MalwareRansomware

Restic

For your environment

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Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

5 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

1 technique

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

Following the creation of the scheduled task, a base64-encoded PowerShell command is run

Stealth

1 technique

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

the file winupdate.exe is a renamed copy of restic.exe

Command and Control

1 technique

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

File IOCs ... AnyDesk.exe ... SimpleService.exe ... elev_win.exe ... KslD.sys ... winupdate.exe (Restic)

Exfiltration

2 techniques

T1567Exfiltration Over Web ServiceEvidence1

operators also exfiltrated sensitive data using RClone, renamed as lsp.exe, to avoid detection.

T1567.002Exfiltration to Cloud StorageEvidence3

Exfiltration ... Restic AnyDesk ... AWS S3 bucket (wasabisys) ... winupdate.exe init (Restic init against S3 wasabisys)

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

1 indicator attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app

Hashes

1 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting

hash.md5●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app27 days ago

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

2 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

2 SOURCESView more in app

ctoatncsc substackNews

Feb 1, 2026

CTO at NCSC Summary: week ending February 1st

Legitimate backup utility referenced because ransomware operators used Restic repositories/artifacts as part of their backup/exfiltration infrastructure, enabling investigative enumeration of snapshots.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

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IOC matching1

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping5

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.