Skip to main content
Mallory
Malware

TrustConnect

Tracked since Feb 19, 2026 · Updated 23 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK11Techniques
IOCs1Tracked
Type
RAT
Capabilities
Privilege escalationPost exploitationDefense evasionReconnaissance
Delivery
PhishingLure
Platforms
Windows

TrustConnect is a Windows remote access trojan sold as malware-as-a-service while masquerading as legitimate remote monitoring and management software. Observed in campaigns in January 2026, it was marketed to cybercriminals through a fabricated software-company website that also served as a subscription portal and command-and-control infrastructure. The service advertised access for $300 per month, payable in cryptocurrency, and provided centralized customer management, a web-based control dashboard, and automated generation of digitally signed malicious installers.

TrustConnect supports command execution, file transfer, system-information collection, and remote desktop control. Its remote desktop functionality uses unauthenticated WebSocket streaming and includes UAC bypass, concealment of operator activity, screen recording, and multi-display switching. The malware communicates with the same API used by its management panel over standard TLS, without an additional application-layer encryption scheme. Operators obtained an Extended Validation code-signing certificate under the purported software company's identity and used it to sign payloads, increasing their apparent legitimacy and reducing detection.

Multiple threat actors distributed TrustConnect through phishing campaigns using tax, document-sharing, meeting, event, and government-themed lures. Malicious installers impersonated applications including Microsoft Teams, Zoom, Adobe Reader, and Google Meet. Infections were followed by deployment of legitimate remote access software, including ScreenConnect and Level RMM, with hands-on-keyboard activity observed shortly after installation.

Coordinated disruption resulted in certificate revocation on February 6, 2026, and disruption of the command-and-control infrastructure around February 17. The revocation was not retroactive, leaving previously signed files valid. The operators subsequently shifted to parallel infrastructure and began testing a rebranded successor called DocConnect.

Is this in your environment?See whether this family's indicators match your telemetry and which of your assets are exposed to the CVEs associated with it.
Check your exposure
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

11 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1586.002Email AccountsEvidence1

“Messages were sent from compromised senders…”

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

“observed deployment of Level RMM via an abused account… (We reported it to Level, and the account was disabled by the vendor.)”

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

“Messages contained URLs leading to an executable file ‘MsTeams.exe’… [which] dropped a file called ‘TrustConnectAgent.exe’…” and “Threat actors distributing TrustConnect have used a variety of lure themes including taxes, document shares, meeting invitations, events, and government themes.”

Execution

2 techniques
T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

“GET /api/agent-commands/… receiving PowerShell command to install ScreenConnect… instructions on how to run a one-liner PowerShell script to run a remote intermediate script that will install the RAT (possibly to be used in ClickFix attacks).”

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

“URLs leading to an executable file which, if executed… installed ScreenConnect… [or] dropped… ‘TrustConnectAgent.exe’…”

Persistence

1 technique
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

“observed deployment of Level RMM via an abused account… (We reported it to Level, and the account was disabled by the vendor.)”

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

“observed deployment of Level RMM via an abused account… (We reported it to Level, and the account was disabled by the vendor.)”

Stealth

2 techniques
T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

“a malware masquerading as an RMM called ‘TrustConnect Agent’… generates ‘branded’ installers that bundle legitimate icons and metadata… Zoom, Microsoft Teams, Adobe Reader, Google Meet… EXE files are named in line with the impersonated brand.”

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

“observed deployment of Level RMM via an abused account… (We reported it to Level, and the account was disabled by the vendor.)”

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1553.002Code SigningEvidence1

“the actor used this EV certificate to sign the malware… When used by threat actors, they can help criminals evade signature-based detections.”

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1021Remote ServicesEvidence1

“connect to the device via a remote desktop function… full mouse and keyboard control, surveillance… screen recording… switch between victim displays.”

Command and Control

3 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

“The malware communicates with the C2 on the same API as the web panel and doesn’t use any additional encryption other than standard SSL/TLS… POST /api/agents/register… GET /api/agent-commands/”

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

“transfer files to the device… /api/files/upload… /api/files/pull… /api/files/browse/pull”

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence2

“A RAT masquerading as legitimate remote monitoring and management (RMM) software… called TrustConnect.”

Indicators of compromise

Observables

1 indicator attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

View all in app →
Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

7 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

View more in app →
+3 more in the timeline. Sign up to see them
Is this in your environment?See whether this family's indicators match your telemetry and which of your assets are exposed to the CVEs associated with it.
Check your exposure
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching1Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping11Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.