Skip to main content
Mallory
Malware1 associated actor

Socks5Systemz

Tracked since Feb 8, 2026 · Updated 28 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK30Techniques
IOCs172Tracked
Type
Proxyware
Capabilities
PersistenceProcess injectionDefense evasion
Delivery
Cracked softwareSeo poisoningLure
Platforms
Windows

Socks5Systemz is Windows proxy malware that converts compromised systems into traffic-forwarding endpoints within a commercially rented botnet. Operators monetize victims’ network connections by selling third-party access to the resulting proxy infrastructure. Associated services include BoostyProxy and ProxyBox; the latter has been used for carding, credential stuffing, and identity theft. These activities exploit the proxy network rather than establish credential-stealing functionality in the malware itself.

Socks5Systemz is distributed through pay-per-install networks, cracked-software downloads, and loaders including PrivateLoader and Amadey. It has also been delivered by OfferLoader through infrastructure operated by the cybercriminal distribution cluster CL-CRI-1171, which uses trojanized installers, SEO poisoning, and gaming-related lures. Infections affect Windows systems worldwide rather than a single industry.

Its installation components decrypt and load a DLL payload into memory and establish persistence through Windows services, with alternative mechanisms including registry autorun entries or replacement of a legitimate updater. Analyzed variants employ encrypted resources, execution delays, self-overwriting loaders, timestamp manipulation, junk code, and control-flow obfuscation to hinder analysis. Command-and-control communication uses RC4-encrypted data over HTTP or HTTPS. Some variants locate active command servers through a domain generation algorithm and attacker-controlled DNS infrastructure. The bot supports commands to connect to or disconnect from backconnect servers, remain idle, and update proxy-related configuration. Backconnect infrastructure assigns infected hosts server-side ports through which authorized customers relay traffic, with access controlled by client allowlisting or authentication.

Is this in your environment?See whether this family's indicators match your telemetry and which of your assets are exposed to the CVEs associated with it.
Check your exposure
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details →
CL-CRI-1171

« Une infection ultérieure (juin 2026) a livré GCleaner et Socks5Systemz via la même infrastructure. »

via cyberveillecyberveille.ch
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

30 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence1

Using a bot named BoostyProxy, the threat actor built a complete proxy service that allows users to subscribe to the service, manage the existing subscriptions, and access the current list of available proxies.

T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence1

To build this massive network of residential IPs, ProxyBox acquires initial access by tricking users into downloading infected files from cracked software sites.

Execution

3 techniques
T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

In an attempt to regain their once previous numbers the ProxyBox operators are observed utilizing pay per install (PPI) sites which distribute the malware through cracked software sites... These sites utilize NSIS installers which will dynamically install a series of applications.

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence1

If file copy or service creation fails, the loader will try to kill all Google update processes and replace the GoogleUpdate.exe original executable by itself.

T1574.010Services File Permissions WeaknessEvidence1

If file copy or service creation fails, the loader will try to kill all Google update processes and replace the GoogleUpdate.exe original executable by itself.

Persistence

3 techniques
T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence1

Using a bot named BoostyProxy, the threat actor built a complete proxy service that allows users to subscribe to the service, manage the existing subscriptions, and access the current list of available proxies.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence3

The install option is responsible for setting up the persistence on the system and to do so it will try to copy the loader to C:\ProgramData\ContentDWSvc\ContentDWSvc.exe and create a Windows service to run the copied loader with both the name and display name set to ContentDWSvc.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

If the install flag is specified, persistence will first be attempted by registering a service; if this fails due to insufficient permissions or for any other reason, a run key will be created.

Privilege Escalation

3 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence2

The loader main function will load the resource with ID 400 to memory and decrypt it. The decrypted data will be a valid DLL file containing the proxy bot that will be injected in memory.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence3

The install option is responsible for setting up the persistence on the system and to do so it will try to copy the loader to C:\ProgramData\ContentDWSvc\ContentDWSvc.exe and create a Windows service to run the copied loader with both the name and display name set to ContentDWSvc.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

If the install flag is specified, persistence will first be attempted by registering a service; if this fails due to insufficient permissions or for any other reason, a run key will be created.

Stealth

11 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

The final payload of Socks5Systemz... heavily relies on junk code and control-flow obfuscation, making static analysis challenging.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

I had been surprised to see the malware was signed. (I was new, this form of trust abuse was unknown to me.)

