MalwareUsed by 1 actor

EVILSCHOLAR

For your environment

Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details

Chernovite

EVILSCHOLAR — A capability designed to discover, access, manipulate, and disable Schneider Electric PLCs.

via dragos bloghub.dragos.com

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

3 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

“EVILSCHOLAR Unauthorized Login … MITRE ATT&CK for ICS Technique: T1078 Valid Accounts” and narrative: “...gather credentials to access a legitimate account...”

Persistence

1 technique

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

“EVILSCHOLAR Unauthorized Login … MITRE ATT&CK for ICS Technique: T1078 Valid Accounts” and narrative: “...gather credentials to access a legitimate account...”

Privilege Escalation

1 technique

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

“EVILSCHOLAR Unauthorized Login … MITRE ATT&CK for ICS Technique: T1078 Valid Accounts” and narrative: “...gather credentials to access a legitimate account...”

Stealth

1 technique

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

“EVILSCHOLAR Unauthorized Login … MITRE ATT&CK for ICS Technique: T1078 Valid Accounts” and narrative: “...gather credentials to access a legitimate account...”

Credential Access

1 technique

T1110Brute ForceEvidence2

Remotely interacting with PLCs using CODESYS to support numerous attacks like brute-force passwords, performing denial-of-service (DoS) attacks against the controller, and severing connections.

Discovery

1 technique

T1046Network Service DiscoveryEvidence2

CHERNOVITE can leverage PIPEDREAM’s multiple components to perform rapid reconnaissance of ICS networks by using a variety of mechanisms, including: Identifying known MAC addresses, Port numbers, HTTP banners, Omron’s proprietary Factory Interface Network Service Protocol (FINS), Modbus, Schneider’s custom Discovery broadcast protocol (NetManage).

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

2 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

2 SOURCESView more in app

cyberscoopNews

Mar 3, 2026

PIPEDREAM component focused on Schneider Electric PLC discovery and manipulation/disablement. Uses/embeds CODESYS-related functionality and supports actions such as password brute forcing and denial-of-service against controllers.

dragos blogNews

Aug 14, 2026

A modular PIPEDREAM component targeting Schneider Electric PLCs for discovery, unauthorized access, password brute forcing, denial-of-service, controller manipulation, and proxying/pivoting across OT network segments.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.

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IOC matching

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping3

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.

Back to malware

MalwareUsed by 1 actor

EVILSCHOLAR

For your environment

Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

Start free trial

THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details

Chernovite

EVILSCHOLAR — A capability designed to discover, access, manipulate, and disable Schneider Electric PLCs.

via dragos bloghub.dragos.com

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

3 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

“EVILSCHOLAR Unauthorized Login … MITRE ATT&CK for ICS Technique: T1078 Valid Accounts” and narrative: “...gather credentials to access a legitimate account...”

Persistence

1 technique

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

“EVILSCHOLAR Unauthorized Login … MITRE ATT&CK for ICS Technique: T1078 Valid Accounts” and narrative: “...gather credentials to access a legitimate account...”

Privilege Escalation

1 technique

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

“EVILSCHOLAR Unauthorized Login … MITRE ATT&CK for ICS Technique: T1078 Valid Accounts” and narrative: “...gather credentials to access a legitimate account...”

Stealth

1 technique

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

“EVILSCHOLAR Unauthorized Login … MITRE ATT&CK for ICS Technique: T1078 Valid Accounts” and narrative: “...gather credentials to access a legitimate account...”

Credential Access

1 technique

T1110Brute ForceEvidence2

Remotely interacting with PLCs using CODESYS to support numerous attacks like brute-force passwords, performing denial-of-service (DoS) attacks against the controller, and severing connections.

Discovery

1 technique

T1046Network Service DiscoveryEvidence2

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

2 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

2 SOURCESView more in app

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

Start free trial

IOC matching

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping3

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.