MeowMeow
- Type
- Backdoor
- Capabilities
- PersistencePost exploitationDefense evasionReconnaissance
- Delivery
- PhishingSpearphishingLure
- Platforms
- Windows
MeowMeow is a Windows backdoor used in Russia-aligned cyberespionage campaigns targeting Ukrainian organizations. Publicly identified in March 2026, it is deployed by the BadPaw loader, also known as CINDERBLOT, and has been associated with the Earth Sirrush intrusion set, also tracked as UAC-0099 and previously as SHADOW-EARTH-065.
MeowMeow enables remote PowerShell command execution and local file manipulation, including enumeration, existence checks, reading, writing, and deletion. It serves as the final backdoor payload in a multistage infection chain that establishes persistent access through scheduled-task execution of an earlier component.
Delivery begins with targeted phishing emails linking to ZIP archives and using Ukrainian-language border-crossing or government-appeal lures. A disguised HTA displays a decoy document while initiating subsequent stages. A VBScript extracts a concealed payload from an image using steganography, producing the BadPaw loader, which communicates with attacker infrastructure and deploys MeowMeow.
MeowMeow uses .NET Reactor protection and parameter-gated execution to hinder analysis. Without the expected launch parameter, it presents a cat-themed decoy interface rather than activating its malicious functionality. It checks for virtualized environments and analysis tools, including Wireshark, Process Monitor, OllyDbg, and Fiddler, and terminates when it detects an analysis environment.
Associated threat actors
3 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
According to ClearSky, MeowMeow contains Russian military-technical debug strings.
According to ClearSky, MeowMeow contains Russian military-technical debug strings.
The final component is an additional executable, dropped after the ASCII data is converted back into a standard string. This file, named MeowMeowProgram[.]exe, serves as a persistent backdoor.
Techniques & procedures
19 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
2 techniques
Initial Access
The attack chain initiates with a phishing email containing a link to a ZIP archive.
When a user clicks the link purportedly containing the ZIP file, the following two actions are triggered... the user is redirected to... a tracking pixel... [and] a secondary link... initiates the final download of the ZIP archive.
Execution
6 techniques
Execution
Persists ResourceExplorer.exe via schtasks.exe LOLBin copy ... scheduled task Helpers\Resources running every 5 minutes with finderstart argument.
PowerShell remote shell execution.
“A VBS script then retrieves hidden payload data embedded within an image using steganography…”
“Once extracted, an initial HTA file displays a lure document…”
“Once extracted, an initial HTA file displays a lure document…”
"... link redirecting to a ZIP archive containing a Ukrainian border checkpoint permit that triggers the download of the BadPaw loader"
Persistence
1 technique
Persistence
Persists ResourceExplorer.exe via schtasks.exe LOLBin copy ... scheduled task Helpers\Resources running every 5 minutes with finderstart argument.
Privilege Escalation
1 technique
Privilege Escalation
Persists ResourceExplorer.exe via schtasks.exe LOLBin copy ... scheduled task Helpers\Resources running every 5 minutes with finderstart argument.
Stealth
6 techniques
Stealth
An additional layer of defense employed by BadPaw is the use of .NET Reactor, a commercial protection and obfuscation tool for .NET assemblies.
The retrieved ZIP archive contains a file with an .html extension; however, this is a masquerade. Technical analysis reveals the file is actually an HTA (HTML Application).
These capabilities include verifying the existence of specific files, as well as the ability to delete, write, and read data from the local storage.
It actively scans for virtual machines and common analysis tools such as Wireshark, ProcMon, and Fiddler, immediately terminating its execution if a sandbox or researcher environment is detected.
By querying this value, the malware calculates the "age" of the operating system. If the system was installed less than ten days prior to execution, the malware terminates.
The code reveals checks for well-known forensic and debugging utilities, including Wireshark, Procmon, Ollydbg, and Fiddler, among others.
Discovery
5 techniques
Discovery
“the HTA file performs an environmental check by inspecting… HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\InstallDate”
Additionally, the backdoor supports a variety of file system operations. These capabilities include verifying the existence of specific files...
It actively scans for virtual machines and common analysis tools such as Wireshark, ProcMon, and Fiddler, immediately terminating its execution if a sandbox or researcher environment is detected.
By querying this value, the malware calculates the "age" of the operating system. If the system was installed less than ten days prior to execution, the malware terminates.
The code reveals checks for well-known forensic and debugging utilities, including Wireshark, Procmon, Ollydbg, and Fiddler, among others.
Command and Control
2 techniques
Command and Control
“Upon establishing command-and-control (C2) communication, the loader deploys MeowMeow…”
Its primary objective is to establish communication with a Command and Control (C2) server to download additional malicious components.
Impact
1 technique
Impact
“…can read, write or delete data on the compromised machine.”
Observables
8 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
14 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.