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Malware2 associated actors

RedAlert

Tracked since Mar 3, 2026 · Updated 5 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days2 mentions · peak 2 in a dayToday
Vulns0Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK15Techniques
IOCs13Tracked
Type
Ransomware
Capabilities
ExtortionDefense evasion
Delivery
SmishingLure
Platforms
WindowsLinuxEsxi

RedAlert, also known as N13V, is a ransomware family identified in July 2022 that targets Windows systems and VMware ESXi infrastructure in corporate networks. It is manually deployed after attackers compromise a victim environment. RedAlert has been used by financially motivated threat actors including Vice Society and Toy Ghouls, also known as Bearlyfy, Labubu, and Laboo.boo.

Its Linux encryptor is designed for VMware ESXi and targets virtual disk, memory, snapshot, swap, and log files. It can enumerate running virtual machines and forcibly terminate them through VMware management utilities before encryption. Command-line options support individual-file and directory encryption, recursive processing, search-only operation, and cryptographic performance testing. The ESXi encryptor requires root privileges. RedAlert uses NTRUEncrypt public-key cryptography to protect encryption material and creates ransom notes directing victims to a Tor-based payment and negotiation service. Windows samples used by Toy Ghouls also delete shadow copies and clear Windows event logs and RDP history, hindering recovery and forensic investigation.

The original RedAlert operation employed double extortion, combining data theft with encryption and threatening publication through a leak site, and demanded payment in Monero. This operational model is not universal among actors using the malware: Toy Ghouls deployments have been associated with encryption-based extortion without observed data exfiltration.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Toy Ghouls

Ранее она использовала сторонние шифровальщики, включая RedAlert, LockBit и Babuk.

via securelist rusecurelist.ru
Vice Society

We identified significant overlap in the encryption implementation observed in the “RedAlert” ransomware, a Linux locker variant targeting VMware ESXi servers, suggesting that both variants were developed by the same group of individuals.

via sentinelone labssentinelone.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

15 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

3 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

Before starting the encryption, BlackCat shuts down the virtual machines with the esxcli command-line utility.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK® Techniques Tactic Technique ID Technique Name Execution T1204 User Execution

T1569.002Service ExecutionEvidence1

When running the ransomware with the ' -w ' argument, the Linux encryptor will shut down all running VMware ESXi virtual machines using the following esxcli command: esxcli --formatter=csv --format-param=fields=="WorldID,DisplayName" vm process list | tail -n +2 | awk -F $',' '{system("esxcli vm process kill --type=force --world-id=" $1)}'

Stealth

3 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK® Techniques ... Defense Evasion T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

RedAlert ransomware has manual operations, which means TAs execute the ransomware after a complete takeover of the victim system. The ransomware binary provides various options to the TAs for performing pre-encryption operations such as stopping all virtual machines running on VMware ESXi, Asymmetric cryptography performance tests, etc.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1

It accesses the mAppDir field of the running application’s LoadedApk object using reflection and overwrites both publicSourceDir and sourceDir.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1685.005Clear Windows Event LogsEvidence1

Windows event logs are cleared using wevtutil.exe or PowerShell; the group uses wevtutil cl to remove traces of activity.

Discovery

4 techniques
T1012Query RegistryEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK® Techniques Tactic Technique ID Technique Name ... Discovery T1012 ... Query Registry

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK® Techniques Tactic Technique ID Technique Name ... T1082 ... System Information Discovery

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

It scans the directory for the presence of files with .log, .vmdk, .vmem, .vswp and .vmsn extensions.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

RedAlert ransomware has manual operations, which means TAs execute the ransomware after a complete takeover of the victim system. The ransomware binary provides various options to the TAs for performing pre-encryption operations such as stopping all virtual machines running on VMware ESXi, Asymmetric cryptography performance tests, etc.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1537Transfer Data to Cloud AccountEvidence1

Like almost all new enterprise-targeting ransomware operations, RedAlert conducts double-extortion attacks, which is when data is stolen, and then ransomware is deployed to encrypt devices.

Impact

4 techniques
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence5

Toy Ghouls uses RedAlert, Babuk, and LockBit to encrypt Windows, Linux, ESXi, NAS, local-disk, and mounted-network-resource data.

T1489Service StopEvidence2

The Linux encryptor is created to target VMware ESXi servers, with command-line options that allow the threat actors to shut down any running virtual machines before encrypting files.

T1490Inhibit System RecoveryEvidence1

RedAlert and LockBit delete shadow copies; the actors also shut down virtual machines before encrypting their disks.

T1529System Shutdown/RebootEvidence1

For example, -w parameter can be used to stop all running virtual machines with the help of the esxcli command-line utility

Indicators of compromise

Observables

13 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

19 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching13Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping15Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.