MalwareUsed by 1 actor

DOUBLEDROP

For your environment

Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details

UNC2529

The dropper, DOUBLEDROP, is implemented as a PowerShell script that contains both 32-bit and 64-bit instances of the backdoor DOUBLEBACK.

via mandiant threat intelligencecloud.google.com

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

10 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique

T1587Develop CapabilitiesEvidence1

“The Triple DOUBLE malware ecosystem consists of a downloader… a dropper… and a backdoor… well coded and extensible backdoor… plugins”

Initial Access

1 technique

T1566PhishingEvidence1

“the initial infection vector starts with phishing emails that contain a link to download a malicious payload”

Execution

4 techniques

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

“If the dropper was executed within an elevated PowerShell process, it creates a scheduled task with an action specified as TASK_ACTION_COM_HANDLER”

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

“Po^wEr^sh^elL -nop -w hidden -ep bypass -enc <base64_encoded_ps_code>”

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence1

“(or alternatively an Excel document with an embedded macro)”

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

“Once executed, DOUBLEDRAG reaches out to its C2 server and downloads a memory-only dropper.”

Persistence

3 techniques

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

“If the dropper was executed within an elevated PowerShell process, it creates a scheduled task with an action specified as TASK_ACTION_COM_HANDLER”

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

“The rest of the components are serialized in the registry database… creates the registry keys and values… saves the encrypted payload… in the registry database”

T1546.015Component Object Model HijackingEvidence1

“the malware hijacks… Microsoft PlaySoundService… or MsCtfMonitor… by creating an associated TreatAs registry key”

Privilege Escalation

3 techniques

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

“If the dropper was executed within an elevated PowerShell process, it creates a scheduled task with an action specified as TASK_ACTION_COM_HANDLER”

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

“injecting the backdoor into its own process (PowerShell.exe)… will then inject itself into a msiexec.exe process… spawns a suspended process around msiexec.exe and inject its image into it”

T1546.015Component Object Model HijackingEvidence1

“the malware hijacks… Microsoft PlaySoundService… or MsCtfMonitor… by creating an associated TreatAs registry key”

Stealth

2 techniques

T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

“heavily obfuscated JavaScript… obfuscated in-memory dropper written in PowerShell… encoded/RC4-encrypted payload… rolling XOR”

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

“injecting the backdoor into its own process (PowerShell.exe)… will then inject itself into a msiexec.exe process… spawns a suspended process around msiexec.exe and inject its image into it”

Defense Impairment

1 technique

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

“The rest of the components are serialized in the registry database… creates the registry keys and values… saves the encrypted payload… in the registry database”

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

1 sources tracked across advisories and community write-ups. News coverage will land here when it surfaces.

1 SOURCESView more in app

No news coverage yet. Advisories and community discussion only.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.

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IOC matching

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping10

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.

Back to malware

MalwareUsed by 1 actor

DOUBLEDROP

For your environment

Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

Start free trial

THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details

UNC2529

The dropper, DOUBLEDROP, is implemented as a PowerShell script that contains both 32-bit and 64-bit instances of the backdoor DOUBLEBACK.

via mandiant threat intelligencecloud.google.com

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

10 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique

T1587Develop CapabilitiesEvidence1

“The Triple DOUBLE malware ecosystem consists of a downloader… a dropper… and a backdoor… well coded and extensible backdoor… plugins”

Initial Access

1 technique

T1566PhishingEvidence1

“the initial infection vector starts with phishing emails that contain a link to download a malicious payload”

Execution

4 techniques

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

“If the dropper was executed within an elevated PowerShell process, it creates a scheduled task with an action specified as TASK_ACTION_COM_HANDLER”

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

“Po^wEr^sh^elL -nop -w hidden -ep bypass -enc <base64_encoded_ps_code>”

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence1

“(or alternatively an Excel document with an embedded macro)”

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

“Once executed, DOUBLEDRAG reaches out to its C2 server and downloads a memory-only dropper.”

Persistence

3 techniques

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

“If the dropper was executed within an elevated PowerShell process, it creates a scheduled task with an action specified as TASK_ACTION_COM_HANDLER”

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

“The rest of the components are serialized in the registry database… creates the registry keys and values… saves the encrypted payload… in the registry database”

T1546.015Component Object Model HijackingEvidence1

“the malware hijacks… Microsoft PlaySoundService… or MsCtfMonitor… by creating an associated TreatAs registry key”

Privilege Escalation

3 techniques

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

“If the dropper was executed within an elevated PowerShell process, it creates a scheduled task with an action specified as TASK_ACTION_COM_HANDLER”

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

“injecting the backdoor into its own process (PowerShell.exe)… will then inject itself into a msiexec.exe process… spawns a suspended process around msiexec.exe and inject its image into it”

T1546.015Component Object Model HijackingEvidence1

“the malware hijacks… Microsoft PlaySoundService… or MsCtfMonitor… by creating an associated TreatAs registry key”

Stealth

2 techniques

T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

“heavily obfuscated JavaScript… obfuscated in-memory dropper written in PowerShell… encoded/RC4-encrypted payload… rolling XOR”

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

“injecting the backdoor into its own process (PowerShell.exe)… will then inject itself into a msiexec.exe process… spawns a suspended process around msiexec.exe and inject its image into it”

Defense Impairment

1 technique

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

“The rest of the components are serialized in the registry database… creates the registry keys and values… saves the encrypted payload… in the registry database”

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

1 sources tracked across advisories and community write-ups. News coverage will land here when it surfaces.

1 SOURCESView more in app

No news coverage yet. Advisories and community discussion only.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

Start free trial

IOC matching

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping10

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.