NFU Pay
Hunt this family in your stack
Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
Groups observed using it
1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
Source code reveals lots of debug messages in Chinese as well as package name referring to "NFU Pay" Malware-as-a-Service promoted on Telegram.
Techniques & procedures
1 distinct technique documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Recent activity
3 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Android NFC relay malware/toolkit referenced for comparison; uses a stealthier HCE approach by registering only the PPSE identifier so Android routes subsequent APDU traffic to its HostApduService.
Commercial/vendor Android NFC relay app offering used for tap-to-pay fraud; advertised on Telegram.
Chinese-origin Malware-as-a-Service platform providing customizable NFC-relay malware used as the underlying service for PhantomCard and tailored for regional targeting.
The version that knows your environment.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.