AiFrame
AiFrame is a coordinated malicious browser-extension campaign involving 32 fake AI assistant extensions, primarily affecting Chrome users. Public reporting describes it as an iframe-injecting data stealer and states the extensions were installed by more than 260,000 users. The extensions embed remote, server-controlled interfaces and operate as privileged proxies to sensitive browser capabilities. Reported behavior includes loading a remote-controlled iframe to extract page content, enabling speech-recognition-based exfiltration, and in some cases reading and transmitting Gmail content. The campaign was documented by LayerX, with researcher Natalie Zargarov noting that the extensions use server-controlled interfaces to access sensitive browser functionality. Within broader reporting on malware campaigns targeting AI tools and browser-extension marketplaces, AiFrame is specifically associated with fake AI assistant browser add-ons used to siphon sensitive data from users.
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Techniques & procedures
10 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Execution
1 technique
Execution
Persistence
1 technique
Persistence
Credential Access
2 techniques
Credential Access
Lateral Movement
1 technique
Lateral Movement
Collection
4 techniques
Collection
"The malware also supports the capability to start speech recognition and exfiltrate the resulting transcript to the remote page."
"specifically target Gmail by reading visible email content directly from the document object model (DOM) when a victim visits mail.google[.]com."
Command and Control
1 technique
Command and Control
Exfiltration
2 techniques
Exfiltration
"...transmits TOTP seeds and current one-time security codes ... to a backend at getauth[.]pro, with an option to forward the same payloads to a Telegram channel controlled by the threat actor."; "...transmitted to third-party backend infrastructure controlled by the extension operator"
IOCs tracked for this family
5 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
Recent activity
2 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Cross-platform data stealer distributed via fake AI assistant browser extensions; uses iframe injection and credential theft techniques.
Coordinated malicious Chrome extension cluster that loads a remote, server-controlled iframe (e.g., claude.tapnetic[.]pro) to dynamically task extensions to extract page content, run speech recognition and exfiltrate transcripts, and in some cases read Gmail DOM content and transmit email data to attacker-controlled backends.
The version that knows your environment.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.