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Malware2 associated actors

CypherRAT

Tracked since Mar 10, 2026 · Updated 13 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days1 mention · peak 1 in a dayToday
Vulns0Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK14Techniques
IOCs6Tracked
Type
Banking trojan
Capabilities
Credential theftKeyloggingExfiltrationPersistenceDefense evasionSpoofing
Delivery
Lure
Platforms
Android

CypherRAT is an Android banking trojan and remote-access tool commercialized as a variant of SpyNote.C. It combines device surveillance and remote control with credential theft through impersonation of financial institutions and popular applications. Its development and sale are associated with the Syria-based malware developer EVLF, who also developed CraxsRAT. CypherRAT was sold through Telegram from August 2021 to October 2022. Publication of its source code in October 2022 enabled independent threat actors to create customized variants and contributed to increased SpyNote/CypherRAT activity.

CypherRAT supports remote access, location tracking, and monitoring of device status and activity. Its SpyNote.C functionality includes SMS and call monitoring, camera and microphone surveillance, and transmission of collected information to command-and-control infrastructure. It abuses Android Accessibility Services for keylogging, banking credential theft, extraction of Google Authenticator codes, automated application installation and updates, and interference with uninstallation. Fraudulent login interfaces also harvest Google and Facebook credentials. String obfuscation and commercial packing hinder analysis. Deceptive applications impersonate banks, including HSBC and Deutsche Bank, as well as services such as Google Play, WhatsApp, and Facebook. Its combination of surveillance and banking functionality threatens Android users and their financial accounts.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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EVLF

BTMob evolved from the SpySolr malware family and shares a common lineage with CraxsRAT and CypherRAT, mobile RATs associated with the Syria-based malware developer EVLF.

via flashpoint blogflashpoint.io
EVLF DEV

“This threat actor is responsible for the development of CypherRAT and CraxsRAT, which in the last 3 years was purchased by over 100 distinct threat actors on a lifetime license.”

via cyfirma blogcyfirma.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

14 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566PhishingEvidence1

While ThreatFabric has not shared how these malicious apps are being distributed, they are likely spread through phishing sites, third-party Android app sites, and social media.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1546Event Triggered ExecutionEvidence1

SpyNote uses Accessibility Services to make it difficult for users to uninstall the application, install new versions, and install other apps. Without any user input, SpyNote can click on the “install” and “update” buttons thanks to accessibility services

T1546.008Accessibility FeaturesEvidence2

Like much Android malware today, this malware abuses the Accessibility API. This API is used to automatically perform UI actions.

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1546Event Triggered ExecutionEvidence1

SpyNote uses Accessibility Services to make it difficult for users to uninstall the application, install new versions, and install other apps. Without any user input, SpyNote can click on the “install” and “update” buttons thanks to accessibility services

T1546.008Accessibility FeaturesEvidence2

Like much Android malware today, this malware abuses the Accessibility API. This API is used to automatically perform UI actions.

Stealth

2 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence2

The most recent versions of SpyNote are not only extremely powerful, but they also include a variety of security features, from simple string obfuscation to the use of commercial packers.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

SpyNote.C has been the first variant to openly target banking applications, impersonating a large number of reputable financial institutions like HSBC, Deutsche Bank, Kotak Bank, BurlaNubank, as well as others to well-known applications like WhatsApp, Facebook, and Google Play. In addition, we also observed that the attackers utilize more generic application masquerades, such as wallpaper apps, productivity apps, or gaming apps.

Credential Access

4 techniques
T1056Input CaptureEvidence1

Uses Accessibility (A11y) to extract codes from Google Authenticator.

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence3

Uses Keylogging powered by Accessibility services, to steal banking credentials.

T1528Steal Application Access TokenEvidence1

SpyNote also has the capacity to function as a social app credential stealer. This is done by deceiving users into entering their private login information during the login process by launching a webpage with a custom layout that looks a lot like famous services like Gmail and Facebook, much like a traditional overlay attack

T1649Steal or Forge Authentication CertificatesEvidence1

intercept SMS messages (for 2FA bypass)

Collection

5 techniques
T1056Input CaptureEvidence1

Uses Accessibility (A11y) to extract codes from Google Authenticator.

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence3

Uses Keylogging powered by Accessibility services, to steal banking credentials.

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

Similarly, by abusing MediaProjection to capture screen content.

T1123Audio CaptureEvidence2

record video and audio on the device

T1125Video CaptureEvidence3

This malicious malware can access a device’s camera and send videos right to its Command-and-Control(C&C) server

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

Ability to use the Camera API to record and send videos from the device’s camera to the Command and Control(C&C) center

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

Use the Camera API to record and send videos from the device to the C2 server

Indicators of compromise

Observables

6 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

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IOC matching6Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping14Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.