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MalwareUsed by 1 actor

ScanPortPlus

ScanPortPlus is a custom network scanning tool used by the intrusion cluster tracked by Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 as CL-UNK-1068 (assessed as a Chinese threat actor). Unit 42 describes ScanPortPlus as a Go-based scanner with both Windows and Linux versions, used by the attackers to scan compromised networks during post-compromise reconnaissance. Reported functionality includes IP address scanning, port scanning, and vulnerability scanning via command-line options. In observed intrusions, ScanPortPlus was among payloads executed in-memory as part of a DLL side-loading chain involving legitimate python.exe/pythonw.exe placed alongside a malicious loader (python20.dll) that deobfuscates shellcode and runs it within the Python process; the shellcode then decrypts/executes tools including ScanPortPlus (as well as other tooling like FRP and PrintSpoofer). No specific ScanPortPlus indicators of compromise (e.g., hashes, filenames, C2 endpoints) are provided in the supplied content.

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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CL-UNK-1068

Another tool in CL-UNK-1068's arsenal is a custom Go-based network scanning tool named ScanPortPlus, for which it has developed both Linux and Windows versions...

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

2 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

1 technique
T1574.001DLLEvidence1

“use of legitimate Python executables to launch DLL side-loading attacks… python.exe… alongside a malicious side-loaded DLL… python20.dll… loader reads… shellcode… executes… in memory.”

Stealth

1 technique
T1574.001DLLEvidence1

“use of legitimate Python executables to launch DLL side-loading attacks… python.exe… alongside a malicious side-loaded DLL… python20.dll… loader reads… shellcode… executes… in memory.”

Discovery

1 technique
T1046Network Service DiscoveryEvidence2

"Another tool in CL-UNK-1068's arsenal is a custom Go-based network scanning tool named ScanPortPlus..."

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

3 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

3 SOURCESView more in app
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IOC matching

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Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping2

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.