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Mallory
Malware

Gcleaner

GCleaner is a malware family identified as a pay-per-install (PPI) loader and also referenced as a fake cleaning tool used in multiple malicious campaigns. Reporting on a March 2026 Amadey botnet campaign tagged "fbf543" lists GCleaner among 24 malware families distributed over roughly 10 days via shared criminal infrastructure, supporting the assessment that it was one of several payloads offered through a financially motivated PPI service. In that campaign, delivery infrastructure included the Amadey C2 domain sys32[.]cc and backend payload hosting tied to labinstalls[.]info at 158.94.211.222, with additional delivery from qpgroup[.]top. Separate reporting on AuraStealer states that a fake cleaning tool named Gcleaner has been used as a distribution mechanism across different campaigns, alongside other loaders and execution techniques such as DLL sideloading and process injection. High-confidence content therefore supports that GCleaner is associated with malware delivery activity, functions as a known PPI loader, and has been observed in financially motivated cybercrime operations likely linked at low-to-medium confidence to CIS/Russian-speaking criminal ecosystems. No sample-specific capabilities, persistence mechanisms, or standalone IOCs unique to GCleaner itself are provided beyond these campaign associations.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

1 distinct technique documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Command and Control

1 technique
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping ... Command and Control Ingress Tool Transfer T1105 Amadey downloads 50+ payloads to infected hosts

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MITRE ATT&CK mapping1

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Researcher chatter

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