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Mallory
Malware

BeatBanker

Tracked since Mar 10, 2026 · Updated 8 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days3 mentions · peak 3 in a dayToday
Vulns0Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK22Techniques
IOCs13Tracked
Type
Dropper
Capabilities
Credential theftKeyloggingExfiltrationPersistenceDefense evasionCrypto theft
Delivery
PhishingLanding pageLureFake update
Platforms
Android

BeatBanker is a modular Android dropper targeting users in Brazil that delivers cryptocurrency-mining and financial-theft payloads. It spreads through phishing pages impersonating Google Play, with malicious applications masquerading as Starlink or Brazilian government services. A counterfeit Google Play update interface persuades victims to authorize installation of additional malicious components.

BeatBanker decrypts and loads hidden DEX code directly into memory, checks for emulated or analysis environments, and can delay malicious activity after installation. It maintains execution through a foreground service and notification while continuously looping an almost inaudible audio recording to discourage Android from terminating the service. Google Firebase Cloud Messaging provides its primary command-and-control channel. Its modified XMRig component mines Monero, adjusting activity according to battery level, temperature, charging state, and device usage to reduce visibility.

The banking payload abuses Android Accessibility Services to monitor activity and manipulate application interfaces. It targets Binance and Trust Wallet with overlays that conceal replacement of recipient addresses during USDT transfers. Additional capabilities include credential theft, browser-activity monitoring, keylogging, screen capture and streaming, microphone recording, SMS sending, and automated interaction with the device. Newer variants replace the banking payload with BTMOB RAT while retaining the miner and persistence mechanisms, adding broad remote-control and surveillance capabilities, including camera access and location tracking.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

22 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566PhishingEvidence3

"BeatBanker, which spreads primarily through phishing attacks via a website disguised as the Google Play Store."

Execution

1 technique
T1204User ExecutionEvidence3

"Installation of an APK file purporting to be the Starlink app" ... "warned against sideloading APKs from external stores."

Persistence

3 techniques
T1543Create or Modify System ProcessEvidence1

"keeps a notification... pinned to the foreground and activates a foreground service" | "plays an almost inaudible audio file on a loop so it cannot be terminated"

T1546.015Component Object Model HijackingEvidence1

"creates overlay pages for Binance and Trust Wallet" and "Requests Draw Over Other Apps permission (overlay)"

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

"After playing an almost inaudible five-second Chinese MP3 recording for persistence"

Privilege Escalation

4 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

"the fake update downloader injects modules directly into RAM to avoid creating files"

T1543Create or Modify System ProcessEvidence1

"keeps a notification... pinned to the foreground and activates a foreground service" | "plays an almost inaudible audio file on a loop so it cannot be terminated"

T1546.015Component Object Model HijackingEvidence1

"creates overlay pages for Binance and Trust Wallet" and "Requests Draw Over Other Apps permission (overlay)"

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

"After playing an almost inaudible five-second Chinese MP3 recording for persistence"

Stealth

6 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence3

"All components of the trojan are encrypted."

T1036MasqueradingEvidence5

BeatBanker targeting Brazil, posing as government apps and Google Play Store

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

"the fake update downloader injects modules directly into RAM to avoid creating files"

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence5

"Besides incorporating runtime checks for emulated or analysis environments"; "advanced evasion techniques, such as native library encryption, rolling XOR string obfuscation"

T1497.003Time Based ChecksEvidence1

"To avoid triggering any alarms, BeatBanker delays malicious operations for a period after its installation."

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1

"bypass mobile antivirus products by utilizing dalvik.system.InMemoryDexClassLoader. It loads malicious DEX code directly into memory"

Credential Access

3 techniques
T1056Input CaptureEvidence3

capable of both crypto mining and stealing banking data

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

"KBO<*>... Enables... the keylogger" and "capture screen lock credentials, including PINs, patterns, and passwords"

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

"...features both banking trojan... capabilities" and "BeatBanker proceeds to launch a banking trojan"

Discovery

3 techniques
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

"...sends... information about the device’s battery level and temperature, charging status, usage activity, and whether it has overheated."

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence5

"Besides incorporating runtime checks for emulated or analysis environments"; "advanced evasion techniques, such as native library encryption, rolling XOR string obfuscation"

T1497.003Time Based ChecksEvidence1

"To avoid triggering any alarms, BeatBanker delays malicious operations for a period after its installation."

Collection

4 techniques
T1056Input CaptureEvidence3

capable of both crypto mining and stealing banking data

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

"KBO<*>... Enables... the keylogger" and "capture screen lock credentials, including PINs, patterns, and passwords"

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence2

"Streaming the screen in real-time"

T1123Audio CaptureEvidence2

"Recording audio from the microphone"

Command and Control

3 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

"Using Firebase Cloud Messaging (FCM), the malware continuously sends the command-and-control (C2) server information about the device’s battery level and temperature..."

T1102Web ServiceEvidence2

"authors leverage Google’s legitimate Firebase Cloud Messaging (FCM)... attackers can monitor the device’s status and change its settings"

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

"...display of a counterfeit Play Store update screen that permits further payload delivery"

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1020Automated ExfiltrationEvidence1

"...credential exfiltration..."

Impact

1 technique
T1496Resource HijackingEvidence6

capable of both crypto mining and stealing banking data

Indicators of compromise

Observables

13 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching13Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping22Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.