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Malware2 associated actors

BigSquatRAT

Tracked since Mar 18, 2026 · Updated 8 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK14Techniques
IOCs15Tracked
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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Contagious Interview

Summary BigSquatRat is a fully-featured, multi-os, persistent JavaScript RAT C2 domain: aurevian.cloud Attacker controlled npm packages: axios-net , bigmathix , bigmathex , bignumx , bigmathutils

via kmseckmsec.uk
Lazarus

in January 2026, I observed a novel RAT that I called BigSquatRAT ... ReversingLabs attributed this activity to FAMOUS CHOLLIMA’s Contagious Interview campaign ... They dubbed this aspect of Contagious Interview graphalgo.

via kmseckmsec.uk
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

14 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1195Supply Chain CompromiseEvidence1

identified a malicious npm package bigmathix published by user jacksonroman338... This npm package is a downloader that retrieves a capable JavaScript RAT.

Execution

1 technique
T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence1

It’s a cross-platform Node.js remote access trojan (RAT)... Polls for any commands to run (which are run as a child process)

Persistence

3 techniques
T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

On Linux, you’ll observe a node -> systemctl process tree, as it uses a systemctl service for persistence

T1546.004Unix Shell Configuration ModificationEvidence1

On Mac, it overwrites .zshrc , .bash_profile , .zprofile , or .bashrc and also attempts to shim itself into ~/.nvm/nvm.sh

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

contains logic for cross-platform persistence, which includes setting an ASEP run key on Windows using reg add

Privilege Escalation

3 techniques
T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

On Linux, you’ll observe a node -> systemctl process tree, as it uses a systemctl service for persistence

T1546.004Unix Shell Configuration ModificationEvidence1

On Mac, it overwrites .zshrc , .bash_profile , .zprofile , or .bashrc and also attempts to shim itself into ~/.nvm/nvm.sh

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

contains logic for cross-platform persistence, which includes setting an ASEP run key on Windows using reg add

Stealth

4 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

Obfuscated multi-stage infection chain Utilisation of multiple logic gates and dynamic variables to prevent immediate deobfuscation/decryption

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

Impersonating big.js The malware derives code content and its alleged purpose from legitimate package big.js

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1

Can self-delete and remove artefacts from filesystem and registry

T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence1

the persistence run key uses a wscript.exe launcher, so the process tree will look like wscript.exe -> node.exe

Discovery

1 technique
T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

Has explicit logic to check for the Chrome extension nkbihfbeogaeaoehlefnkodbefgpgknn (MetaMask)

Command and Control

3 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

configured with a hardcoded C2 - the same one used throughout the infection chain for retrieving payloads - aurevian.cloud

T1071.004DNSEvidence1

use DNS to get the IP address i of the hostname z

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

The final payload of this infection chain is downloaded from https://aurevian.cloud/public/index.js?ver=1.5&type=module

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

Polls for any commands to run (which are run as a child process), and can send files back to C2

Indicators of compromise

Observables

15 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching15Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping14Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.