads and the VShell framework for command-and-control (C2)"

Indicators of compromise

Observables

1 indicator attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

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IOC matching1Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping5Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.