BigSquatRAT
Associated threat actors
2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
Summary BigSquatRat is a fully-featured, multi-os, persistent JavaScript RAT C2 domain: aurevian.cloud Attacker controlled npm packages: axios-net , bigmathix , bigmathex , bignumx , bigmathutils
in January 2026, I observed a novel RAT that I called BigSquatRAT ... ReversingLabs attributed this activity to FAMOUS CHOLLIMA’s Contagious Interview campaign ... They dubbed this aspect of Contagious Interview graphalgo.
Techniques & procedures
14 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
1 technique
Initial Access
identified a malicious npm package bigmathix published by user jacksonroman338... This npm package is a downloader that retrieves a capable JavaScript RAT.
Execution
1 technique
Execution
It’s a cross-platform Node.js remote access trojan (RAT)... Polls for any commands to run (which are run as a child process)
Persistence
3 techniques
Persistence
On Linux, you’ll observe a node -> systemctl process tree, as it uses a systemctl service for persistence
On Mac, it overwrites .zshrc , .bash_profile , .zprofile , or .bashrc and also attempts to shim itself into ~/.nvm/nvm.sh
contains logic for cross-platform persistence, which includes setting an ASEP run key on Windows using reg add
Privilege Escalation
3 techniques
Privilege Escalation
On Linux, you’ll observe a node -> systemctl process tree, as it uses a systemctl service for persistence
On Mac, it overwrites .zshrc , .bash_profile , .zprofile , or .bashrc and also attempts to shim itself into ~/.nvm/nvm.sh
contains logic for cross-platform persistence, which includes setting an ASEP run key on Windows using reg add
Stealth
4 techniques
Stealth
Obfuscated multi-stage infection chain Utilisation of multiple logic gates and dynamic variables to prevent immediate deobfuscation/decryption
Impersonating big.js The malware derives code content and its alleged purpose from legitimate package big.js
Can self-delete and remove artefacts from filesystem and registry
the persistence run key uses a wscript.exe launcher, so the process tree will look like wscript.exe -> node.exe
Discovery
1 technique
Discovery
Has explicit logic to check for the Chrome extension nkbihfbeogaeaoehlefnkodbefgpgknn (MetaMask)
Command and Control
3 techniques
Command and Control
configured with a hardcoded C2 - the same one used throughout the infection chain for retrieving payloads - aurevian.cloud
use DNS to get the IP address i of the hostname z
The final payload of this infection chain is downloaded from https://aurevian.cloud/public/index.js?ver=1.5&type=module
Exfiltration
1 technique
Exfiltration
Polls for any commands to run (which are run as a child process), and can send files back to C2
Observables
15 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
3 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.