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Mallory
Malware1 associated actor

Gcleaner

Tracked since Mar 3, 2026 · Updated 24 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK5Techniques
IOCs1Tracked
Type
Loader
Capabilities
Defense evasion
Delivery
Seo poisoningCracked softwareLure
Platforms
Windows

GCleaner is a Windows pay-per-install loader used to download and execute additional malware. It has been distributed as a fake system-cleaning utility under the name Garbage Cleaner, imitating CCleaner. GCleaner communicates with command-and-control infrastructure over HTTP, reports installation-related information, retrieves executable payloads, and launches them using Windows APIs. Analyzed samples construct obfuscated strings in memory and write downloaded payloads to temporary storage before execution. GCleaner has been used to distribute information stealers, including Raccoon Stealer and AuraStealer; these payloads provide capabilities distinct from the loader itself.

GCleaner circulates through the commodity malware-distribution ecosystem. It has been delivered by PrivateLoader, NullMixer, Amadey, and OfferLoader, including through the pay-per-install infrastructure tracked as CL-CRI-1171. Observed infection chains use SEO-poisoned software-download sites, cracked-software offers, and password-protected archives containing installers that execute multiple malware families. These distribution relationships do not establish common authorship or control of GCleaner and the other malware involved.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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CL-CRI-1171

« Une infection ultérieure (juin 2026) a livré GCleaner et Socks5Systemz via la même infrastructure. »

via cyberveillecyberveille.ch
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

5 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1583Acquire InfrastructureEvidence1

[ATK-16] Malvertising

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence1

Distribution campaigns generally rely on a network of search engine optimization (SEO) enhanced websites that lure unsuspecting victims searching for warez aka pirated software to download and execute malware.

T1566PhishingEvidence1

According to some samples, we believe it is also being distributed in the form of fake game cheats, patches for cracked software (including hacks and mods for Fortnite, Valorant, and NBA2K22), or other software.

Execution

1 technique
T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

After a few redirections, the final payload is served to the user as a password-protected compressed (.zip) archive... It contained a Nullsoft Scriptable Install System (NSIS) installer named “setup_x86_x64_install.exe,” which embeds and executes numerous malicious payloads such as GCleaner, PrivateLoader and Redline.

Command and Control

1 technique
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

NullMixer is a dropper currently being used to drop multiple malware families. | Downloader.INNO is an Inno Setup installer that utilizes Inno Download Plugin to download a file from the C2.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

1 indicator attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching1Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping5Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.