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Mallory
Malware1 associated CVE

NPS

Tracked since Feb 17, 2026 · Updated 9 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns1Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK10Techniques
IOCs2Tracked
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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2023-3519via cisaExploited in the wildUnauthenticated Remote Code Execution in Citrix NetScaler ADC and GatewayCISA is releasing this Cybersecurity Advisory to warn network defenders about exploitation of CVE-2023-3519, an unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability affecting NetScaler (formerly Citrix) Application Delivery Controller (ADC) and NetScaler Gateway. In June 2023, threat actors exploited this vulnerability as a zero-day to drop a webshell...View vulnerability →Source ↗
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

10 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1588.002ToolEvidence2

The content repeatedly states that threat actors 'obtained,' 'acquired,' or 'used' publicly available, open-source, legitimate, or modified tools such as Mimikatz, Cobalt Strike, PsExec, Empire, Impacket, and many others.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1505.003Web ShellEvidence1

A 2023 CISA investigation into a campaign against Citrix NetScaler devices noted a 'NPS tunneller' deployed after attackers had deployed a webshell onto a compromised appliance.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

The NPS client (NPC) renamed WindowsUpdate.exe and registered as a service, running next to a Cobalt Strike beacon and Meterpreter.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

The NPS client (NPC) renamed WindowsUpdate.exe and registered as a service, running next to a Cobalt Strike beacon and Meterpreter.

Stealth

1 technique
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

[The altered DLL] loads a beacon in base64 format from a file named config.ini ... [NPS] strings [were] encrypt[ed] during compilation.

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1021Remote ServicesEvidence1

port-forwarding/proxy tunneling tool used to relay traffic through compromised hosts

Command and Control

5 techniques
T1090ProxyEvidence2

The attacker established a proxy connection to 206.237.0[.]49 ... [and] Rakshasa ... creates a proxy tunnel to the threat actor infrastructure.

T1090.001Internal ProxyEvidence3

Once the NPC (NPS client) is running on a foothold and has dialed out to the operator’s NPS server, that server exposes a SOCKS5 listener whose traffic tunnels back through the connection and exits inside the victim network.

T1090.002External ProxyEvidence1

Several entries mention use of proxy and tunneling tools including PLINK, Venom proxy, GOST reverse proxy, Ligolo, Cloudflared, rsocx reverse proxy, Iox proxy tool, NPS tunneling tool, and AirVPN.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

As part of their initial exploit chain [T1190], the threat actors uploaded a TGZ file [T1105] containing a generic webshell [T1505.003], discovery script [TA0007], and setuid binary [T1548.001] on the ADC appliance.

T1572Protocol TunnelingEvidence2

NPS gives an operator a low-footprint reverse tunnel that can be deployed alongside existing control channels to support further network pivoting and access to internal resources.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

2 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching2Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities1CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping10Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.