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MalwareUsed by 3 actors

GearDoor

GearDoor is a custom .NET backdoor used in intrusions attributed to the China-nexus activity cluster “Silver Dragon,” assessed by Check Point to operate under the broader APT41 umbrella. It has been observed in cyberespionage-focused campaigns targeting government and public-sector/high-profile organizations in Europe and Southeast Asia since at least mid-2024.

GearDoor’s defining feature is its use of Google Drive as a file-based command-and-control (C2) channel, leveraging trusted cloud traffic to reduce detection. Operators use a dedicated Google Drive account/folders for tasking and exfiltration; the malware creates a per-victim Google Drive folder named as a SHA-256 hash of the machine hostname. It exchanges commands and results via uploads/downloads where specific file extensions encode task types (e.g., .cab for command execution, .pdf for directory tasks, .rar for dropping payloads/self-update, .7z for in-memory .NET plugin execution). GearDoor deletes input files after processing and uploads a .bak result file to confirm completion. It also uploads a heartbeat file with a .png extension containing basic host metadata (hostname, username, IP address, OS version).

Communications/configuration are encrypted using DES; the DES key is derived from the first 8 characters of an MD5 hash of a hardcoded string. Reporting notes changes in GearDoor’s command set across versions, consistent with ongoing development/testing.

GearDoor is described as being deployed alongside other Silver Dragon post-exploitation tooling, including SilverScreen (covert screenshot capture) and SSHcmd (SSH-based remote command execution and file transfer), and in operations that also involve phishing and exploitation of public-facing servers, with Cobalt Strike used elsewhere in the intrusion chains.

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

3 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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APT41

Recent operations used the GearDoor backdoor with SSHcmd and SilverScreen, enabling remote access, covert screen capture, and stealthy control after phishing and server exploitation.

via checkpoint research blogresearch.checkpoint.com
Silver Dragon

Recent operations used the GearDoor backdoor with SSHcmd and SilverScreen, enabling remote access, covert screen capture, and stealthy control after phishing and server exploitation.

via checkpoint research blogresearch.checkpoint.com
APT17

"...Silver Dragon deployed GearDoor, a new backdoor which leverages Google Drive as its command-and-control (C2) channel..."

via ctoatncsc substackctoatncsc.substack.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

25 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence3

“Silver Dragon gains its initial access by exploiting public-facing internet servers…”

T1566PhishingEvidence1

"using phishing emails... to infiltrate government networks" and "gains initial access... sending phishing emails with malicious attachments."

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence3

“...and by delivering phishing emails that contain malicious attachments.”

Execution

6 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

"...run commands via 'cmd.exe' or scheduled tasks..."

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1
TacticExecution

"LNK files that triggered PowerShell commands, dropping additional malware components".

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1
TacticExecution

"...launch PowerShell code by means of 'cmd.exe'" ... "run commands via 'cmd.exe' or scheduled tasks"

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1
TacticExecution

"attackers sent LNK files that triggered PowerShell commands".

T1574.001DLLEvidence3

"malicious Windows shortcut files and DLL-based persistence techniques" and "load malicious DLLs".

T1574.011Services Registry Permissions WeaknessEvidence1

“To maintain persistence, the group hijacks legitimate Windows services…”

Persistence

1 technique
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

"...run commands via 'cmd.exe' or scheduled tasks..."

T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

"...run commands via 'cmd.exe' or scheduled tasks..."

T1134Access Token ManipulationEvidence1

GearDoor command list includes “steal_token <pid> Impersonates the security token…” and SilverScreen “relaunches itself… using token impersonation.”

Stealth

5 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1
TacticStealth

“strings are entirely obfuscated using a Brainfuck-based string decryption routine… control flow flattening and inserting junk code…”

T1134Access Token ManipulationEvidence1

GearDoor command list includes “steal_token <pid> Impersonates the security token…” and SilverScreen “relaunches itself… using token impersonation.”

T1574.001DLLEvidence3

"malicious Windows shortcut files and DLL-based persistence techniques" and "load malicious DLLs".

T1574.011Services Registry Permissions WeaknessEvidence1

“To maintain persistence, the group hijacks legitimate Windows services…”

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1
TacticStealth

"a .7z file runs an in-memory .NET plugin"

Discovery

5 techniques
T1018Remote System DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

GearDoor supported commands include “ipconfig”, “netstat”, “ps” and directory listing operations.

T1049System Network Connections DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

GearDoor command list includes “netstat”.

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

GearDoor command list includes “ps None Lists running processes on the system.”

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

"uploads a heartbeat file... containing the machine’s hostname, username, IP address, and OS version"

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

"a .pdf file handles directory tasks"

Collection

1 technique
T1560.001Archive via UtilityEvidence1

"...delivered via compressed archives..." ... "RAR archive containing a batch script" ... "*.rar ... *.7z"

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence2

"GearDoor, a backdoor that communicates with command-and-control infrastructure through Google Drive."

T1102Web ServiceEvidence3

“...GearDoor, a new backdoor which leverages Google Drive as its command-and-control (C2) channel…”

T1102.002Bidirectional CommunicationEvidence3

"...leveraged a dedicated Google Drive account as command-and-control infrastructure for its GearDoor backdoor..."

T1102.003One-Way CommunicationEvidence1

"...uses ... Google Drive-based command-and-control" ... "GearDoor, a .NET backdoor, uses Google Drive as a command-and-control channel"

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

"a .rar file drops new payloads or triggers a self-update" and "a .7z file runs an in-memory .NET plugin"

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence1

"All data exchanged through Google Drive is encrypted using the DES algorithm"

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1567.002Exfiltration to Cloud StorageEvidence1

“GearDoor… exfiltrating information via Google Drive… the download command exfiltrates files from the infected host to Google Drive.”

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Threat actor attribution3

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping25

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.