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Malware1 associated actor

MemFun

Tracked since Mar 12, 2026 · Updated 7 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK23Techniques
IOCs10Tracked

MemFun is a custom backdoor used in the long-running cyber espionage campaign tracked as CL-STA-1087, which has targeted military organizations in Southeast Asia since at least 2020. Reporting assesses the broader campaign with moderate confidence as China-aligned or China-nexus, although no specific threat group is publicly named. MemFun was deployed alongside the AppleChris backdoor and the Getpass credential harvester in operations focused on selective intelligence collection against military environments, including C4I-related systems, domain controllers, web servers, IT workstations, and executive assets.

MemFun is described as a modular, multi-stage payload that executes entirely in memory. Its infection chain includes an initial loader disguised as GoogleUpdate.exe, an in-memory downloader, and a final DLL payload retrieved from the command-and-control server at runtime. The malware uses multiple evasion and anti-forensic techniques, including timestomping, process hollowing into dllhost.exe, reflective DLL loading, memory zeroing, anti-debugging, token impersonation, and in-memory execution to reduce disk artifacts and hinder analysis. It also used a dead drop resolver via Pastebin to dynamically resolve command-and-control infrastructure, and reporting states that AppleChris and MemFun used custom HTTP verbs for C2 communications.

Additional technical details reported for MemFun include session-specific Blowfish encryption for payload retrieval, with one description noting a downloader request pattern using the /DL1 resource, headers such as "Get: 0" and "User-Agent: MyIE," and a 24-byte Blowfish key sent in the Cookie header to decrypt the final payload. High-confidence indicators directly mentioned in the content include the loader name GoogleUpdate.exe, process hollowing into dllhost.exe, and use of Pastebin-based dead drop resolution as part of the CL-STA-1087 toolset.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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CL-STA-1087

They deployed two backdoors, AppleChris and MemFun, both using custom HTTP verbs and a dead drop resolver (DDR) via Pastebin to dynamically reach C2 servers.

via security affairssecurityaffairs.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

23 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

4 techniques
T1047Windows Management InstrumentationEvidence2

They used Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) and native Windows .NET commands to spread malware to domain controllers, web servers, IT workstations, and executive systems

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

The cybersecurity vendor said it detected the intrusion set after identifying suspicious PowerShell execution, allowing the script to enter into a sleep state for six hours and then create reverse shells to a threat actor-controlled command-and-control (C2) server.

T1106Native APIEvidence1

The campaign leveraged Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) and native Windows .NET commands to deploy malware across critical infrastructure, including domain controllers, web servers, IT workstations, and executive systems.

T1574.001DLLEvidence2

performed DLL hijacking by placing malicious DLL files inside the system32 directory, registering them through legitimate Windows services to blend in.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence2

Attackers created new Windows services

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

The cyber spies maintained persistence on an unmanaged endpoint, using scripts to create reverse shells to multiple C2 servers.

Privilege Escalation

5 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

MemFun is launched by means of a multi-stage chain: an initial loader injects shellcode responsible for launching an in-memory downloader... Subsequently, it injects the main payload into the memory of a suspended process associated with "dllhost.exe" using a technique referred to as process hollowing.

T1055.012Process HollowingEvidence5

MemFun used timestomping, process hollowing into dllhost.exe, and reflective DLL loading to stay hidden

T1134.001Token Impersonation/TheftEvidence1

The downloader performs token impersonation to steal and impersonate logged-on user credentials, allowing it to inherit user proxy settings and bypass network restrictions

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence2

Attackers created new Windows services

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

The cyber spies maintained persistence on an unmanaged endpoint, using scripts to create reverse shells to multiple C2 servers.

Stealth

10 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

MemFun is launched by means of a multi-stage chain: an initial loader injects shellcode responsible for launching an in-memory downloader... Subsequently, it injects the main payload into the memory of a suspended process associated with "dllhost.exe" using a technique referred to as process hollowing.

T1055.012Process HollowingEvidence5

MemFun used timestomping, process hollowing into dllhost.exe, and reflective DLL loading to stay hidden

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence1

It runs entirely in memory, using process hollowing, reflective DLL loading, and anti-forensic techniques like timestomping and memory zeroing.

