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Malware1 associated actor

Badhide2s

Tracked since Mar 2, 2026 · Updated 7 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK2Techniques
IOCs0Tracked

Badhide2s is a Linux userland rootkit, also identified as libutilkeybd.so, described as part of the modular RingH23 server-side malware framework attributed in the reporting to the Funnull cybercriminal group (also known as Fangneng CDN). It is based on LD_PRELOAD technology and achieves stealth by writing itself to /etc/ld.so.preload. The rootkit is reported to hide malicious files, processes, and network connections from common system utilities such as ps, ls, and netstat. In the described campaign, Badhide2s was deployed alongside other RingH23 components including an SSH-propagated downloader, a backdoor, a malicious Nginx module, and udev-based persistence, following compromises of GoEdge CDN infrastructure and poisoning of the maccms.la update channel. The broader operation reportedly targeted CDN nodes and streaming/movie-related websites to support malicious JavaScript injection and traffic redirection to illegal sites. A known associated file name mentioned in the reporting is libutilkeybd.so, and the key persistence/stealth indicator is modification of /etc/ld.so.preload.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Funnull

"The Badhide2s userland rootkit completes the picture by writing itself into /etc/ld.so.preload to conceal all malicious files..."

via cyber security newscybersecuritynews.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

2 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1195Supply Chain CompromiseEvidence1

"Funnull pursued two separate infection routes. In the first, attackers compromised a GoEdge CDN management node... forcing all connected edge nodes to download and execute the RingH23 toolkit. In the second path, the group poisoned the official update channel of maccms.la... to deliver a malicious PHP backdoor."

Stealth

1 technique
T1014RootkitEvidence1

"...Badhide2s userland rootkit... writing itself into /etc/ld.so.preload to conceal all malicious files, processes, and network connections..."

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Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping2Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.