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Mallory
Malware2 associated actors

BadPaw

Tracked since Mar 3, 2026 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK27Techniques
IOCs19Tracked
Type
Loader
Capabilities
Defense evasionReconnaissance
Delivery
PhishingLure
Platforms
Windows

BadPaw, also known as CINDERBLOT, is a Windows malware loader implemented in .NET Framework 4.6. It establishes command-and-control communications to retrieve and deploy additional malicious components, including the MeowMeow backdoor. BadPaw has been used in Russian state-aligned phishing campaigns targeting Ukrainian organizations, with activity documented in early 2026.

Its delivery chain begins with phishing emails linking to ZIP archives containing disguised HTML Applications and Ukrainian-language border-crossing decoys. The initial scripts display a decoy document, perform environment checks, and establish scheduled-task persistence. A subsequent VBScript extracts the BadPaw executable from an image containing steganographically concealed payload data. BadPaw then contacts attacker infrastructure and reconstructs downloaded components for deployment.

BadPaw masquerades as a functional Windows Forms regular-expression testing utility. Its malicious logic is gated behind a specific launch parameter; execution outside the intended infection chain instead exposes benign-looking GUI behavior. Defensive measures include .NET Reactor obfuscation, anti-debugging and assembly-integrity checks, sandbox detection, timing and uptime checks, and runtime reconstruction of API names. It gathers hardware and operating-system information through WMI to generate a deterministic victim identifier. Its task-based command-and-control design uses HTTPS and cryptographic routines for payload protection and key exchange.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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UAC-0099

February – April 2026: BadPaw aka CINDERBLOT (.NET-based loader)

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com
APT28

At the time of analysis, the file is recognized as malicious by only nine antivirus engines. We have named this malware “BadPaw”. Its primary objective is to establish communication with a Command and Control (C2) server to download additional malicious components.

via clearsky blogclearskysec.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

27 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence2

The attack chain initiates with a phishing email containing a link to a ZIP archive.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence8

The email contained a cutt[.]ly shortened link redirecting to order.cyberflysystems[.]com.

Execution

7 techniques
T1047Windows Management InstrumentationEvidence1

BadPaw builds a comprehensive victim profile through seven WMI queries via the SOS class

T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence2

To ensure persistence on the infected system, a scheduled task is created to execute the VBS file.

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence2

“…establishes persistence through a scheduled task.”

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence2

To ensure persistence on the infected system, a scheduled task is created to execute the VBS file.

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence1

“Once extracted, an initial HTA file displays a lure document…”

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

“Once extracted, an initial HTA file displays a lure document…”

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence4

"... link redirecting to a ZIP archive containing a Ukrainian border checkpoint permit that triggers the download of the BadPaw loader"

Persistence

2 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence2

To ensure persistence on the infected system, a scheduled task is created to execute the VBS file.

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence2

“…establishes persistence through a scheduled task.”

Privilege Escalation

3 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence2

To ensure persistence on the infected system, a scheduled task is created to execute the VBS file.

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence2

“…establishes persistence through a scheduled task.”

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

Process Injection Chain ... OpenProcess obtains a handle to the target, VirtualAlloc reserves memory, WriteProcessMemory writes the payload, and VirtualProtect flips the page to executable.

Stealth

11 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence4

An additional layer of defense employed by BadPaw is the use of .NET Reactor, a commercial protection and obfuscation tool for .NET assemblies.

T1027.003SteganographyEvidence4

These scripts download PNG images, extract embedded ZIP archives from pixel data, and deploy executables.

T1027.007Dynamic API ResolutionEvidence1

Layer 5: API String Splitting -- Win32 API names are split across the .NET #US heap ... These are reassembled at runtime via Marshal.GetDelegateForFunctionPointer. Static string scanners see nothing.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

The retrieved ZIP archive contains a file with an .html extension; however, this is a masquerade. Technical analysis reveals the file is actually an HTA (HTML Application).

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

Process Injection Chain ... OpenProcess obtains a handle to the target, VirtualAlloc reserves memory, WriteProcessMemory writes the payload, and VirtualProtect flips the page to executable.

T1070.006TimestompEvidence1

The PE compilation timestamp is falsified to 2039, an anti-forensics measure.

T1218.005MshtaEvidence1

Technical analysis reveals the file is actually an HTA (HTML Application). Upon execution, the HTA file drops and opens a decoy document...

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence3

Layer 4: Sandbox Detection -- The Sand class implements IsSandBox() for environment fingerprinting, CheckSleep() for timing-based detection ... and a Windows EventLog reader that checks for sandbox-indicator events. System uptime analysis rounds it out -- fresh VMs have short uptimes.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence2

By querying this value, the malware calculates the "age" of the operating system. If the system was installed less than ten days prior to execution, the malware terminates.

T1497.003Time Based ChecksEvidence1

CheckSleep() for timing-based detection (real machines have real sleep; emulated sleep is instant)

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

Layer 2: Anti-Debug -- A Debugger.IsAttached check fires early, with a reference to clrjit.dll suggesting JIT hook detection as a secondary measure.

Discovery

6 techniques
T1012Query RegistryEvidence2

Defender Reconnaissance Before any malicious activity, BadPaw queries the registry for the state of Windows Defender: HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\AMSI ... HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender\PassiveMode ...

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

Before phoning home, BadPaw builds a comprehensive victim profile through seven WMI queries ... MAC address, Disk serial number, Motherboard serial, BIOS information, Computer system details, OS identity string, Process ID.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence3

Layer 4: Sandbox Detection -- The Sand class implements IsSandBox() for environment fingerprinting, CheckSleep() for timing-based detection ... and a Windows EventLog reader that checks for sandbox-indicator events. System uptime analysis rounds it out -- fresh VMs have short uptimes.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence2

By querying this value, the malware calculates the "age" of the operating system. If the system was installed less than ten days prior to execution, the malware terminates.

T1497.003Time Based ChecksEvidence1

CheckSleep() for timing-based detection (real machines have real sleep; emulated sleep is instant)

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

Layer 2: Anti-Debug -- A Debugger.IsAttached check fires early, with a reference to clrjit.dll suggesting JIT hook detection as a secondary measure.

Command and Control

4 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence3

“Upon establishing command-and-control (C2) communication, the loader deploys MeowMeow…”

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

The Task-Based C2 ... GetTaskRequest() -- poll the C2 for pending commands ... Transport is HTTPS with custom User-Agent headers

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence6

Its primary objective is to establish communication with a Command and Control (C2) server to download additional malicious components.

T1132Data EncodingEvidence1

The data received in the second stage consists of a standard HTML page containing a block of ASCII code... The identified ASCII block is decoded to reconstruct an additional malware component.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

SendResultRequest() -- exfiltrate task results

Indicators of compromise

Observables

19 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

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IOC matching19Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping27Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.