T1055Process InjectionEvidence2

The loader main function will load the resource with ID 400 to memory and decrypt it. The decrypted data will be a valid DLL file containing the proxy bot that will be injected in memory.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

Chunks of the encrypted payload are embedded within the .text section... Once the loader stub decrypts the second stage module... To decrypt the resource, it extracts a 32-byte key from the end of the resource... Both requests and responses are RC4 encrypted using the same RC4 encryption key.

T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence1

The first operation the loader will perform in the main function is to register a service control handle... The advantage of this design decision is that it allows the module to function both as a service and as a regular PE/EXE.

T1497.003Time Based ChecksEvidence1

Before unpacking, the loader will sleep in a loop to delay execution, both before and in the middle of the memory loading process.

T1564Hide ArtifactsEvidence1

It also uses timestamp stomping, showing that it was compiled in 2011, which is false.

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence1

If file copy or service creation fails, the loader will try to kill all Google update processes and replace the GoogleUpdate.exe original executable by itself.

T1574.010Services File Permissions WeaknessEvidence1

If file copy or service creation fails, the loader will try to kill all Google update processes and replace the GoogleUpdate.exe original executable by itself.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1

Otherwise, if no flags are specified, the packed DLL will be memory-loaded into the current process without any further operations... The memory loader will fix relocations and zero the PE headers before transferring control to the DLL entry point.

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

A second advantage is that it complicates debugging... the first loader dynamically overwrites itself with the second stage during each run. Resulting in a loss of control and or a frustrating experience.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1553.002Code SigningEvidence1

I had been surprised to see the malware was signed... if the certificate became revoked—multiple systems like browsers and operation systems— would respond to the malware differently possibly preventing its download or execution.

Discovery

4 techniques
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence2

The plain text beacon string has the following format: client_id=%.8x&connected=%d&server_port=%d&debug=%d&os=%d.%d.%04d&dgt=%d&dti=%d

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence2

Next, the bot generates a 32-bit client ID based on the creation date of the Windows directory on the infected system.

T1497.003Time Based ChecksEvidence1

Before unpacking, the loader will sleep in a loop to delay execution, both before and in the middle of the memory loading process.

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

A second advantage is that it complicates debugging... the first loader dynamically overwrites itself with the second stage during each run. Resulting in a loss of control and or a frustrating experience.

Command and Control

10 techniques
T1001Data ObfuscationEvidence2

The data that goes in the c= parameter is the hex encoded result of encrypting the beacon string using the same RC4 key heyfg645fdhwi. The responses from the command and control servers are also hex encoded and encrypted using the same RC4 key.

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence3

Process 4440 is also seen communicating with its C2 server, 185[.]216.70.235 and 195.20.16[.]45 via port 80 (T1071 – Application Layer Protocol).

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence2

After getting the IP address of an active command and control server, the bot is ready to start the C2 communications by doing a HTTP GET request to the following endpoint /single.php?c=<rc4 data hex encoded>.

T1090ProxyEvidence4

This sample, upon reverse engineering, was found to install a proxy bot on infected systems, turning them into proxies capable of forwarding traffic for someone else.

T1090.002External ProxyEvidence1

"Socks5Systemz Botnet Powers Illegal Proxy Service with 85,000+ Hacked Devices"

T1090.003Multi-hop ProxyEvidence1

"Socks5Systemz Botnet Powers Illegal Proxy Service with 85,000+ Hacked Devices"

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence4

Additionally, it fetches a PDF file from hxxp://datasheet[.]fun/manual/avon_4_2022.pdf?<client_id> , saving it in the C:\ProgramData folder.

T1568Dynamic ResolutionEvidence2

Finally, the bot tries to get the address of a C2 server that's online. To do so, the bot computes a domain name using a domain generation algorithm and uses a hardcoded list of DNS servers to resolve it.

T1568.002Domain Generation AlgorithmsEvidence1

Finally, the bot tries to get the address of a C2 server that's online. To do so, the bot computes a domain name using a domain generation algorithm and uses a hardcoded list of DNS servers to resolve it.

T1571Non-Standard PortEvidence3

Process 6280 was seen repeatedly connecting to 45.15[.]156.187 over port 23929 (T1571 – Non-Standard Port).

Impact

1 technique
T1496Resource HijackingEvidence1

Like Smoke Loader, it uses explorer.exe as its process and was observed steadily communicating with domains associated with coinminers over port 10343 (T1496: Resource Hijacking and T1571: Non-Standard Port)

Indicators of compromise

Observables

172 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

View all in app →
Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

12 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

View more in app →
+8 more in the timeline. Sign up to see them
Is this in your environment?See whether this family's indicators match your telemetry and which of your assets are exposed to the CVEs associated with it.
Check your exposure
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching172Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping30Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.