T1070.006TimestompEvidence5

MemFun used timestomping, process hollowing into dllhost.exe, and reflective DLL loading to stay hidden

T1134.001Token Impersonation/TheftEvidence1

The downloader performs token impersonation to steal and impersonate logged-on user credentials, allowing it to inherit user proxy settings and bypass network restrictions

T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence1

It launches dllhost.exe in a suspended state and decrypts an embedded shellcode payload using the XOR key 0x25.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

To bypass automated security systems, some of the malware variants employ sandbox evasion tactics at runtime. These variants trigger delayed execution through sleep timers of 30 seconds (EXE) and 120 seconds (DLL), effectively outlasting the typical monitoring windows of automated sandboxes.

T1574.001DLLEvidence2

performed DLL hijacking by placing malicious DLL files inside the system32 directory, registering them through legitimate Windows services to blend in.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence4

MemFun used timestomping, process hollowing into dllhost.exe, and reflective DLL loading to stay hidden

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

The MemFun in-memory downloader initializes with multiple evasion techniques, including the creation of a mutex named GOOGLE and anti-debug measures to evade analysis.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

the shellcode implements another anti-forensics measure: zeroing the first 4 KB of allocated memory, to erase DOS and PE headers. This makes the loaded module invisible to memory analysis tools that rely on header signatures.

Discovery

2 techniques
T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

To bypass automated security systems, some of the malware variants employ sandbox evasion tactics at runtime. These variants trigger delayed execution through sleep timers of 30 seconds (EXE) and 120 seconds (DLL), effectively outlasting the typical monitoring windows of automated sandboxes.

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

The MemFun in-memory downloader initializes with multiple evasion techniques, including the creation of a mutex named GOOGLE and anti-debug measures to evade analysis.

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1021.003Distributed Component Object ModelEvidence1

They used a combination of Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) and native Windows .NET commands to deploy malware to additional endpoints.

Collection

2 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

We observed highly selective searches for sensitive files related to: Official meeting records Joint military activities Detailed assessments of operational capabilities.

T1213Data from Information RepositoriesEvidence1

After gaining persistence, attackers collected highly sensitive files on military operations, organizational structure, and C4I systems.

Command and Control

4 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

running delayed execution scripts that connected back to multiple command-and-control (C2) servers.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

They deployed two backdoors, AppleChris and MemFun, both using custom HTTP verbs and a dead drop resolver (DDR) via Pastebin to dynamically reach C2 servers.

T1102.001Dead Drop ResolverEvidence3

They deployed two backdoors, AppleChris and MemFun, both using custom HTTP verbs and a dead drop resolver (DDR) via Pastebin to dynamically reach C2 servers.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence4

which launched an in-memory downloader that fetched a final DLL payload from the C2 server.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

10 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

6 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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cyber security newsNews · Mar 25, 2026China-Linked Hackers Breach Southeast Asian Military Systems in Long-Running Spy CampaignA custom in-memory backdoor designed for stealth. It is delivered via a file disguised as GoogleUpdate.exe, then uses an in-memory downloader to fetch a DLL payload from C2. It employs timestomping, process hollowing into dllhost.exe, reflective DLL loading, and session-specific Blowfish keys for encrypted payload exchange.Read more ↗polyswarmNews · Mar 23, 2026China-Linked Espionage Campaign Targets Southeast Asian Military NetworksCustom modular multi-stage backdoor executed entirely in memory. It uses a loader, in-memory downloader, and final DLL payload, and employs timestomping, process hollowing into dllhost.exe, reflective DLL loading, and session-specific Blowfish encryption for payload delivery.Read more ↗security affairsNews · Mar 17, 2026CL-STA-1087 targets military capabilities since 2020A modular, multi-stage backdoor consisting of a GoogleUpdate.exe loader, an in-memory downloader, and a final DLL payload from the C2 server. It runs entirely in memory and uses process hollowing, reflective DLL loading, timestomping, memory zeroing, and Blowfish-encrypted C2 communications for stealthy operations.Read more ↗dark readingNews · Mar 17, 2026China-Nexus Hackers Skulk in Southeast Asian Military Orgs for YearsA novel backdoor used in the CL-STA-1087 cyberespionage campaign against Southeast Asian military organizations. It uses dead-drop resolvers via legitimate services such as Pastebin and Dropbox, includes protected C2 retrieval through encryption, and uses evasion methods including delayed execution and timestomping.Read more ↗
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IOC matching10Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping23Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.