Diaoyu (original filename observed: "DiaoYu.exe") is a custom malware loader used in Palo Alto Networks Unit 42’s reported global espionage activity dubbed “Shadow Campaigns,” attributed with high confidence to an Asia-based state-sponsored actor tracked as TGR-STA-1030/UNC6619 (CISA is also tracking TGR-STA-1030). Diaoyu has been delivered via tailored phishing: emails to government officials linked to malicious archives hosted on mega[.]nz (including a zero-byte PNG named pic1.png) that contained the loader. Unit 42 also reported the broader campaign used exploitation of at least 15 known vulnerabilities (including in SAP Solution Manager, Microsoft Exchange Server, D-Link, Microsoft Windows, and Atlassian products) for initial access.
Behavior/capabilities described by Unit 42 include multiple evasion checks: requiring a horizontal screen resolution of at least 1440; checking for the presence of pic1.png as a file-based integrity check; and checking for running processes associated with Kaspersky, Avira, Bitdefender, SentinelOne, and Symantec/Norton. Under certain conditions, Diaoyu can fetch and deploy Cobalt Strike payloads and the VShell framework for command-and-control (C2).
The associated operations primarily targeted government and critical infrastructure organizations globally (Unit 42 confirmed at least 70 compromises across 37 countries, with additional reconnaissance targeting government entities connected to 155 countries), including ministries and agencies spanning law enforcement/border control, finance/trade, energy/mining, immigration, and diplomatic functions. No specific Diaoyu network indicators (e.g., hashes, C2 IPs/domains) were provided in the content beyond the mega[.]nz hosting and the referenced decoy/marker file name pic1.png.
1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
"The compressed files contained a malware loader called Diaoyu..." / "the Diaoyu loader would fetch Cobalt Strike payloads and the VShell framework for command-and-control (C2) under certain conditions..."
5 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
"Early operations relied on highly tailored phishing emails sent to government officials... The emails embedded links to malicious archives... hosted on the Mega.nz storage service."
"The emails embedded links to malicious archives... The compressed files contained a malware loader called Diaoyu"
"They're also using a custom loader dubbed 'Diaoyu' with some clever sandbox evasion tricks."
"They're also using a custom loader dubbed 'Diaoyu' with some clever sandbox evasion tricks."
"To evade detection, the loader looks for running processes from... Kaspersky, Avira, Bitdefender, Sentinel One, and Norton"
"...Diaoyu loader would fetch Cobalt Strike payloads and the VShell framework for command-and-control (C2)"
1 indicator attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
3 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.