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Malware3 associated actors

MeowMeow

Tracked since Mar 3, 2026 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors3Associated
ATT&CK19Techniques
IOCs8Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
PersistencePost exploitationDefense evasionReconnaissance
Delivery
PhishingSpearphishingLure
Platforms
Windows

MeowMeow is a Windows backdoor used in Russia-aligned cyberespionage campaigns targeting Ukrainian organizations. Publicly identified in March 2026, it is deployed by the BadPaw loader, also known as CINDERBLOT, and has been associated with the Earth Sirrush intrusion set, also tracked as UAC-0099 and previously as SHADOW-EARTH-065.

MeowMeow enables remote PowerShell command execution and local file manipulation, including enumeration, existence checks, reading, writing, and deletion. It serves as the final backdoor payload in a multistage infection chain that establishes persistent access through scheduled-task execution of an earlier component.

Delivery begins with targeted phishing emails linking to ZIP archives and using Ukrainian-language border-crossing or government-appeal lures. A disguised HTA displays a decoy document while initiating subsequent stages. A VBScript extracts a concealed payload from an image using steganography, producing the BadPaw loader, which communicates with attacker infrastructure and deploys MeowMeow.

MeowMeow uses .NET Reactor protection and parameter-gated execution to hinder analysis. Without the expected launch parameter, it presents a cat-themed decoy interface rather than activating its malicious functionality. It checks for virtualized environments and analysis tools, including Wireshark, Process Monitor, OllyDbg, and Fiddler, and terminates when it detects an analysis environment.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

3 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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UAC-0099

According to ClearSky, MeowMeow contains Russian military-technical debug strings.

via trendai documentscdn.sanity.io
Earth Sirrush

According to ClearSky, MeowMeow contains Russian military-technical debug strings.

via trendai documentscdn.sanity.io
APT28

The final component is an additional executable, dropped after the ASCII data is converted back into a standard string. This file, named MeowMeowProgram[.]exe, serves as a persistent backdoor.

via clearsky blogclearskysec.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

19 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence2

The attack chain initiates with a phishing email containing a link to a ZIP archive.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence7

When a user clicks the link purportedly containing the ZIP file, the following two actions are triggered... the user is redirected to... a tracking pixel... [and] a secondary link... initiates the final download of the ZIP archive.

Execution

6 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence2

Persists ResourceExplorer.exe via schtasks.exe LOLBin copy ... scheduled task Helpers\Resources running every 5 minutes with finderstart argument.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence3

PowerShell remote shell execution.

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence1

“A VBS script then retrieves hidden payload data embedded within an image using steganography…”

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence1

“Once extracted, an initial HTA file displays a lure document…”

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

“Once extracted, an initial HTA file displays a lure document…”

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence4

"... link redirecting to a ZIP archive containing a Ukrainian border checkpoint permit that triggers the download of the BadPaw loader"

Persistence

1 technique
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence2

Persists ResourceExplorer.exe via schtasks.exe LOLBin copy ... scheduled task Helpers\Resources running every 5 minutes with finderstart argument.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence2

Persists ResourceExplorer.exe via schtasks.exe LOLBin copy ... scheduled task Helpers\Resources running every 5 minutes with finderstart argument.

Stealth

6 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence3

An additional layer of defense employed by BadPaw is the use of .NET Reactor, a commercial protection and obfuscation tool for .NET assemblies.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

The retrieved ZIP archive contains a file with an .html extension; however, this is a masquerade. Technical analysis reveals the file is actually an HTA (HTML Application).

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence1

These capabilities include verifying the existence of specific files, as well as the ability to delete, write, and read data from the local storage.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence5

It actively scans for virtual machines and common analysis tools such as Wireshark, ProcMon, and Fiddler, immediately terminating its execution if a sandbox or researcher environment is detected.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

By querying this value, the malware calculates the "age" of the operating system. If the system was installed less than ten days prior to execution, the malware terminates.

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

The code reveals checks for well-known forensic and debugging utilities, including Wireshark, Procmon, Ollydbg, and Fiddler, among others.

Discovery

5 techniques
T1012Query RegistryEvidence1

“the HTA file performs an environmental check by inspecting… HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\InstallDate”

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence4

Additionally, the backdoor supports a variety of file system operations. These capabilities include verifying the existence of specific files...

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence5

It actively scans for virtual machines and common analysis tools such as Wireshark, ProcMon, and Fiddler, immediately terminating its execution if a sandbox or researcher environment is detected.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

By querying this value, the malware calculates the "age" of the operating system. If the system was installed less than ten days prior to execution, the malware terminates.

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

The code reveals checks for well-known forensic and debugging utilities, including Wireshark, Procmon, Ollydbg, and Fiddler, among others.

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence3

“Upon establishing command-and-control (C2) communication, the loader deploys MeowMeow…”

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence3

Its primary objective is to establish communication with a Command and Control (C2) server to download additional malicious components.

Impact

1 technique
T1565Data ManipulationEvidence1

“…can read, write or delete data on the compromised machine.”

Indicators of compromise

Observables

8 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching8Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors3Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping19Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.