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Mallory
Malware

Apfell

Apfell is a macOS-focused JavaScript for Automation (JXA) agent in the open-source Mythic/MythicAgents command-and-control and post-exploitation framework. The provided content describes it as written specifically for macOS/OSX and used as a payload/agent for post-compromise operations. Reported capabilities include extensive data collection and reconnaissance, screenshot collection, theft of Google Chrome data, and password capture via a fake prompt. In one observed infection chain, Apfell was used to create a new macOS user with administrator privileges. Apfell has been observed delivered through software supply-chain compromises, including malicious npm packages such as eslint-verify-plugin and ambar-src. In those cases, macOS infection used osascript to execute the JXA payload after package installation, with exfiltration/C2 traffic reported to Yandex Cloud infrastructure in the ambar-src campaign. The content also places Apfell within the broader Mythic ecosystem, which supports multiple C2 protocols and has been linked by researchers to adversaries operating in the wild.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

15 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1195.001Compromise Software Dependencies and Development ToolsEvidence1

"Cybersecurity researchers have discovered four malicious NuGet packages... designed to target ASP.NET web application developers..." and "a malicious npm package named ambar-src..."

Execution

3 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

The macOS infection sequence executes Apfell, a JavaScript for Automation (JXA) agent for macOS... drop ScreenConnect on Windows and a Python reverse shell on macOS and Linux machines.

T1059.002AppleScriptEvidence1

Рабочее решение — apfell-агент, который работает через osascript (AppleScript, T1059.002, Execution) и не зависит от архитектуры процессора. Callback через osascript проходит на arm64 без проблем.

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence1

"...uses osascript to run JavaScript responsible for dropping Apfell, a JavaScript for Automation (JXA) agent..." and "trigger the execution of malicious code contained within index.js"

Persistence

1 technique
T1136Create AccountEvidence1

The macOS infection sequence executes Apfell... to conduct extensive data collection and create a new macOS user with admin privileges.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1553.001Gatekeeper BypassEvidence1

Обход Gatekeeper (T1553.001, Defense Evasion)… Gatekeeper проверяет атрибут com.apple.quarantine у скачанных файлов и блокирует неподписанный или ненотаризованный код. А вот при доставке через curl, scp или rsync — не ставится, и Gatekeeper молчит.

Credential Access

2 techniques
T1552Unsecured CredentialsEvidence1

The malicious code embedded into the packages comes with capabilities to siphon system information, access tokens, environment secrets, and API keys from developer environments... It also harvests API keys for nine large language models (LLM) providers.

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

The entire attack chain unfolds over two stages: a first-stage component that captures credentials and cryptocurrency keys and then loads a secondary stage that subsequently performs deeper harvesting of credentials from password managers.

Discovery

1 technique
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

The malicious code embedded into the packages comes with capabilities to siphon system information... Some of the data stolen by the agent are as follows - System information

Collection

2 techniques
T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

Some of the data stolen by the agent are as follows - ... Screenshots

T1115Clipboard DataEvidence1

Some of the data stolen by the agent are as follows - ... Clipboard contents

Command and Control

3 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

The same is true for installing C2 Profiles: sudo ./mythic-cli install github https://github.com/MythicC2Profiles/http | Installing Agents and C2 Profiles The Mythic repository itself does not host any Payload Types or any C2 Profiles... sudo ./mythic-cli install github https://github.com/MythicC2Profiles/http

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

"...relays traffic... to the attacker's external C2 server" and "exfiltrated... to a Yandex Cloud domain"

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

Mythic provides a command, ./mythic-cli install github <url> [-b branch name] [-f] , that can be used to install agents into a current Mythic instance.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

"...begin transmitting the ASP.NET Identity data through the local proxy to the external infrastructure." and "Once the data is collected, it's exfiltrated..."

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Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

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MITRE ATT&CK mapping15

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.