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MalwareUsed by 1 actor

SoftEther VPN Bridge

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For your environment

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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UNC2814

Subsequently, SoftEther VPN Bridge was deployed to establish an outbound encrypted connection to an external IP address.

via mandiant threat intelligencecloud.google.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

5 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Persistence

1 technique
T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

"To ensure further persistence, the hackers installed SoftEther VPN Bridge and registered it as an automatic Windows service."

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

"To ensure further persistence, the hackers installed SoftEther VPN Bridge and registered it as an automatic Windows service."

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1021Remote ServicesEvidence1

"The VPN established an outbound tunnel to the attacker infrastructure, enabling covert lateral movement..."

Command and Control

3 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

"using legitimate-looking traffic over port 443."

T1090.002External ProxyEvidence2

Subsequently, SoftEther VPN Bridge was deployed to establish an outbound encrypted connection to an external IP address.

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence1

SoftEther VPN Bridge was deployed to establish an outbound encrypted connection to an external IP address.

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

1 sources tracked across advisories and community write-ups. News coverage will land here when it surfaces.

No news coverage yet. Advisories and community discussion only.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching

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Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping5

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.