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Malware

SURXRAT

Tracked since Feb 24, 2026 · Updated 7 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK8Techniques
IOCs2Tracked

SURXRAT is an actively developed Android remote access trojan (RAT) marketed as a malware-as-a-service offering under the “SURXRAT V5” branding and distributed through a Telegram-based ecosystem. Reporting cited in the content assesses it as likely operated by an Indonesian threat actor and indicates it likely evolved from the ArsinkRAT malware family, supported by code overlap and use of an "arsinkRAT" database reference. Researchers identified more than 180 related samples, with the Telegram marketing channel created in late 2024 and active development likely beginning in early 2025.

SURXRAT abuses Android Accessibility Services for persistent control and automation, and communicates with Firebase Realtime Database command-and-control infrastructure, including xrat-sisuriya-default-rtdb.firebaseio.com, which helps its traffic blend with legitimate cloud services. It registers infected devices using a random UUID and maintains a persistent background service.

Its capabilities include extensive surveillance, data theft, and remote device control. Reported collection includes contacts, SMS messages, call logs, Gmail account data, browser history, clipboard contents, location data, notifications, Wi-Fi history, cellular tower information, installed applications, files, device brand and model, Android version, battery status, SIM details, network information, and public IP address. Remote actions include recording audio, taking camera photos, sending SMS messages, placing phone calls, opening URLs, changing wallpapers, controlling the flashlight, vibrating the device, displaying toast or text-to-speech messages, unlocking devices, deleting files, uploading files, and wiping storage.

SURXRAT also includes a ransomware-style screen locker that can display a persistent full-screen lock message, enforce an attacker-defined PIN, report incorrect PIN attempts to the backend in real time, and be remotely removed by the attacker. The malware has been described as targeting Android devices broadly, with broader reporting placing it among threats actively targeting Brazilian PIX payment infrastructure.

A notable recent behavior is conditional download of a very large LLM module, reported as larger than 23 GB, from Hugging Face or other third-party repositories. This download is triggered when specific gaming apps are active, including Free Fire MAX x JUJUTSU KAISEN and Free Fire x JUJUTSU KAISEN, or when target package names are supplied remotely by the operator. The content states these AI modules can automate malicious tasks, including generating realistic phishing content, tailoring social-engineering prompts, and autonomously interacting with on-device apps and user interfaces to steal credentials or other sensitive data. Researchers also assessed the LLM-related behavior may be intended for device or network lag manipulation, masking malicious activity through degraded performance, evasion, future AI-assisted functionality, or alternative monetization.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

8 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566PhishingEvidence1

"SurxRAT can generate realistic phishing content"

Execution

2 techniques
T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

"tailor social-engineering prompts, and interact autonomously with on-device apps and user interfaces to exfiltrate credentials"

T1648Serverless ExecutionEvidence1

"Once installed, the apps urge users to enable accessibility services to realize their goals."; "TaxiSpy RAT... abuses Android's accessibility service..."; "The malware abuses accessibility permissions for persistent control"

Credential Access

2 techniques
T1056Input CaptureEvidence1

"interact autonomously with on-device apps and user interfaces to exfiltrate credentials"

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

"exfiltrate credentials or sensitive data"

Collection

1 technique
T1056Input CaptureEvidence1

"interact autonomously with on-device apps and user interfaces to exfiltrate credentials"

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

"can download and run large language model (LLM) modules from third-party repositories"

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence1

"full-fledged remote administration tools such as SURXRAT"; "enabling threat actors to gather sensitive data and execute commands"; "comprehensive remote control"

Impact

1 technique
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence1

"incorporate a ransomware-style screen locker module... deny access by displaying a full-screen lock message until a payment is made."

Indicators of compromise

Observables

2 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

5 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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breakglass intelNews · Mar 12, 2026SpyAgent Trojan Impersonates Brazilian Loyalty App With Chinese-Signed Dropper - Breakglass Intelligence - Breakglass IntelligenceAn Android RAT mentioned as active in Brazil and described as LLM-equipped and associated with ransomware activity targeting PIX payment infrastructure.Read more ↗the hacker newsNews · Mar 12, 2026Six Android Malware Families Target Pix Payments, Banking Apps, and Crypto WalletsAndroid RAT sold via a Telegram MaaS ecosystem; abuses accessibility for persistent device control and uses Firebase-based C2; some samples include an on-demand LLM module and a ransomware-style screen locker for device lockout/extortion.Read more ↗zimperium blogNews · Mar 9, 2026SurxRAT Shows How Mobile Malware Can Leverage Large-Language ModelsAndroid remote-access trojan that can fetch and execute LLM modules to automate malicious activity, including generating realistic phishing content, tailoring social-engineering prompts, autonomously interacting with on-device apps/UI, and exfiltrating credentials or sensitive data; emphasizes increased automation, evasion, and persistence.Read more ↗cyble blogNews · Feb 24, 2026SURXRAT Downloads Large LLM Module From Hugging FaceAndroid remote access trojan sold via a Telegram MaaS ecosystem. Provides extensive surveillance (SMS, contacts, call logs, location, notifications, clipboard, browser history, files), remote device control (calls, SMS send, camera, audio recording, URL opening, wallpaper changes, vibration/flashlight, unlock/lock, wipe), and uses Firebase Realtime Database for C2. Latest variants conditionally download a very large LLM module (>23GB) from Hugging Face—apparently to induce lag/performance degradation (notably during specific games) and potentially enable future AI-assisted capabilities. Includes a ransomware-style screen locker for extortion/denial of access.Read more ↗
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IOC matching2Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping8Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.