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Malware1 associated actor

Getpass

Tracked since Mar 12, 2026 · Updated 7 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK5Techniques
IOCs1Tracked

Getpass is a custom credential-harvesting malware tool and modified Mimikatz variant used in the CL-STA-1087 cyber espionage campaign targeting military organizations in Southeast Asia since at least 2020. Reporting assesses the broader operation with moderate confidence as China-aligned or China-nexus, though no specific threat group is publicly named. Getpass was used alongside the AppleChris and MemFun backdoors to support long-term intelligence collection operations focused on military capabilities, organizational structures, C4I systems, and cooperation with Western armed forces.

Based on the reporting, Getpass is a custom Mimikatz DLL or variant that accesses lsass.exe memory to extract plaintext passwords, NTLM hashes, authentication tokens, and other authentication data. It targets multiple Windows authentication packages; one report states it harvested credentials from 10 packages, and another specifically mentions packages including MSV, WDigest, Kerberos, and CloudAP. The malware is also described as escalating privileges before attempting credential extraction. Stolen credential material was written to a file named WinSAT.db to resemble a legitimate Windows system database. One account states the tool masqueraded as a Palo Alto tool, and another notes it operated under the Cyvera directory.

High-confidence associations in the source material tie Getpass to the CL-STA-1087 intrusion set documented by Palo Alto Networks Unit 42. The campaign used persistence, dormant periods, lateral movement via WMI and native Windows .NET commands, and deployment across domain controllers, web servers, IT workstations, and executive systems. While those behaviors describe the broader campaign rather than Getpass specifically, Getpass’s role within it was credential theft to facilitate access and intelligence collection.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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CL-STA-1087

Attackers also used Getpass, a custom Mimikatz DLL, masquerading as a Palo Alto tool, which automatically harvests credentials from 10 Windows authentication packages by accessing lsass.exe memory.

via security affairssecurityaffairs.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

5 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

1 technique
T1047Windows Management InstrumentationEvidence1

They used Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) and native Windows .NET commands to spread malware to domain controllers, web servers, IT workstations, and executive systems

Stealth

1 technique
T1036MasqueradingEvidence3

Unlike standard Mimikatz, this variant executes automatically and stores harvested data in a file named WinSAT.db, which is designed to resemble a legitimate Windows system database.

Credential Access

3 techniques
T1003OS Credential DumpingEvidence2

Also put to use in the attacks is a custom version of Mimikatz known as Getpass that escalates privileges and attempts to extract plaintext passwords, NTLM hashes and authentication data directly from the "lsass.exe" process memory.

T1003.001LSASS MemoryEvidence5

Credential theft was handled by Getpass, which silently pulled plaintext passwords, NTLM hashes, and authentication tokens from the lsass.exe process.

T1649Steal or Forge Authentication CertificatesEvidence1

Credential theft was handled by Getpass, which silently pulled plaintext passwords, NTLM hashes, and authentication tokens from the lsass.exe process.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

1 indicator attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

6 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

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IOC matching1Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping5Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.