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Malware2 associated actors

FastFire

Tracked since Mar 18, 2026 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK6Techniques
IOCs12Tracked
Type
Trojan
Capabilities
Defense evasionSpoofing
Platforms
Android

FastFire is an Android malware family associated with the North Korean espionage group Kimsuky. It has been observed masquerading as a Google security plug-in and reflects Kimsuky’s expansion of mobile targeting against Android users, particularly in South Korea. At the time it was documented, FastFire appeared to still be under development, but its implemented functionality already showed a shift in Kimsuky tradecraft from earlier mobile malware that relied on conventional HTTP/S communications toward command delivery through Firebase Cloud Messaging.

After installation, FastFire hides its launcher icon to reduce user awareness and requests permissions consistent with intrusive device interaction, including overlay-related access. It generates a Firebase messaging token and reports that token to attacker-controlled infrastructure so the operators can push commands to the infected device. Embedded functionality included retrieval of phishing-themed HTML content and use of Android deep-linking to direct victims into specific application pages, indicating support for credential-harvesting or social-engineering workflows. The malware is therefore best understood as an Android trojanized espionage implant under active development rather than a mature commodity family.

FastFire is linked to Kimsuky, also tracked under aliases including Thallium and Black Banshee, a long-running North Korean threat actor known for spearphishing, account compromise, and intelligence collection against media, research, political, diplomatic, and other strategic targets. Reporting tied FastFire to the same broader Android malware cluster as FastViewer and FastSpy, which were used against South Korean victims, underscoring Kimsuky’s growing sophistication in mobile operations.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Kimsuky

We named the three malicious APKs FastFire, FastViewer, and FastSpy... FastFire is a malicious APK currently being developed by the Kimsuky group, disguised as a Google security plug-in. It receives commands from Firebase...

via medium s2wblogmedium.com
Nickel Kimball

Tools BabyShark, KONNI, FastFire, FireViewer, FastSpy, ReconShark, KimJongRAT, Kimsuky

via secureworks threat profilessecureworks.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

6 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

2 techniques
T1583.001DomainsEvidence1

"...using typosquatting or domains thematically aligned with their target."

T1583.007ServerlessEvidence1

It receives commands from Firebase, an app development platform backed by Google, rather than receiving commands from the C&C through HTTP/S communication as in the traditional method.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence2

The group mainly attempts to collect by distributing malware and taking over accounts through spear-phishing attacks. | Kimsuky group conducts phishing attacks disguised as the site to hijack the accounts of large Korean portal sites such as Naver and Daum, FastFire malware also targets the two portal sites.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

"...often involves malicious Hangul Word Processing (HWP) documents as a delivery mechanism... evolved its capabilities to include... Microsoft Word and PDF documents."

Stealth

2 techniques
T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

The FastFire malware is disguised as a Google security plugin, and the FastViewer malware disguises itself as “Hancom Office Viewer”

T1564Hide ArtifactsEvidence1

After installation, it hides its launcher icon so that the victim does not know that it is installed.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

12 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching12Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping6Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.